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INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court excised two provisions 
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA)1 that had made the Sen-
tencing Guidelines binding on sentencing judges:  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), 
the provision that had confined departures to specified, limited cir-
cumstances, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), the standard of review under 
which courts of appeals had enforced those limitations.2  The Court 
made the law of sentencing the purposes and factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the standard of review for all sentences, inside 
or outside the guideline range, the “reasonableness” of the sentencing 
judge’s application of that law.3   
The mandatory guidelines system Booker replaced was badly out of 
balance in ways never contemplated by the framers of the SRA or the 
Supreme Court when it upheld the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
against separation-of-powers challenges.4  Yet Booker was initially met 
 
1 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987.   
2 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). Booker made clear that sentencing judges would still 
consider the guideline range as one of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the 
Court instructed judges in a subsequent decision to begin the sentencing determina-
tion by calculating the guideline range.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007).   
3 Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 264. 
4 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (rejecting several constitutional 
challenges to the Commission, its composition, and its delegated authority).   
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with resistance by the Commission and the Department of Justice,5 and 
many lower courts continued to treat the guidelines as “virtually man-
datory.”6  In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court firmly insisted 
that the guidelines are—and must be—advisory only.7  The result has 
been a gradual but marked improvement in the quality, transparency, 
and rationality of federal sentencing, in both the sentencing of indi-
vidual defendants and the Commission’s rulemaking.  The advisory 
guidelines system has broad support:  the vast majority of federal judges 
believe that advisory guidelines achieve the purposes of sentencing 
better than any kind of mandatory guidelines system or no guidelines 
at all,8 the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States supports the advisory guidelines system,9 prosecutors 
 
5 The Commission promptly instituted a “standard training program” that explained 
“how the sentencing guidelines reflect Congress’ objectives in the SRA and that the 
guidelines accordingly should be given substantial weight in fashioning sentences . . . 
post-Booker.”  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES 
V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 42 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT].  The 
Department of Justice initially directed prosecutors to “actively seek sentences within 
the [guideline] range . . . in all but extraordinary cases . . . involving circumstances that 
were not contemplated by the Sentencing Commission.”  Memorandum from James  
B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors 2 ( Jan. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/memo-01282005.pdf. 
6 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 366 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring).   
7 See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (stating that a district court commits “significant pro-
cedural error” by “treating the Guidelines as mandatory”).  For a further discussion of 
the Court’s post-Booker decisions, see infra Part II.   
8 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.19 (2010) (reporting that when asked 
which system “best achieves the purposes of sentencing,” 75% of district court judges 
selected the current advisory guidelines system, 8% selected no guidelines, 3% selected 
the mandatory guidelines in effect before Booker, and 14% selected mandatory guidelines 
with broader ranges and jury factfinding, if coupled with fewer mandatory minimums).   
9 See Theodore McKee, Chief U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/201202
15-16/Testimony_16_McKee.pdf; Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of N.H., 
Statement Before the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/201202
15-16/Testimony_16_Barbadoro.pdf; see also Letter from Hon. Myron H. Bright, U.S. 
Circuit Judge, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n ( Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20120215-16/Testimony_16_Bright.pdf. 
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prefer advisory guidelines to other available options,10 and the organized 
public and private defense bars support the advisory guidelines system.11 
Nevertheless, a former Chair of the Sentencing Commission and 
the current Commission itself have each proposed that Congress enact 
a Booker “fix.”  Former Commission Chair Judge William K. Sessions III 
proposes “the resurrection of presumptive (formerly called ‘mandato-
ry’) guidelines,” with enhancing facts to be charged in an indictment 
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the 
defendant.12  The Commission proposes codification of a variety of 
 
10 See Lanny A. Breuer, The Attorney General’s Sentencing and Corrections Working 
Group:  A Progress Report, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 110, 112 (2010) (noting that prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges “were not enthusiastic” about a return to a mandatory 
guidelines structure, and that the Department of Justice “does not plan to seek legisla-
tive reinstatement of a mandatory Guidelines system”); Matthew Axelrod, Assoc. Deputy 
Att’y Gen., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 88-89 (Feb. 16, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_ 
Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Hearing_Transcript_20120216.pdf) (noting that 
“any change is going to result in lots of litigation and be disruptive” and that “uncer-
tainty is not good for prosecutors or . . . the justice system”).  
11 See, e.g., Uncertain Justice:  The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission Six Years After Booker:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of James E. 
Felman, Member, Am. Bar Ass’n) [hereinafter Felman Testimony], available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Felman%2010112011.pdf; Letter from Thomas W. 
Hillier, II, Fed. Pub. Defender, to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chair, Subcom-
mittee on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, and the Hon. Robert C. (Bobby) Scott, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 2011), 
available at http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/ 
files/Hillier111011.pdf. 
Several representatives of the defense bar testified at the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion Hearing on “Federal Sentencing Options After Booker,” including  Federal Public 
Defenders Raymond Moore, Henry J. Bemporad, and Michael Nachmanoff; James E. 
Felman, Co-Chair of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section Committee 
on Sentencing; David Debold, Chair of the Practitioners Advisory Group; and Lisa Wayne, 
President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  The written and 
oral testimony of all witnesses is available on the Sentencing Commission's website.   
See Public Hearing Meeting—February 16, 2012, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http:// 
www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215- 
16/Agenda_16.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).    
12 William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches:  The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Strug-
gles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 346, 350 (2011).  For an in-depth analysis of Judge Sessions’s 
proposal, see infra Section IV.A. 
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devices designed to give its guidelines, as well as its restrictions on non-
guideline sentences, increased weight at sentencing, and to more 
strictly enforce the guidelines on appeal.13  These proposals—seeking 
to fix a system that, far from being broken, is actually working properly 
for the first time—are unwise, unworkable, and likely unconstitutional. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I explores the history and 
failings of the former mandatory guidelines system.  Some of the history 
we set forth has not previously been examined, yet is critical to under-
standing how the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Sen-
tencing Commission’s policy statements and commentary, as well as its 
guidelines, were binding on judges—a conclusion that was essential to 
the Court’s recognition in Booker that the guidelines regime was “man-
datory.”14  Part II describes the improvements made by the advisory 
guidelines system, drawing primarily upon new data and recent cases.  
Part III examines the flawed justifications that have been offered for a 
Booker “fix.”  Most importantly, we carefully examine and refute the 
claim that judges have exercised their increased discretion after Booker 
in a racially biased manner.  Drawing on a variety of evidence including 
empirical analyses by others, we conclude that (1) increased judicial 
discretion after Booker has mitigated racial disparity built into the 
guidelines; (2) racial disparity after Booker is driven primarily by the 
increased impact of mandatory minimums that constrain judicial dis-
cretion and apply most frequently to black offenders; and (3) if it were 
possible to devise a study controlling for all legally relevant factors, a 
finding of racial disparity in judicial decisionmaking would be unlikely.  
Part IV sets forth practical, policy, and constitutional reasons for  
rejecting both Judge Sessions’s and the Commission’s proposals.  We 
conclude that these proposals would likely violate Booker and its prog-
eny, and that Judge Sessions’s proposal would violate fundamental 
principles of separation of powers.  
 
13 Uncertain Justice:  The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Six Years After Booker:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 55-60(2011) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris, 
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n) [hereinafter Commission Testimony], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_ 
Reports/Testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf.  For an in-depth discussion of the 
Commission’s proposal, see infra Section IV.B. 
14 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-35 (2005).  
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I.  THE FAILURE OF THE MANDATORY GUIDELINES SYSTEM 
A.  The Vision of the Sentencing Reform Act’s Framers:   
An Expert Judicial Branch Agency Insulated  
from Political Influence 
Congress could have enacted a set of statutory sentencing guide-
lines.  But the framers of the SRA15 recognized that Congress lacked 
the expertise and political neutrality required for this task, and chose 
instead to delegate the job to a sentencing commission.16  As envisioned 
by Congress, the Commission was to be a politically neutral expert 
body that would promulgate guidelines based on empirical research 
and judicial experience.17  The Commission would be guided by the 
“intelligible principles” set forth in the SRA,18 which required it to de-
velop guidelines on the basis of sentencing data, empirical research, 
and consultation with frontline participants.19  The Commission would 
 
15 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987. 
16 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform:  Congress and the United 
States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 297 (1993) (describing the 
considerations that “commanded” the decision to delegate promulgation of guidelines 
to a sentencing commission).  Kenneth Feinberg served as Special Counsel to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee from 1975 through 1980. 
17 Expertise and political neutrality were to be the core features of a sentencing 
commission since sentencing reform was conceived.  See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 53-60, 118-23 (1973); Edward M. Kennedy, 
Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing:  Law with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 380 
(1979).  
18 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (holding that Congress 
did not grant the Commission excessive legislative discretion in violation of the non-
delegation doctrine because Congress directed the Commission to comply with suffi-
ciently detailed “intelligible principle[s]” in promulgating the guidelines).  
19 See SRA, sec. 217(a), § 991(b)(1), 98 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991(b)(1) (2006)) (directing the Commission to “establish sentencing policies and 
practices” that “assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 
3553(a)(2)” and that “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of 
human behavior”); id. § 991(b)(2), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2)) 
(directing the Commission to “develop means of measuring the degree to which the 
sentencing . . . practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth 
in section 3553(a)(2)”); id. § 994(n), 98. Stat. at 2022 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)) 
(directing the Commission to “periodically . . . review and revise” the guidelines “in 
consideration of comments and data coming to its attention,” and to “consult with au-
thorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the 
Federal criminal justice system”); id. § 995(a)(12)–(16), 98 Stat. at 2024-25 (codified at 
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be engaged in an “essentially neutral endeavor”20 and would not be 
coerced or co-opted by the political branches.21  Because the SRA’s 
framers intended for the new Commission to be insulated from politi-
cal influence, the judicial branch was the natural place to put it.22 
There were other compelling reasons for locating the Commission 
within the judicial—and not the executive—branch.  One was Con-
gress’s “strong feeling” that sentencing was “within the province of the 
judiciary” and “should remain primarily a judicial function.”23  Another 
was that the executive branch had no constitutional or historical au-
thority to make sentencing policy or to impose sentences.24  Another 
was Congress’s related concern that placing sentencing authority with-
in the executive branch would violate constitutional separation of 
powers principles (a concern that, as noted below, the Supreme Court 
shared).25  Congress had no expectation that the Department of Justice 
would dominate the Commission.  The SRA gave the Department only 
an ex officio, nonvoting seat,26 and placed the Department on the 
same footing as other institutional actors in the rulemaking process.27  
 
28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)–(16)) (empowering the Commission to establish a research and 
development program and to collect, study, and disseminate sentencing data and other 
empirical research).   
20 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407. 
21 See id. at 408 (“[W]here the subject lies so close to the heart of the judicial func-
tion and where purposes of the Commission are not inherently partisan, such enlist-
ment [of judges in the creation of sentencing rules] is not coercion or co-optation, but 
merely assurance of judicial participation.”); id. at 411 (“[P]recisely to ensure that they 
would not be subject to coercion [by the President] . . . Congress insulated the mem-
bers from Presidential removal except for good cause.”). 
22 SRA § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)). 
23 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 54, 159 (1983). 
24 See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916).    
25 “Traditionally, the courts and Congress have shared responsibility for establish-
ing Federal sentencing policy.  Congress defines criminal conduct and sets maximum 
sentences, while the courts impose sentences in individual cases.  Any suggestion that 
the Executive Branch should be responsible for promulgating the guidelines would 
present troubling constitutional problems.”  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 95 (1984) 
(footnote omitted).  See also infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.  
26 SRA § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)). 
27 The Commission was to “review and revise” the guidelines based on, inter alia, 
consultation with and regular reports from the Judicial Conference, the Department of 
Justice, the Federal Public Defenders, the United States Probation System, and the 
Bureau of Prisons.  Id. § 994(n), 98 Stat. at 2022-23 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)). 
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Moreover, aware that ex ante sentencing rules might have the effect of 
transferring sentencing power to prosecutors,28 Congress directed the 
Commission to issue policy guidance to judges to avoid that result.29 
The expectation was that the judicial branch would have the great-
est ongoing influence over the development of the guidelines, not only 
because at least three voting Commissioners had to be judges,30 but 
also because judges were to be the primary source of information  
regarding whether and how the guidelines needed to be revised.  To 
determine whether the guidelines were effective in meeting the pur-
poses of sentencing—and to revise them if they were not31—the Com-
mission was to systematically collect and study data regarding 
sentences imposed, the relationship between the factors set forth in 
§ 3553(a) and sentences imposed, and the effectiveness of sentences 
imposed in meeting the purposes of sentencing.32  District courts were 
required to state their reasons for departure,33 and appellate courts 
were to uphold “reasonable” departures having regard for the sentenc-
 
28 According to a 1979 study by the Federal Judicial Center, reducing judicial dis-
cretion was likely to increase prosecutorial control over sentencing and consequently 
unwarranted disparity.  See 1 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROSECUTO-
RIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM 3, 8-13 (1979).   
29 In response to the 1979 study, Congress directed the Commission to promulgate 
policy statements for judges to use in deciding whether to accept plea agreements.  
SRA § 994(a)(2)(D), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E)); see also 
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines:  The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 241 (1989).  Moreover, the 
guideline range would be determined by the judge, based on aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors identified by the parties and by the probation officer in the presentence 
report, and the judge would have the power to depart from the guideline range.  See 
SRA § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)); id. 
§ 994(c)–(d) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)–(d)); id. sec. 212(a), § 3553(a)–(b), 98 
Stat. at 1989-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–(b) (Supp. II 1984)). 
30 SRA, sec. 217(a), § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) 
(1998)). 
31 See id. § 991(b), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)–(2) (2006)) 
(enumerating the foundational purposes and duties of the Commission); id. § 994(n), 
98 Stat. at 2022-23 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)) (directing the Commission to review 
and revise the guidelines in light of data and comments coming to its attention).   
32 Id. § 995(a)(13)–(16), 98 Stat. at 2024-25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(13)– 
(16)). 
33 SRA, sec. 212(a), § 3553(c), 98 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)). 
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ing court’s reasons and the factors set forth in § 3553(a).34  The Com-
mission would study the district courts’ reasons and the appellate 
courts’ decisions, and revise the guidelines based on what it learned.  
As then–Chief Judge Breyer stated:   
[T]he very theory of the Guidelines system is that when courts, drawing 
upon experience and informed judgment in such cases, decide to depart, 
they will explain their departures.  The courts of appeals, and the Sen-
tencing Commission, will examine, and learn from, those reasons.  And, 
the resulting knowledge will help the Commission to change, to refine, 
and to improve, the Guidelines themselves.
35
 
The Commission’s placement within the judicial branch proved 
critical in Mistretta v. United States; largely for this reason, the Supreme 
Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to the SRA.36  Emphasiz-
ing the “consistent responsibility of federal judges to pronounce sen-
tence within the statutory range established by Congress,”37 the Court 
noted that it was proper to delegate to the judicial branch rulemaking 
power related to the “conduct of its own business.”38  Sentencing rules, 
the Court reasoned, were “attendant to a central element of the histor-
ically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch”39 and were “not 
more appropriate for another Branch.”40  The Court recognized that the 
Commission had been placed “in the Judicial Branch precisely because 
of the Judiciary’s special knowledge and expertise” in making “sub-
stantive” policy judgments in sentencing individual cases.41  Because 
“substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been and remains 
appropriate to the Judicial Branch,” Congress’s decision to locate the 
Commission “within the Judicial Branch simply leaves with the Judici-
ary what long has belonged to it.”42  The Court therefore rejected the 
Solicitor General’s argument that the Commission did not violate sep-
 
34 Id. sec. 213(a), § 3742(d)(3), (e)(3), 98 Stat. at 2011-13 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(d)(3), (e)(3) (Supp. II 1984)).  
35 United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1993).   
36 488 U.S. 361, 380-408 (1989).   
37 Id. at 391. 
38 Id. at 388. 
39 Id. at 391. 
40 Id. at 390. 
41 Id. at 395-96.  
42 Id. at 396-97. 
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aration of powers principles because its power to promulgate enforce-
able sentencing guidelines was executive in nature, despite its “judicial 
branch” label.43  Indeed, the Court noted that “had Congress decided 
to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the 
Executive Branch, we might face the constitutional questions whether 
Congress unconstitutionally had assigned judicial responsibilities to 
the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute 
and the power to sentence within one Branch.”44   
The SRA, as written and as construed by the Court in Mistretta, 
thus envisioned an expert judicial branch commission insulated from 
undue influence by the political branches.  But the Mistretta Court’s 
rosy view of the Commission’s independence and of its “judicial” role 
was based on a number of assumptions—some grounded in the SRA 
and others purely speculative—that later proved to be false.45  As Pro-
fessor Frank Bowman has observed, “[T]he architects of the [SRA] 
miscalculated and created a sentencing structure almost perfectly  
designed for capture and manipulation by the political branches.”46  
The framers miscalculated by failing to place sufficient checks—
particularly a judicial check—on the Commission.   
 
43 Brief for the United States 33-43, Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (Nos. 87-1904, 87-7028), 
1998 WL 1026050.  The Solicitor General went on to suggest that the Supreme Court 
could “sever[]” the “‘judicial branch’ label,” leaving the Commission designated as an 
“independent agency.”  Id. at 40-42.  
44 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17. 
45 See, e.g., Kate Stith, United States v. Mistretta:  The Constitution and the Sentencing 
Guidelines (“If the [Sentencing Commission is] indeed in the judicial branch, then the 
political branches commandeered that branch, obscuring who is responsible for the 
[sentencing] rules . . . and who is really exercising sentencing authority in criminal 
cases.” (footnote omitted)), in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 455, 482 (Carol S. 
Steicker ed., 2006); id. at 476-82 (discussing a number of false assumptions made by the 
Mistretta Court); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law 
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28-40 (1991) (con-
tending that the Mistretta Court upheld the Commission and its guidelines based on a 
number of assumptions—including (1) an optimistic assessment that granting judges 
such legislative and executive powers would not compromise their impartiality, (2) a 
presumption that substantive judicial rulemaking would not stray too far from accepta-
ble past precedent, and (3) a belief that the President could exercise little influence 
over the judges on the Commission—and did not address whether the Commission and 
its guidelines would be constitutional if those assumptions proved to be ill-founded). 
46 Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine:  The Political Science of 
Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (2005). 
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B.  The Breakdown of the Framers’ Vision:  Insufficient  
Checks on the Commission 
Although Congress’s desire to insulate the Commission from polit-
ical pressures was sound in theory, it was as unrealistic for this federal 
agency as it would be for other prominent agencies that issue rules 
regarding politically contentious matters.47  Given this reality, Con-
gress’s decision to exempt the Commission’s work from the judicial 
review applicable to other federal agencies caused the framers’ vision 
to quickly unravel.  The only functionally similar mechanism under 
the SRA was judicial authority to depart based on circumstances not 
“adequately taken into consideration” by the Commission in formulat-
ing the guidelines,48 and the Commission’s responsibility to review and 
revise the guidelines based on what it learned from these departures.49  
But the departure power never operated as intended.  The Commission 
acted forcefully to prevent judicial departures and judicial scrutiny of 
the guidelines even before, and repeatedly after, the guidelines went 
into effect.     
1.  The Commission’s Exemption from Judicial Review and Related 
Transparency and Explanation Requirements 
The SRA required that the notice, comment, and hearing re-
quirements of § 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) be 
applied to the Commission’s “guidelines”50 in order to ensure that the 
Commission took into account “all relevant views.”51  Congress also 
required the Commission to consult with experts and representatives 
of each of the primary institutional actors in the federal criminal jus-
tice system.52 
 
47 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 48-51 (1998) (noting that from its inception, the Commission 
has been both “acutely sensitive to the political environment in which it operates, and 
controversial”); see also infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text. 
48 SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 212(a), § 3553(b), 98 Stat. 1987, 1990 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. II 1984)).   
49 Id. sec. 217(a), § 994(n), 98 Stat. at 2022 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006)). 
50 Id. § 994(w), 98 Stat. at 2024 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(x)).  
51 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 181 (1983).   
52 See supra note 27.   
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Significantly, however, the Commission was not subject to the most 
important procedures and constraints designed to ensure honesty, 
transparency, and accountability in rulemaking by federal agencies.53  
The failure to provide for judicial review of the Commission’s rule-
making is a major reason that the framers’ vision was never realized.  
The APA subjects other federal agencies to this judicial check, whereby 
the reviewing court must “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action 
found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law,” contrary to constitutional right or statute, 
or “without observance of procedure required by law.”54  Moreover, 
other federal agencies must hold “every portion of every meeting . . . 
open to public observation,”55 and may not engage in ex parte com-
munications regarding matters subject to a public hearing.56  When 
promulgating regulations, they must follow the “logical outgrowth” 
principle, which requires a second notice and comment period if a reg-
ulation under consideration differs significantly from a version previ-
ously published for comment.57  They must provide a statement of 
“basis and purpose” for their rules58 that includes a thorough explana-
tion in light of the factors made relevant by the enabling legislation, 
factual evidence supporting the rule, a reasoned response to com-
 
53 The Commission was subject only to § 553 of the APA.  For other agencies, the 
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), id. § 552, 
and the Government in the Sunshine Act, id. § 552b, require additional procedures.  
“The openness these acts require reflects what is perhaps a peculiarly American politi-
cal idea, that publicity can serve as an effective constraint on government action—that 
‘sunlight is the best disinfectant.’”  PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINIS-
TRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (1989). 
54 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  While the APA provides that this judicial review provision is 
not applicable to “the courts of the United States,” id. § 551(1)(B), it is not clear that 
this exclusion should apply to the Commission, even if one accepts its “judicial branch” 
label.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“[T]he Commission is 
not a court.”).     
55 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b). 
56 Id. § 557(d)(1). 
57 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007).  
58 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
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ments opposing the rule, and a “rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice[s] made.”59 
None of these requirements was made applicable to the Commis-
sion.  Although the Commission might have voluntarily adopted open 
and rigorous procedures, it chose not to do so.  Pursuant to its Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, it deliberates in private meetings closed to 
all but the Justice Department’s ex officio commissioner,60 engages in 
unrecorded ex parte communications with Department staff, law en-
forcement officials, and others,61 and excludes these and all internal 
communications from its public comment file.62  The Commission 
provides reasons in connection with its notices of proposed amend-
ments only “to the extent appropriate and practicable” and infor-
mation relevant to the issues only if such information is “publicly 
available.”63    
Without enforceable constraints, the Commission failed to take into 
account the views and evidence presented by the judiciary, the defense 
bar, and others who advised against its proposals.64  It promulgated 
amendments materially different from those originally proposed for 
comment, to which stakeholders had no opportunity to respond.65  And 
 
59 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 42-43 & n.9 (1983); see also 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE  
§ 7.1, at 559 (5th ed. 2010); id. § 7.4, at 592-94, 599.  
60 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE r.3.2 (2007) 
(stating that only meetings “with outside parties shall be conducted in public”). 
61 See id. r.3.3 (declaring that the Commission may hold nonpublic meetings to re-
ceive information from and participate in discussions with any person designated by an 
ex officio commissioner as support staff, or to receive or share information deemed 
inappropriate for public disclosure); id. r.3.5 (requiring that only public meetings be 
recorded). 
62 Id. r.5.1. 
63 Id. r.4.4. 
64 See Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”:  A Call for Meaningful 
Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1276 (1999).  
65 See, e.g., Fred W. Bennett, A Direct Participant’s Perspective on the Guideline Amend-
ment Process, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 148, 148 & 151 n.5 (1990) (noting that at least eighteen 
of the fifty-three final amendments had materially different language than that pub-
lished for comment); id. at 149 (“In some instances it was impossible to discern what 
prompted options to proposed amendments and what empirical study or research,  
if any, supported final language sent to Congress but not originally published in the 
Federal Register . . . .”); Samuel J. Buffone, The Federal Sentencing Commission’s Proposed 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 67, 69 (1996) (noting that the Com-
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while the SRA required the Commission to include with amendments 
sent to Congress a “statement of the reasons therefor,”66 the Commis-
sion typically provided little or no explanation for its amendments.67  
Neither a failure to explain nor an arbitrary result was reviewable  
under the APA or otherwise.68  And under the departure standard 
promulgated by the Commission, discussed below, courts were required 
to follow unexplained and unjustified guidelines.69  The Commission 
was therefore under no pressure to base its actions on reasons, evidence, 
or a sound empirical foundation, and frequently acted instead on the 
basis of political pressure or the Commissioners’ personal policy views.70   
Shortly before leaving the Commission, then-Judge Breyer report-
edly warned his colleagues against acting on the basis of their personal 
views71 and advised the Commission to “revise the present version of 
the Guidelines in light of its information-based analyses and sugges-
 
mission failed to provide notice and a second comment period for final guidelines 
regarding environmental crimes and organizational sanctions that were not a logical 
outgrowth of its initial proposals). 
66 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006). 
67 The typical “reason for amendment” simply stated that the amendment increased 
base offense levels or enhancements by specified levels, see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 189, reason for amend. (Nov. 1, 1989), or that 
the amendment “sets forth the Commission’s position” that certain factors “are not 
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable 
guideline range,” id. amend. 386, reason for amend. (Nov. 1, 1991). 
68 See, e.g., United States v. Wimbush, 103 F.3d 968, 969-70 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Fed-
eral courts do not have authority to review the Commission’s actions for compliance 
with APA provisions, at least insofar as the adequacy of the statement of the basis and 
purpose of an amendment is concerned.”); United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 
1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that, because Congress did not subject the Commis-
sion to judicial review under the APA, “this court lacks authority to review the adequacy 
of the Commission's statement of reasons in support of its conclusion that age is not 
ordinarily relevant to sentencing”).   
69 See infra notes 120-39 and accompanying text. 
70 See Samuel J. Buffone, Control of Arbitrary Sentencing Guidelines:  Is Administrative 
Law the Answer?, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 139 (1991).  
71 See Michael K. Block, Emerging Problems in the Sentencing Commission’s Approach to 
Guideline Amendments, 1 FED. SENT’G REP. 451, 453 (1989) (quoting Commissioner 
Breyer as warning that “this [Commission] will not last if the answer to the question 
‘How did you choose that level?’ is that what happened was seven people sat around in 
a room and they decided on the basis of what they thought was somehow appropriately 
severe” (alteration in original)). 
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tions from judges, probation officers and others in the field.”72  Just 
before resigning, Commissioner Michael Block put the matter more 
bluntly:  “At times it appears that a majority of the Commission is  
actively seeking an ‘information free’ environment in which to make 
sentencing policy.”73  Early on, the Judicial Conference made a serious 
effort to convince the Commission to explain its proposals, forego fur-
ther increases in severity and restrictions on departures, and adopt 
moderating changes to the guidelines, all to no avail.74  Judges and 
practitioners watched with alarm as the Commission ignored the views 
and evidence presented to it and set about implementing an unex-
plained agenda that profoundly altered federal sentencing in ways the 
SRA’s framers clearly did not intend.75  The Department of Justice took 
full advantage of this environment and its position as an ex officio 
member to advocate its desired results behind closed doors.76   
 
72 What Are the Two Most Important Tasks Facing the Sentencing Commission, Through 
Modification Either of the Existing Guidelines or the Process by Which the Commission Relates to 
Judges and Practitioners?, 1 FED. SENT’G REP. 365, 366 (response of Stephen G. Breyer) 
(1989).   
73 Block, supra note 71, at 453. 
74 See Hon. Vincent L. Broderick, Chairman, Comm. on Criminal Law & Probation 
Admin. of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., & Hon. Mark Wolf, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Sentencing Guidelines & Procedures, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (Mar. 5, 1991), in 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 276, 278-81 (1991); Judge Mark 
Wolf & Judge Vincent L. Broderick, Testimony Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(Mar. 5, 1991), in 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 287, 287-88 (1991); What Are the Two Most Im-
portant Tasks Facing the Sentencing Commission, Through Modification Either of the Existing 
Guidelines or the Process by Which the Commission Relates to Judges and Practitioners?, supra 
note 72, at 365 (response of Marvin E. Frankel); Letter from Hon. Vincent L. Broderick, 
to Hon. Avern Cohn ( June 13, 1991), in 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 48, 48-49 (1991). 
75 See Thomas W. Hillier, II, The Commission’s Departure from an Evolutionary Amend-
ment Process, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 45 (1991) (observing that the Commission had “all 
but ignored the input of ‘outsiders’” in favor of its “internal agenda,” which was “not a 
matter of public record or debate and, as a result, Congress’s view that the guidelines 
evolve from a community of ideas [was] left unrealized”); Guideline Amendments, 2 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 238 (1990) (including critical responses to proposed amendments and the 
Commission’s failure to justify or explain them by Judge Becker on behalf of the Judi-
cial Conference, Samuel Buffone on behalf of the American Bar Association, Benson 
Weintraub on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and 
Professors Daniel J. Freed and Marc Miller, among others). 
76 See, e.g., Jeffery S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing Commission, P.M. 
(Post-Mistretta):  Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 319-20 (1989) (explain-
ing that the Department’s ex officio representative convinced four of six Commission-
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2.  The Eradication of Reasoned Departures 
The one mechanism under the SRA that would have placed pres-
sure on the Commission to base its guidelines on reason and evidence 
was the district courts’ authority to depart from the guidelines and to 
explain their reasons for doing so.  But the Commission, aided by the 
Supreme Court, virtually eradicated the judicial departure power ex-
cept as explicitly authorized by the Commission itself. 
Departures were intended to serve two important functions:  first, 
to permit individualized sentences based on circumstances not ade-
quately taken into account in the guidelines,77 and second, to provide 
systematic feedback to the Commission to assist it in reviewing and 
revising the guidelines.78  Section 3553(b) of Title 18, as enacted in the 
SRA in 1984, provided that sentencing courts “shall impose a sentence 
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4)”—
which referenced the Commission’s authority to create “guide-
lines”79—“unless the court finds that an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that 
 
ers to increase fraud penalties with a “fallacious” argument “that recent congressional 
enactments had given oblique ‘signals’ to the Commission” to do so and “despite the 
absence of any empirical proof that an increase would improve the effectiveness of 
sentencing”); cf. Hon. Edward R. Becker, Suggestions for the New Sentencing Commission, 8 
FED. SENT’G REP. 10, 10-11 (1995) (arguing against the inclusion of the DOJ as an ex 
officio member because it raises separation of powers issues and “creates the appear-
ance that the interest of the government . . . is favored in the promulgation of the 
guidelines”); David J. Gottlieb, The Sentencing Commission’s Administrative Reforms:  Two 
Cheers, and Some Suggestions, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 71, 76 (1996) (arguing that the Com-
mission’s work should be more open to the public, especially in light of the DOJ’s “un-
usual position” as both an “interested party” and an ex officio member). 
77 See SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 991(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 
2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)) (directing the Commission to 
“maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by 
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general 
sentencing practices”). 
78 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
79 See SRA, sec. 211(a), § 3553(a)(4), 98 Stat. at 1989-90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4) (Supp. II 1984)) (directing the court to consider “the kinds of sentence 
and the sentencing range . . . as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1)”). 
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should result in a sentence different from that described.”80  The SRA 
also directed the courts, in section 3553(a), to “impose a sentence suf-
ficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” of 
sentencing81—that is, “just punishment,” “adequate deterrence,” pro-
tection of the public against “further crimes of the defendant,” and 
rehabilitation “in the most effective manner.”82  In determining the 
“particular sentence to be imposed,” judges were to consider “the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteris-
tics of the defendant,” “the need for the sentence imposed” to satisfy 
the purposes of sentencing, the “kinds of sentences available” by stat-
ute, the kinds and range of sentences set forth in the “guidelines,” 
“any pertinent policy statement,” and the “need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants.83        
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained how subsec-
tions (a) and (b) would work together.  The judge would first consider 
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and character-
istics of the defendant, and the purposes of sentencing, as required by 
§ 3553(a).84  This consideration would inform the judge’s decision as 
to whether the guideline range “adequately” reflected the circum-
stances of the case and whether a different sentence “should result,” as 
required by § 3553(b).85  The judge would then determine the guide-
line range, and either sentence within the guideline range because it 
appropriately reflected the relevant factors, or sentence outside the 
guideline range because it did not.86  The standard of appellate review 
for departures was also tied to § 3553(a) and the facts of the case:  the 
court of appeals was to determine whether a sentence outside the 
guideline range was “unreasonable, having regard for . . . the factors to 
be considered in imposing a sentence” as set forth in § 3553(a), and 
 
80 Id. § 3553(b), 98 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. II 1984)).  
81 Id. § 3553(a), 98 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. II 1984)).   
82 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D), 98 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–
(D) (Supp. II 1984)). 
83 Id. § 3553(a)(1)–(6), 98 Stat. at 1989-90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1)–(6) (Supp. II 1984)) . 
84 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983). 
85 Id. at 51-52. 
86 Id. at 52, 75. 
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“the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by 
the district court.”87 
Congress did not intend to eliminate judges’ “thoughtful imposi-
tion of individualized sentences.”88  To the contrary, Congress’s goal 
was to “enhance the individualization of sentences,”89 and it believed 
that “the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the rele-
vant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines 
in an appropriate case.”90  To this end, the SRA directed the Commis-
sion to consider for inclusion in the guidelines nonexhaustive lists of 
aggravating and mitigating offense and offender characteristics,91 and 
to “maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentencing 
when warranted by mitigating and aggravating factors not taken into 
account” in the guidelines.92  Congress recognized that it was not pos-
sible to write all relevant factors into general rules, and that “some var-
iation [was] not only inevitable but desirable.”93 
The Commission, however, read the SRA differently.  In commen-
tary issued in April 1987, before the guidelines went into effect, it took 
the position that § 3553(b) meant that, “in principle, the Commission, 
by specifying that it had adequately considered a particular factor, 
could prevent a court from using it as grounds for departure.”94  The 
commentary also described a departure standard quite unlike that de-
scribed in § 3553; in the Commission’s view, departures were permissi-
ble only in “atypical” cases that “significantly differ[]” from the 
“heartland” of “typical cases embodying the conduct that each guide-
line describes.”95  The Commission simultaneously issued policy state-
ments declaring, without explanation, that the mitigating factors 
Congress had directed it to consider for inclusion in the guidelines, as 
 
87 SRA sec. 213(a), § 3742(d)(3), 98 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(3) 
(Supp. II 1984)).   
88 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52.  
89 Id. at 52-53, 161.  
90 Id. at 52. 
91 SRA sec. 217(a), § 994(c)–(d), 98 Stat. at 2020 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)–(d)). 
92 Id. § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)). 
93 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150.   
94 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,050 (May 13, 1987) (emphasis added).  
95 Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(b) (2011).  
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well as others, were prohibited or “not ordinarily relevant” as grounds 
for departure.96 
Notably, the original version of § 3553(b) did not direct the courts 
to consider the Commission’s “policy statements” or “commentary” in 
deciding whether to depart.  Indeed, the SRA did not even authorize 
the Commission to issue “commentary,” and while it did authorize  
the Commission to issue “policy statements,” restricting departures was 
not among their specified purposes.97  Nevertheless, the Commission 
secured an amendment to § 3553(b) as part of the Sentencing Act of 
198798 that came to mean that its “policy statements” and “commen-
tary” were binding on the courts.99 
On October 22, 1987, the Chair of the Sentencing Commission, 
Judge William W. Wilkins, complained to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee that the departure standard under § 3553(b) was too “indefinite, 
subjective, and impractical” because courts would have to “wrestle 
with” whether a factor had been “adequately considered” by the 
Commission and, in doing so, might feel the need to subpoena the 
 
96 See 52 Fed. Reg. at 18,102-05; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 
policy statement (1987) (age); id. § 5H1.2 policy statement (educational and vocational 
skills); id. § 5H1.3 policy statement (mental and emotional conditions); id. § 5H1.4 
policy statement (physical condition, drug dependence, alcohol abuse); id. § 5H1.5 
policy statement (employment record); id. § 5H1.6 policy statement (family ties and 
responsibilities); id. § 5K2.12 policy statement (personal financial difficulties, economic 
pressures on a trade or business).  
97 SRA, sec. 217(a), § 994(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(a)(2)). 
98 Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266, 1266 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b) (1988)). 
99 Some analyses of the legislative history of the SRA have noted the 1987 amendment 
to § 3553(b).  See, e.g., Luby, supra note 64, at 1256-57; Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, 
Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 235, 236-
37 (1991); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 270 (1993); 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land):  The Long Search for Admin-
istrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 786-87 (1999).  This Article, how-
ever, is the first (as far as we are aware) to explain its significance to the subsequent 
decisions of the Supreme Court that held, inexplicably and contrary to the usual can-
ons of administrative law, that Commission policy statements and commentary were as 
binding on courts as the guidelines themselves. 
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Commission to enable them to “make the necessary determinations.”100  
To remedy these asserted problems, the Commission proposed that 
§ 3553(b) be amended to permit departure only on a ground that 
provides “a compelling reason” and that “is not expressly addressed in 
the guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary” of the Sen-
tencing Commission,101 unless “specifically invited” therein.102  In addi-
tion, the Commission proposed that the courts be directed, in making 
this determination, to “consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy 
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis-
sion.”103  The purpose of this request to “limit [the courts’] focus to the 
‘four corners’ of the officially promulgated guidelines, policy state-
ments, and commentary of the Sentencing Commission” was to “defin-
itively preclude the possibility of any legal process directed at the 
Commission . . . in an effort to look behind or beyond those official 
Commission pronouncements in order to discover intent or resolve 
matters in dispute.”104 
Congress declined to confine departures to circumstances that 
provided “a compelling reason,” or to circumstances “not expressly 
addressed” unless “specifically invited” by the Commission.  Further, it 
added language to § 3553(b), as proposed by the House, clarifying 
that even if a factor appeared in some form in the guidelines, the sen-
tencing judge was authorized to depart if he determined that the fac-
tor was “of a kind, or to a degree” not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Commission.105  But Congress did address the 
 
100 Sentencing Commission Guidelines:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 29-30 (1987) (statement of William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing 
Commission).    
101 See id. app. at 158-59 (setting forth proposed amendments). 
102 Id. at 31 (statement of William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion). 
103 Id. app. at 158-59. 
104 Id. at 32-33 (statement of William W. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission).  Chairman Wilkins explained that the amendment was necessary to protect 
the Commission from “repetitive, time-consuming, and unnecessary legal process.” Id. 
at 30.    
105 Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266, 1266 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)); 133 CONG. REC. 31,947 (1987).  
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Commission’s fear of being subpoenaed106 by also inserting the follow-
ing sentence in § 3553(b):  “In determining whether a circumstance 
was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only 
the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary 
of the Sentencing Commission.”107 
The plain language of the 1987 amendments appeared to mean 
that a court should determine whether the factors it found to be rele-
vant in a case were adequately reflected, in kind and degree, in the 
guidelines, and that, in doing so, it could not subpoena the Commis-
sion or its records to examine the adequacy of its actual deliberations.  
Subsections (a) and (b) of § 3553 would work together as described in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied the SRA.108   
The legislative history of the 1987 amendments generally pointed 
to the same conclusion.  The House of Representatives stated that the 
purpose of the sentence confining the inquiry to the guidelines, policy 
statements, and commentary was to address the Commission’s fear 
that it would be subpoenaed.109  The House firmly rejected the Com-
mission’s assertion that “in principle” it could “prevent” departure by 
specifying that it had adequately considered a factor.110  Instead, courts 
would first ascertain as, “an objective matter,” whether “the guidelines 
take into account at all the circumstance in question.”111  If so, “the 
court must then decide whether the guidelines ‘adequately’ take the 
circumstance into account, a subjective determination,” made by look-
ing “to whether the circumstance in the case differs in kind or degree 
 
106 133 CONG. REC. 31,947 (explaining that the bill adopted the Commission’s sug-
gested amendment to address its “fear[] that its members and records will frequently 
be subpoenaed”); see also id. at  33,110 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (noting that the 
sentence was added to address “concern that failure to specifically designate the mate-
rials that may be used in determining the appropriateness of departure could result in 
members of the Commission, or their notes and other internal work products, being 
subpoenaed”). 
107 Sentencing Act of 1987 § 3, 101 Stat. at 1266 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b) (1988)).  The Act was enacted on December 7, 1987, after the guidelines 
went into effect on November 1, 1987. 
108 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
109 133 CONG. REC. 31,947 (1987).  
110 Id. at 31,947 & 31,949 n.12; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.   
111 133 CONG. REC. 31,947. 
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from the circumstance as accounted for by the guidelines.”112  In decid-
ing whether the guidelines took a circumstance into account “at all” or 
whether it “differs in kind or degree from the circumstance as account-
ed for by the guidelines,” the court could consider only “the guidelines 
themselves, the official commentary to the guidelines, and the policy 
statements of the Sentencing Commission”113—i.e., it could not sub-
poena the Commission.  The court would then determine, as a subjec-
tive matter, whether a different sentence “should result.”114  The House 
also noted that § 3553(a) provided grounds for departure when the 
guideline sentence was greater than necessary to serve the purposes of 
sentencing.115 
A “Joint Explanation” issued by four of the SRA’s original Senate 
sponsors muddied the waters a bit.  The statement acknowledged that 
the new sentence was added to protect the Commission from subpoe-
nas, but asserted that § 3553(a) provided no ground for departure, 
and that if the Commission stated “that it had adequately considered a 
factor in formulating the guidelines . . . the court would be precluded 
from departing unless, as a threshold matter, the court reasonably de-
termined that the factor was not meant to be covered by the commission’s 
statement.”116  Although their individual statements are ambiguous, the 
four Senators appeared to abandon the position stated in their Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report that judges would independently evaluate 
whether the guidelines adequately reflected a given circumstance in 
light of the factors and purposes set forth in § 3553(a).117   
Whatever the Senators’ statement meant, it could not amend the 
plain language of the statute.118  A statutory provision directing the 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id.   
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 33,109 ( joint statement of Sens. Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch) 
(emphasis added). 
117 See id. at 33,109-10; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52-53, 75 (1983); supra notes 
84-86 and accompanying text.   
118 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (“Floor statements 
from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute.”); 
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1984) (expressing “grave doubts” that statements 
of individual congressmen could overcome clear statutory language).   
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courts to determine whether potential grounds for departure were  
“adequately taken into consideration” by the Commission could not 
reasonably be read to grant the Commission the power to dictate the 
answer to this question.  Moreover, the standard of appellate review 
for sentences outside the guideline range was whether the sentence “is 
unreasonable, having regard for . . . the factors to be considered in 
imposing a sentence” set forth in § 3553(a).119  Because the reason-
ableness of a departure depended on the § 3553(a) factors, those fac-
tors must necessarily have guided the district court in determining 
whether and to what extent to depart. 
Thus, after the 1987 amendments, it should have been clear that 
while the Commission was relieved of having to respond to subpoenas, 
it was obliged to provide explanations in the Guidelines Manual itself 
to demonstrate that it had “adequately taken into consideration” all 
relevant factors in formulating the guidelines.120  Unfortunately, in a 
trio of misguided cases, the Supreme Court effectively read the statu-
tory departure standard, as well as the reasonableness standard of re-
view for departures, out of existence, and allowed the Commission to 
dictate limits on departure through policy statements and commen-
tary.  In each of these cases, the fateful sentence added to § 3553(b) in 
December 1987 to prevent the Commission from being subpoenaed 
played a substantial—and questionable—role.   
In 1992, the Court in Williams v. United States, over a vigorous dis-
sent but in agreement with both parties, cited that sentence in holding 
that a court’s use of a ground for departure that was prohibited by a 
“policy statement” was reversible as “an incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines,” and that such a departure could not be upheld 
as reasonable.121  The majority rejected the dissent’s reliance on the 
distinction drawn by the SRA between binding guidelines and non-
binding policy statements,122 and failed to recognize the appellate re-
 
119 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(3) (1988).   
120 See Miller & Freed, supra note 99, at 236 (“[T]he Commission must now shoul-
der the burden of demonstrating adequate consideration of each circumstance.  Evi-
dence of its thinking process—not just its conclusion—must be spelled out in the text 
of its Guidelines Manual.”).   
121 503 U.S. 193, 200-02 (1992). 
122 Id. at 200-01.   
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view provision’s clear language directing that guideline sentences were 
to be reviewed for correctness, while departures were to be reviewed 
only for unreasonableness.123  In doing so, the majority noted that,  
under § 3553(b), “in determining whether a circumstance was ade-
quately taken into consideration, a court must consider . . . ‘policy 
statements.’”124   
In Stinson v. United States, the Court took Williams a step further, 
holding that policy statements and commentary, though not subject to 
notice, comment, or congressional approval requirements, were “bind-
ing” on the courts.125  The Court acknowledged that the SRA “does not 
in express terms authorize the issuance of commentary,” but, pointing 
to the new language adopted in 1987, noted that “the Act does refer to 
it” in § 3553(b).126    
The Court went still further in its 1996 decision in Koon v. United 
States, where it adopted the Commission’s policy statements and com-
mentary as the sole  framework for review of departures.127  The Court 
again relied on the sentence added in 1987 for the purpose of shield-
ing the Commission from subpoenas:  “To determine whether a cir-
cumstance was adequately taken into consideration by the Commission, 
Congress instructed courts to ‘consider only the sentencing guidelines, 
policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis-
sion.’”128  Turning its attention, “as instructed,” to official commentary 
in the Guidelines Manual, the Court “learn[ed] that the Commission 
 
123 Cf. id. at 210-11, 217 (White, J., dissenting).  The dissent highlighted the sepa-
rate and distinct standards set forth in § 3742(e).  Id. at 210-11.  Section 3742 provided: 
[T]he court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence . . . (2) was im-
posed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; [or] 
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable, having re-
gard for—(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth 
in [§ 3553(a)] of this title; and (B) the reasons for the imposition of the par-
ticular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of 
section 3553(c) . . . .   
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988).  
124 Williams, 503 U.S. at 201 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).  
125 508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993). 
126 Id. at 41.  
127 518 U.S. 81, 92-96 (1996). 
128 Id. at 92-93 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)).  
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did not adequately take into account cases that are, for one reason or 
another, ‘unusual,’” as compared to cases falling within the “‘heart-
land . . . of typical cases.’”129  The courts were not “left adrift,” however, 
because the Commission had specified which factors were within or 
outside the “heartland” through policy statements forbidding, discour-
aging, or encouraging their consideration.130  While the Court in Koon 
adopted an “abuse of discretion” standard of review for departures,131 
this was meaningless in most cases because the areas within which  
district courts had discretion were demarcated by the Commission’s 
pronouncements.  And the district court’s interpretation of those pro-
nouncements was reviewed de novo.132  Further, the Court made clear 
that judges were not permitted to “test potential departure factors 
against” the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a).133  Remark-
ably, the Court made no mention of the standard of review for depar-
tures stated in the statute itself:  unreasonableness with regard to the 
factors set forth in § 3553(a).134  
 
129 Id. at 92-93 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro-
ductory cmt. 4(b) (1995)).  
130 Id. at 94-96.  Relying on the Commission’s commentary, the Court said that if a 
factor was “forbidden” by the Commission, “the sentencing court cannot use it as a 
basis for departure.”  Id. at 95-96.  If a factor was “encouraged,” the court was “author-
ized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it into account.”  Id. at 
96.  If a factor was a “discouraged factor” or an “encouraged factor already taken into 
account,” the court “should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree 
or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor 
is present.”  Id.  If a factor was “unmentioned,” the court “must, after considering the 
‘structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as 
a whole,’” id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, 
C.J.)), then “decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline’s heart-
land . . . bear[ing] in mind the Commission’s expectation that departures based on 
grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be ‘highly infrequent.’”  Id. (quoting 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. 4, introductory cmt. 4(b) (1995)). 
131 Id. at 91.  
132 See United States v. Roberts, 313 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 
871 (5th Cir. 2002). 
133 Koon, 518 U.S. at 108.  
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994) (stating that the standard of review for sen-
tences “outside the applicable guideline range” was whether the sentence “is unreason-
able, having regard for . . . the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set 
forth in [§ 3553(a)] of this title; and . . . the reasons for the imposition of the particular 
sentence, as stated by the district court”). 
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Through the status it gave to the Commission’s commentary and 
policy statements in Williams, Stinson, and Koon, the Court “enhanced 
the role of the Sentencing Commission vis-à-vis the sentencing court 
and probably vis-à-vis Congress.”135  The result was to virtually nullify 
the statutory language giving courts the power to depart based on cir-
cumstances “not adequately taken into consideration” by the Commis-
sion in the guidelines, to make that determination in light of the 
factors and purposes set forth in § 3553(a), and to have that decision 
reviewed for “unreasonableness” with regard to § 3553(a).   Pursuant 
to these decisions, any factor mentioned in the Guidelines Manual, or 
even implicitly considered through omission, was deemed to be ade-
quately considered and within the “heartland.”136  The Commission 
instructed sentencing courts that they could depart from the guideline 
range only based on a circumstance that was “atypical,” and that they 
were not permitted to disagree with the policy judgments of the 
Commission.137  Courts acted at their peril in forthrightly expressing 
dissatisfaction with the guidelines in the course of explaining a depar-
 
135 THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 1B1.7 (2011 ed.). 
136 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 107 F. App’x 295, 298 (3d Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that “nothing about” an eighteen-year-old girl’s age “removes her situation from the 
heartland of cases involving comparable drug crimes,” since drug importers often use 
“young, naive men and women without extensive criminal experience”); United States 
v. Bristow, 110 F.3d 754, 755, 757-58 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a departure would 
have been impermissible for a young man who pled guilty to being a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm based on his brief possession of an unloaded handgun lawfully owned 
by his father, solely to pawn it in order to pay child support, because, although these 
circumstances were not taken into account in the guideline range, the defendant was 
motivated by financial difficulties, a factor prohibited as a ground for departure); United 
States v. Webb, 49 F.3d 636 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the case of a single father 
convicted of manufacturing and failing to register a “silencer”—here, a toilet paper roll 
filled with toy animal stuffing—that he attached to a legally owned rifle that he intend-
ed to use to shoot animals in his yard, was within the “heartland” contemplated by the 
guideline). 
137 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 policy statement (1995) 
(“In the absence of a characteristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as suffi-
ciently atypical to warrant a sentence different from that called for under the guide-
lines, a sentence outside the guideline range is not authorized.  For example, 
dissatisfaction with the available sentencing range or a preference for a different sen-
tence than that authorized by the guidelines is not an appropriate basis for a sentence 
outside the applicable guideline range.” (citation omitted)).   
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ture138 and were not permitted to correct for the most egregious prob-
lems in the guidelines because they were, or were assumed to have 
been, intended by the Commission to be within the “heartland.”139  
3.  Unexplained and Imbalanced Guidelines 
The impact of giving an unaccountable agency unchecked power 
over federal sentencing was quickly felt.  The first Commission made 
key choices that were not required by any specific directive in the SRA, 
that were not the product of empirical study as required by the SRA, 
and that diverged dramatically from sentences imposed before the 
SRA, upon which the Commission claimed the guidelines were largely 
based.140 
For example, the SRA directed the Commission to include both 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the guidelines141 and to maintain 
 
138 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 386 F.3d 273, 275, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (re-
versing a departure based on a variety of grounds in part because the judge stated that 
he was “not going to be the instrument of injustice in this case” and “[t]o the extent 
the district court based the departure on its belief that the sentence was unjust, it relied 
on a factor that is clearly impermissible under the Guidelines”). 
139 See In re Sealed Case, 292 F.3d 913, 915-16 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (disallowing a depar-
ture based on the “crack/powder disparity” because this disparity was not “atypical” and 
therefore was in the “heartland”); see also, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 358 F.3d 1278, 
1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a departure was not permitted where a prior drug 
trafficking offense led to the same 16-level enhancement that would ensue from a prior 
murder because the Commission determined it was “serious enough to warrant [the] 
enhancement,” and thus it “was adequately taken into account by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating” the guideline); United States v. Jared, 50 F. App’x 259, 
261 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a departure based on “first offender” status was not 
permitted because the Commission had instructed that such a departure “cannot be 
appropriate” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 policy state-
ment (2001))); United States v. Weaver, 126 F.3d 789, 792-94 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that a departure based on “disproportionate results between high and low-level” theft 
and fraud offenders was not permitted because such results were “squarely within the 
norm contemplated” by the guidelines). 
140 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(3) introductory cmt. 
(2011) (noting that in the first set of guidelines, the Commission took an “empirical 
approach that used as a starting point data estimating pre-guidelines sentencing  
practice”). 
141 See SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 994(c), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2006)) (listing offense circumstances); id. § 994(d) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)) (listing offender characteristics).  
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“sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted 
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in” the 
guidelines.142  But while the Commission included a vast array of  
aggravating factors in the guidelines,143 it omitted all but one of the 
mitigating factors Congress directed it to consider144 and issued policy 
statements prohibiting or discouraging downward departure based on 
these and other mitigating factors.145  The Commission gave no reasons 
for its restrictions on downward departures.  Later, it claimed that 
some, but not all, of these policy statements were “require[d]” by a 
provision of the SRA.146  That provision, however, directed only that 
the Commission was not to recommend imprisonment instead of pro-
bation or a longer prison term based on the defendant’s lack of educa-
tion, employment, or stabilizing ties.147  But the SRA made clear that 
 
142 Id. § 991(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)).  
143 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (Offense Conduct); id. ch. 3 
(Adjustments); id. ch. 4 (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood). 
144 Of the mitigating factors specified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), the Commission in-
cluded only “role in the offense” in the guideline rules.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (1987) (allowing a downward adjustment for “minimal” or 
“minor” participation in the criminal activity).  The Commission included one other 
mitigating factor in the guideline rules, acceptance of responsibility, which in practice 
has meant pleading guilty.  See id. § 3E1.1.   
145 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.5 policy statement 
(“Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is 
warranted.”); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
146 The Commission amended the commentary in 1990 to “clarif[y]” that certain 
policy statements were “require[d]” by § 994(e).  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
app. C, amend. 357 (Nov. 1, 1990). 
147 See SRA § 994(e), 98 Stat. at 2021 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(e)) (“The Com-
mission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term 
of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the general inappropri-
ateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties 
and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”).  As the Senate Report 
explained, the purpose of § 994(e) was “of course, to guard against the inappropriate 
use of incarceration for those defendants who lack education, employment, and stabi-
lizing ties.”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 175 (1983).  Section 994(e) was one of three provi-
sions of the SRA that reflected Congress’s judgment that prison was not an appropriate 
means of rehabilitation and that a term of imprisonment should therefore not be  
imposed or lengthened solely on the theory that prison might be rehabilitative.  The 
other two provisions were 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).  See S. REP. NO. 
98-225, at 67 n.140, 76, 119 (explaining that § 994(k) and § 3582(a) recognize that 
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation).  Interpreting 
these two provisions, the Supreme Court recently explained: 
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those and other factors were appropriate considerations in mitigation 
of a sentence.148  Then-Commissioner Breyer explained that the Com-
mission had omitted from the guidelines most of the mitigating factors 
Congress directed it to consider as one of several “‘trade-offs’ among 
Commissioners with different viewpoints.”149  Later, Justice Breyer, who 
had hoped that the guidelines would evolve, said that the exclusion of 
these factors was “intended to be provisional” and “subject to revision 
in light of Guideline implementation experience.”150  That revision did 
not materialize.  Moreover, when courts sought to depart on grounds 
not already disapproved, the Commission responded by adding those 
grounds to its disfavored list, frequently overruling the courts of  
appeals.151    
 
Section 994(k) bars the Commission from recommending a “term of impris-
onment”—a phrase that again refers both to the fact and to the length of  
incarceration—based on a defendant’s rehabilitative needs.  And § 3582(a) 
prohibits a court from considering those needs to impose or lengthen a period 
of confinement when selecting a sentence from within, or choosing to depart 
from, the Guidelines range. 
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (2011).   
148 Congress directed the Commission to consider the relevance of eleven charac-
teristics, “among others,” in establishing categories of offenders in the guidelines and 
policy statements regarding the type, length, and conditions of sentences.  SRA § 994(d), 
98 Stat. at 2020 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)).  These included the five factors identi-
fied in § 994(e).  Id.  In other words, Congress considered all eleven offender charac-
teristics to be relevant to all aspects of the sentencing decision, with the exception that 
the factors listed in § 994(e) could not be a basis for imposing or lengthening a term of 
imprisonment.  As the Senate Report explained, “[E]ach of these factors may play other 
roles in the sentencing decision.”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 174.  For example, “they may, in 
an appropriate case, call for the use of a term of probation instead of imprisonment.”  
Id.  The Senate Report gave several examples suggesting how the Commission might 
recommend that these and other offender characteristics be considered to mitigate the 
kind or length of sentences.  See id. at 171-74 & nn.410-11.   
149 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1988).   
150 Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180, 
182 (1999).   
151 For example, in United States v. Lara, the Second Circuit upheld a departure 
based on the defendant’s “diminutive size [and] immature appearance,” after he was 
sexually victimized and subsequently placed in solitary confinement for his protection.  
905 F.2d 599, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1990).  The Commission responded by immediately issu-
ing an amended policy statement asserting that “[p]hysical appearance, including phy-
sique, is not ordinarily relevant” in deciding whether to depart.  U.S. SENTENCING 
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The first Commission also created unnecessarily severe rules.  
Though not required by statute to do so, the Commission linked 
guideline ranges for drug offenses to the two mandatory minimum 
punishment levels specified in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,152 
added two severity levels to induce defendants to “plead guilty or  
otherwise cooperate with authorities,”153 and spread the quantity-based 
punishment scheme across seventeen levels.154   The effect was to more 
than double the average time served by federal drug offenders and to 
massively expand the federal prison population over the next twenty 
years.155  The Commission also created a “relevant conduct” guideline 
that required punishment for separate uncharged, dismissed, and  
acquitted crimes at the same rate as if charged in an indictment and 
 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 policy statement (1991).  In response to the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s ruling in United States v. Floyd that a disadvantaged childhood could justify a 
downward departure, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099-100 (9th Cir. 1991), the Commission issued 
a policy statement asserting that a defendant’s “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and simi-
lar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds” for 
departure.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 policy statement (1992).  
The Commission also prohibited departure based on post-sentencing rehabilitation.  
Id. § 5K2.19 policy statement (2000).  In doing so, it effectively overruled seven courts 
of appeals.  See United States v. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Rudolph, 190 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Roberts, No. 98-
8037, 1999 WL 13073, at *6-7 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999); United States v. Green, 152  
F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rhodes, 145 F.3d 1375, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Sally, 116 
F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1997).  Additionally, employment-related contributions, prior good 
works, and military, civic, charitable and public service were all deemed “not ordinarily 
relevant.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 policy statement (1991). 
This amendment was also a “response to court decisions.”  Simplification Draft Paper:  
Departures and Offender Characteristics, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION (Nov. 1996), http:// 
www.ussc.gov/Research/Working_Group_Reports/Simplification/depart.htm.   
152 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING:  AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING 
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 49 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW]; 
see also Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. 
153 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 148 (1995). 
154 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2011). 
155 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 47-48, 53-54, 76.  The federal pris-
on population, not including those in community corrections centers or home con-
finement, grew from 35,781 in 1985 to 179,220 in 2005, a 400% increase.  BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 
6.13.2009 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6132009.pdf.  
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proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.156  This rule, which argua-
bly is contrary to the SRA’s most basic instructions,157 provided prose-
cutors with the power to obtain or threaten to obtain enormous 
sentences, to pursue or avoid in their sole discretion, causing unwar-
ranted and hidden disparities.158  In addition, the Commission rec-
ommended that the facts driving the decades-long sentences often 
mandated by the guidelines be easy to prove, announcing its “belie[f]” 
that the preponderance of the evidence standard was “appropriate to 
meet due process requirements.”159  This recommendation was adopted 
over the objection of the Judicial Conference, which advised the 
Commission that setting minimum constitutional standards was beyond 
its authority.160  The Commission also created a severe guideline for 
third-time offenders (the “career offender” guideline),161 as directed by 
Congress,162 but much broader in scope than the statute required.163  
 
156 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2011).  
157 The Commission was to take into account “the circumstances under which the  
offense was committed” and “the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense.”  
SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 994(c)(2)–(3), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2)–(3) (2006)) (emphasis added).    
158 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 86-87 (noting that the relevant 
conduct rule is applied inconsistently because of “discomfort with the role of law  
enforcement in establishing relevant conduct, and discomfort with the severity of sen-
tences that often result”); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:  
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714-15 (1992)  
(arguing that the relevant conduct rule, “contrary to the Commission’s rationale, . . . 
enhances rather than reduces the power of the prosecutor,” allows “a prosecutor to in-
crease an offender’s sentence more easily by dropping charges than by bringing them,” 
results in “presentencing guideline manipulation,” “reduces visibility and candor in sen-
tencing,” and is a “disaster for guidelines that purport to reduce unwarranted dispari-
ty”); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities:  An Empirical Study of 
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 501, 535, 540, 557 (1992) (describing the key role the relevant conduct rule plays 
in plea negotiations and noting that Commission’s study found “circumvention” of the 
guidelines based on prosecutors’ personal sense of justice that “produces arguably just 
results” in some cases but is “hidden and unsystematic” and “obscures accountability”). 
159 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 policy statement cmt. (2011).   
160 See Wolf & Broderick, supra note 74, at 278 (“We suggest that the development 
of sentencing procedures are beyond the Commission’s statutory authority, and that 
difficult questions of procedural fairness are best left to resolution through traditional 
case-by-case adjudication.”).   
161 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2 (1989). 
162 SRA § 994(h), 98 Stat. at 2021 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).  
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The Commission ignored Congress’s directive to recommend proba-
tion for first offenders not convicted of a violent or otherwise serious 
offense,164 and instead required imprisonment in the vast majority of 
cases, contrary to Congress’s intent that probation and intermediate 
sanctions be broadly available under the guidelines.165   
The environment in which these radical measures were instituted 
was not only “information free,”166 but also highly politicized and far 
from neutral.167  In the very first amendment cycle, the Justice Depart-
ment’s ex officio Commissioner persuaded four of six voting Commis-
 
163 See Amy Baron-Evans et al., Deconstructing the Career Offender Guideline, 2 CHAR-
LOTTE L. REV. 39, 51 (2010).   
164 See SRA § 994( j), 98 Stat. at 2022 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994( j)).  
165 Congress directed the Commission to promulgate a guideline for the use of the 
courts in determining “whether to impose a sentence of probation, a fine, or a term  
of imprisonment.”  Id. § 994(a)(1)(A), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(a)(1)(A)) (emphasis added).  The Commission was also to ensure that the guide-
lines recommended a “sentence other than imprisonment” for first offenders not con-
victed of a violent or otherwise serious offense.  Id. § 994( j), 98 Stat. at 2022 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 994( j)). Congress required judges to consider the “kinds of sentences 
available” by statute, id. sec. 212(a), § 3553(a)(3), 98 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984)), authorized them to impose probation for most offenses, 
id. §§ 3559(a), 3561(a), 98 Stat. at 1991-92 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a), 3561(a) 
(2006)), and directed them to consider probation, fines, imprisonment, and any com-
bination thereof. See id. §§ 3551, 3561(a), 3562–3564, 98 Stat. at 1988, 1992-94 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3561(a), 3562–3564).   
The Commission did not promulgate a guideline for courts to use to determine 
whether to impose prison, probation, or a fine, and did not implement the first offender 
directive.  Instead, it implemented a zone system requiring straight prison for the vast 
majority of offenders, requiring some confinement for offenders with a guideline range 
greater than 0-6 months and up to 10-16 months, and permitting straight probation 
only for offenders with a guideline range of 0-6 months.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (1992); id. § 5C1.1.       
166 Block, supra note 71, at 453. 
167 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 765 (2005) 
(“[T]he Sentencing Commission was a highly politicized agency from the outset.”); 
Breyer, supra note 149, at 8 (“Some compromises were forced upon the Commis-
sion . . . by the fact that the Commission was appointed by politically responsible offi-
cials and is therefore, at least to some degree, a ‘political’ body.”); Michael Tonry, 
Federal Sentencing Can Be Made More Just, if the Sentencing Commission Wants to Make It So, 
12 FED. SENT’G REP. 83, 83 (1999) (noting that the Commission “chose . . . to view the 
Department of Justice and conservative members of Congress as its primary constituency,” 
while “federal judges were not well-integrated into the federal [guideline] development 
process”). 
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sioners to increase fraud penalties—a move described by former 
Commissioner Block as inflicting “gratuitous punishment” for reasons 
that were “overtly political and inexpert.”168  At the same time, the 
Commission sought to suppress reasoned criticism of its policies by the 
judges who applied them, going so far as to prohibit “dissatisfaction” 
with the guidelines as a ground for departure.169   
Without the balancing influence of the views of Article III judges (or 
line prosecutors) who had to apply the Commission’s policies in real 
cases, “Main Justice” in Washington, backed by its allies in Congress, 
dominated the Commission’s agenda and specific outcomes.170  By fail-
ing to act neutrally or expertly, the Commission undermined its own 
legitimacy and invited ongoing political interference.171  Thus, until 
recently, nearly all of the Commission’s amendments increased the 
severity of punishment or restricted judicial departures, many in re-
sponse to congressional directives, but most initiated by the Commis-
sion itself, frequently at the instance of the Department of Justice.172    
 
168 Parker & Block, supra note 76, at 318-20. 
169 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 policy statement cmt. (1995); 
see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 policy statement cmt. back-
ground (2003) (“Departures were never intended to permit sentencing courts to substi-
tute their policy judgments for those of Congress and the Sentencing Commission.”).  
170 See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A Struc-
tural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319-20 (2005) (“[T]he power to make and 
influence sentencing rules has migrated away from the judiciary, from the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission, and even from local federal prosecutors, toward political actors in 
Congress and the central administration of the Department of Justice.”); see also Kate 
Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:  Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1420, 1440-43 (2008) (discussing how Main Justice used mandatory guidelines to 
centralize control over sentencing). 
171 See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform:  Establishing a 
Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 221 (2005); see also Jeffrey 
S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; or, Confes-
sions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1025 (2001) (noting that 
had the Commission “developed a guidelines system based upon coherent principles, 
then Congress may not have perceived the need to intervene so frequently and in such 
minute detail”); Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment:  The U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission’s Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 
1044, 1103-04 (2003) (contending that “the Commission’s failure to confront sentenc-
ing purposes” has rendered it a “weak institution” susceptible to political influence and 
“Congressional meddling” and without “independent legitimacy”). 
172 Through 2009, the Commission promulgated 737 amendments, set forth in an 
appendix spanning nearly 1400 pages, with the large majority making substantive 
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The concentration of power over sentencing in the executive 
branch increased with the 2003 enactment of the PROTECT Act.173  
On March 11, 2003, an Associate Deputy Attorney General appeared 
before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security to complain that the rate of downward departures not spon-
sored by the government had increased as the result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Koon.174  Justice Department officials drafted legisla-
tion to implement their twin goals of reducing judicial discretion and 
increasing prosecutorial power and enlisted freshman Congressman 
Tom Feeney to introduce it.175  On March 27, 2003, Congressman 
Feeney, who said he was just the “messenger,”176 introduced the 
amendment along with the Department’s message:  judges were “arbi-
trarily deviating from the sentencing guidelines . . . based on their per-
sonal biases and prejudices, resulting in wide disparity in sentencing,”177 
as shown by an alleged fifty percent increase in downward departures 
not based on substantial assistance to the government over the preced-
ing five years.178 
 
changes, often to several guidelines or policy statements at once.  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2011).  During this same period, Congress issued ninety-
eight directives suggesting or requiring increased severity.  Sentencing Res. Counsel 
Project, Congressional Directives to Sentencing Commission 1988–2011, OFF. DEFENDER 
SERVICES, 1-203 (Nov. 2011), http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/SRC%20directives%20Table 
%20November%202011.pdf.  Until recently, nearly all substantive amendments in-
creased severity or removed grounds for departure.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL app. C.  For recent notable exceptions to this trend of increasing severity, see 
infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text. 
173 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.). 
174 See The Child Abduction Prevent Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography Preven-
tion Act of 2003:  Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 15-18 (2003) 
(statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.).  
175 See H. REP. NO. 108-66, at 58-59 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); see also Daniel Richman, 
Federal Sentencing in 2007:  The Supreme Court Holds—The Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 
1374, 1388 (2008).  
176 Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, U.S. Prosecutors to Report, Appeal Short Sentences by 
Federal Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1. 
177 149 CONG. REC. 7643 (2003).  
178 Id. at 9081.  
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On April 30, 2003, a version of the Feeney Amendment to the 
PROTECT Act was enacted into law.179  The new provision ordered the 
Commission to “substantially reduce[]” the incidence of judicial down-
ward departures.180  At the same time, it required the Commission to 
create a new “early disposition” (or “fast track”) downward departure, 
solely in districts designated by the Attorney General and solely upon 
motion of the prosecutor, to induce defendants to swiftly waive a variety 
of rights and plead guilty.181  The Feeney Amendment also replaced 
the by-now-vestigial “unreasonableness” standard of review for depar-
tures with a stricter standard that fortified and codified the holdings in 
Williams and Koon.182  The new standard required reversal if the basis 
for departure was “not authorized under section 3553(b)” and also 
required de novo review of the district court’s application of the guide-
lines to the facts.183  The Feeney Amendment had its intended result:  “a 
transfer of even more plea-bargaining power from judges to prosecu-
tors, resulting in higher sentences on prosecutors’ terms.”184 
Later, it came to light that the Department’s claim that Koon had 
caused a significant increase in judicial departures was false.  In Octo-
ber 2003, the Commission reported that while there had been an in-
crease in the rate of non-substantial assistance downward departures, 
this began well before Koon was decided and was primarily attributable 
to an increase in government sponsored downward departures, mainly 
in immigration and drug cases on the border.185  Excluding border 
 
179 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 650, at 675. 
180 Id.   
181 Id.; see also Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys, 
Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or “Fast-Track” 
Prosecution Program in a District (Sept. 22, 2003) (stating that in order to qualify for a 
fast track disposition, a defendant must enter into an expedited agreement to plead guilty 
and waive his rights to file pretrial motions, to appeal, and to challenge the legality of 
his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “except on the issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel”), in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 135 (2003).  
182 PROTECT Act § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)); see also 
supra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.  
183 PROTECT Act § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670.   
184 Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power 
to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 308 (2004). 
185 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 53-65 (2003). 
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districts, the rate of downward departures was the same before and 
after Koon and had even declined in recent years.186  From the early 
1990s until 2003, the Commission had reported a large and growing 
number of government sponsored departures in the same category 
with judge-initiated departures; the only departures it identified as 
government sponsored were those for cooperation with authorities.187   
This gave the impression that the increasing rate of “other” downward 
departures was the result of judicial discretion, when in fact it was the 
result of prosecutorial discretion.188  Unfortunately, while the Commis-
sion had become aware at some point that the rate of “other” downward 
departures had been increasing since 1992 due to government-
initiated departures,189 it did not correct the way in which it publicly 
reported departure data until after the PROTECT Act was passed.190   
 
186 Id. at 54-56, 60.  
187 Through 2002, the Commission reported only two categories of downward depar-
tures:  “substantial assistance departure[s]” and “other downward departure[s].”  See, 
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.26 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 SOURCEBOOK].  The Sentencing Commission publishes 
annual Sourcebooks, which are available on the Commission’s website.  Data and Statistics, 
U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ (last visited Mar. 
15, 2012).  
188 After receiving comments from the Judicial Conference expressing concern that 
the Commission’s “approach to reporting the data has resulted in confusion, misinfor-
mation, and misuse by some who mistakenly infer that all ‘other downward’ departures 
are attributable to judges” and “may have prompted the enactment of the PROTECT 
Act,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that the Commission’s “data 
are not recorded, coded, or reported in ways that clearly delineate other downward 
departures due to judicial discretion from those due to prosecutorial discretion” and 
that the Commission’s “other” departure category, which had been “generally thought 
to represent judicial discretion,” included a significant proportion of government 
sponsored departures, and suggested that changes to the way the Commission reports 
“other” departures would be beneficial.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
04-105, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES:  DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1999–2001, at 4, 11, 22-23, 24, 26, 64, 
app. IV at 67, app. VI at 78-79 (2003). 
189 See Oversight of the United States Sentencing Commission:  Are the Guidelines Being  
Followed?  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 20-22, 38 (2002) (statement of John R. Steer, Vice-Chair, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission). 
190 Following the enactment of the PROTECT Act, the Commission reported that 
after subtracting government-initiated downward departures, the 2001 rate of “other” 
downward departures was reduced from 18.1% to 10.9%.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
supra note 185, at 60.  In 2003 and 2004, the Commission separated the “other downward 
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To one astute and long-time observer, the PROTECT Act simply 
“followed the pattern of the previous twenty years—jeering disparities 
created by judges while cheering those created by prosecutors,” and 
confirmed that “[i]ncreasing prosecutorial power and the severity of 
criminal punishments was not the unintended consequence of Guidelines 
designed to reduce sentencing disparity,” but “the point all along.”191  
This may have pleased key factions within the Department of Justice in 
the short term, but it damaged respect for law and ignited widespread 
suspicion about the bona fides of the entire project of mandatory fed-
eral sentencing guidelines.  
II.  THE SUCCESS OF THE ADVISORY GUIDELINES SYSTEM 
In United States v. Booker and subsequent decisions, the Supreme 
Court has “reset the balance of authority in federal sentencing.”192  The 
Court has dismantled not only the provisions of the PROTECT Act,193 
but also the Commission’s previous restrictions on judicial discretion 
that were contrary to or not required by the SRA.194  It has encouraged 
 
departures” category into “government sponsored” and “other” downward departures.  
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.26A (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26A (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
SOURCEBOOK].  Since Booker, the Commission has reported government sponsored 
below-guideline sentences as § 5K1.1 (substantial assistance), § 5K3.1 (fast track), or 
“other.”  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING STATISTICS tbl.26 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK]. 
191 Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity:  The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 116 (2005) (emphasis added).  
192 Stith, supra note 170, at 1477.  
193 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005) (severing and excising 
§ 3553(b) and § 3742(e)); see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1243-46 (2011) 
(severing and excising § 3742(g)(2)). 
194 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007) (stating that courts may find 
that “the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or . . . do not generally treat certain 
defendant characteristics in the proper way”); id. at 364-65 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(noting that offender characteristics “not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines” 
are “matters that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing judge to consider”); see also Pep-
per, 131 S. Ct. at 1241-44, 1247-50 (holding that district courts may consider evidence of 
post-sentencing rehabilitation in varying from the guideline range, despite a policy 
statement prohibiting departure on that ground); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 
56-60 (2007) (upholding a variance based on offender characteristics that are relevant 
to the purposes of sentencing, though disapproved by policy statements).    
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the Commission to act as the neutral expert body it was created to be195 
and to review and revise its guidelines based on what it learns from the 
courts that apply them in practice.196  The Court has limited the ways 
in which the political branches and the Commission can restrict, 
should they wish to do so, the sentencing authority of Article III judges 
and has brought greater balance and transparency to the Commission’s 
rulemaking.   
Judges must treat the advisory guideline range as the “starting 
point and the initial benchmark,” but must also consider all relevant 
circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the defendant, in-
cluding factors the guidelines omit, prohibit, or discourage.197  Policy 
statements that disapprove consideration of individualized circum-
stances relevant under § 3553(a) may not be elevated over such rele-
vant factors and may be freely disregarded.198   
Judges may also vary from the guideline range based on a policy 
disagreement, that is, a decision that the guideline recommendation 
embodies a policy judgment that fails to achieve the purposes of sen-
tencing, apart from any case-specific facts that might otherwise justify a 
variance.199  The Court made clear in Cunningham v. California that the 
 
195 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (describing the Com-
mission’s “characteristic institutional role” as its capacity to “base its determinations on 
empirical data and national experience” (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 
1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring))). 
196 The major theme of Booker and its progeny is that sentencing judges may impose 
sentences outside the guideline range where doing so would better achieve the purposes 
of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that the courts’ reasoned judgments 
will assist the Commission in reviewing and revising the guidelines.  
197 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50; see also id. at 53-60 (reviewing the factors considered  
by the district court and concluding that based on these factors the sentence was  
reasonable). 
198 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1247-50 (explaining that policy statements that prohibit 
consideration of factors that are highly relevant to the purposes of sentencing cannot 
be elevated above such relevant factors, and that instead the court must give “appropri-
ate weight” to the factors); Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60 (upholding a variance based on fac-
tors relevant to the purposes of sentencing that had been deemed never or not 
ordinarily relevant by policy statements, without addressing the policy statements or 
requiring courts to address them).  Justice Alito has expressed a view that judges should 
give “some significant weight” to policy statements, id. at 68 (Alito, J., dissenting), but 
no other member of the Court has agreed with this view.    
199 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101-02.  
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availability of this type of variance is constitutionally required.200  In 
Rita v. United States, meanwhile, the Court held that courts may not 
employ a “legal presumption” that the guidelines should apply and 
hence may consider arguments that “the Guidelines sentence itself 
fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.”201  In Kimbrough v. 
United States, the Court reiterated that “courts may vary [from Guide-
lines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including disagree-
ments with the Guidelines.”202  The Court held that, since “the cocaine 
Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only,” it “would not 
be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sen-
tencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a 
sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, 
even in a mine-run case.”203  Similarly, the Court held in Pepper v. United 
States that a district court may “disagree[] with the Commission’s views” 
regarding the relevance of offender characteristics, particularly where 
those “views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflect-
ed in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.”204   
The judicial check on the Commission that has arisen from Booker 
and subsequent decisions resembles judicial review of the rules of other 
federal agencies,205 but it differs in important respects.  Under the  
 
200 See 549 U.S. 270, 278-81, 292-93 (2007) (invalidating California’s guidelines sys-
tem because, unlike the federal system, it required a sentence to a specified term unless 
the court found case-specific “facts” about the offense or the offender and did not au-
thorize a sentence outside the specified term based on a “policy judgment” in light of 
the “[g]eneral objectives of sentencing”); see also id. at 304-08 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(disputing the majority’s conclusion that the California system did not allow courts to 
sentence outside the specified term based on “policy considerations” such as the pur-
poses of sentencing). 
201 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). 
202  552 U.S. at 101-02 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).  
203 Id. at 91, 109-10; see also Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009) 
(“[D]istrict courts are entitled to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines in a mine-run 
case where there are no ‘particular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a vari-
ance from the Guidelines’ sentencing range.”).   
204 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011). 
205 For example, in a recent APA decision invalidating as “arbitrary and capricious” 
a rule promulgated by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals, the Court used language 
similar to that in Kimbrough and Pepper in holding that the rule was “unmoored from 
the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws,” and stated that it could not “dis-
cern a reason for it.”  Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 490 (2011). 
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judicial review afforded by the APA, an agency’s interpretation of a 
relevant statute is given “controlling weight” in some circumstances.206  
In contrast, district courts may never assume that a guideline sentence 
complies with § 3553(a),207 and neither district courts nor courts of 
appeals may presume that a non-guideline sentence is unreasonable.208  
A court of appeals may apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonable-
ness to a guideline sentence, but this is rooted in deference to the dis-
trict court, not to the Commission,209 and it does not reflect the sort of 
deference “that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway 
to an expert agency than to a district judge.”210  If it were otherwise, the 
guidelines would again have a mandatory character and hence would 
be unconstitutional.  On the other hand, a court’s conclusion that a 
guideline is unsound does not (as it would under APA review) result in 
the guideline being held “unlawful and set aside.”211  District courts 
must still treat the guideline range as the “starting point and the initial 
benchmark” in each case212 but may vary from that range to reach a 
 
206 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984). 
207 See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (“The Guidelines are not 
only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable.”); 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007) (“[T]he district judge . . . may not pre-
sume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.”). 
208 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (“[T]he approaches we reject come too close to creating 
an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guide-
lines range.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354-55 (2007) (“The fact that we 
permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that 
courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness.”). 
209 In Rita, the Court explained that 
the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is consider-
ing a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the 
Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the prop-
er sentence in the particular case.  That double determination significantly in-
creases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one. 
551 U.S. at 347; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 40 (noting that Rita permitted the appeals 
court to presume reasonableness “when a district judge’s discretionary decision in a par-
ticular case accords with the sentence the [Commission] deems appropriate” (empha-
sis added)). 
210 Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. 
211 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).  
212 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49). 
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sentence that they find better achieves the purposes of sentencing,213 
subject to review for procedural and substantive reasonableness.214   
 Booker has thus created a dialogue between the courts and the 
Commission that has, for the first time in the Commission’s history, 
made possible the “continuous evolution helped by the sentencing 
courts and courts of appeals”215 that the SRA’s framers envisioned.216  
The Commission can persuade the courts to follow the guidelines 
through “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power 
to control.”217  And the courts can persuade the Commission to revise 
guidelines that they find to be unsound by varying from them and  
explaining why.218   
Recall that, before Booker, judges were not permitted to depart based 
on dissatisfaction with the guidelines, no matter how well-founded 
their dissatisfaction or how ill-considered the guideline.219 Thus, for 
example, judges were not permitted to depart based on disagreement 
with the crack guidelines, even after the Commission itself found that 
the 100-to-1 powder-to-crack ratio required excessive punishment and 
created unwarranted disparity, because these problems were “typical” 
 
213 See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1242-43 (2011); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 
at 110-11; Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).   
214 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.   
215 Rita, 551 U.S. at 350. 
216 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.   
217 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing the bases on 
which courts may accord deference to an agency’s nonlegislative rules); cf. Stith & 
Dunn, supra note 171, at 232 (“Booker makes the Sentencing Guidelines nonlegislative, 
and Mead uses broad language in holding that nonlegislative agency rules are entitled 
to less deference [under Skidmore] than regulations that have the force of law.”). 
218 See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58 (“[T]he sentencing judge[’s] . . . reasoned sentenc-
ing judgment, resting upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through 
§ 3553(a)’s list of factors . . . should help the Guidelines constructively evolve over 
time.”); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“[T]he Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing 
Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court sentencing decisions, 
undertaking research, and revising the Guidelines accordingly.”).   
219 See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. 
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of all crack cases and thus within the guidelines’ “heartland.”220  If a 
judge disagreed with the punishment required by a guideline based on 
the Commission’s own research or based on her experience in sen-
tencing hundreds of defendants every year, she was unable to act upon 
that disagreement.  Although the courts of appeals occasionally called 
upon the Commission to amend unsound guidelines, they nonetheless 
enforced those guidelines and thus were easily ignored.221  
Booker has been transformative simply by permitting the courts to 
communicate with the Commission (and with each other) in a trans-
parent and effective manner.  Supreme Court and lower court deci-
sions have moved the Commission to revise a number of guidelines 
and to use its expertise to persuade Congress to revise its own unsound 
policies.  The most well-known example is the reform of penalties for 
crack cocaine.  The Commission began exposing the excessive harsh-
ness and unwarranted disparity built into the crack cocaine guidelines 
in 1995.222  The courts were nonetheless required to follow those 
guidelines because the unjust disparity was not a permissible ground 
for departure under the Commission’s departure standard.223  After 
Booker, judges more frequently imposed reduced sentences in crack 
cases, some based on individualized circumstances and others on the 
 
220 See In re Sealed Case, 292 F.3d 913, 914-16 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Canales, 91 F.3d 363, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 90 F.3d 302, 304-06 
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). 
221 See, e.g., United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding 
a career offender sentence predicated on a “pure recklessness” crime, but “recom-
mend[ing] that the Commission consider a return to the original Guideline definition 
of ‘crime of violence,’ adopted by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 16, or else in some other  
way exclude pure recklessness crimes from the category of predicate crimes for career 
offender status”); see also id. at 875 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I fully agree that the broad 
definition of a ‘crime of violence’ in [guideline] § 4B1.2(1) merits reexamination by 
the Sentencing Commission.”); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 
1995) (sharing Parson’s concerns and calling upon Commission to reevaluate the 
guideline); United States v. Stubler, 271 F. App’x 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (reluctantly 
following Parson in a case involving reckless endangerment and noting that while Par-
son had “questioned the wisdom of the possibly inadvertent adoption of a definition for 
‘crime of violence’ that can include offenses that do not involve the intentional use of 
force . . . neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission has seen fit to revise that 
definition” (citation omitted)). 
222 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 153. 
223 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.  
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unjustified severity of the guideline itself.224  The circuits split on 
whether the latter was permissible,225 and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.226  In January 2007, two of the original sponsors of the SRA, 
Senators Kennedy and Hatch, along with Senator Feinstein, filed an 
amicus brief in the Supreme Court, urging the Court to permit judges 
to disagree with unsound policies reflected in the guidelines, includ-
ing the crack/powder disparity.227  Citing these developments,228 the 
Commission took the next step:  it voted to reduce the crack guide-
lines by two levels (to include but no longer to exceed mandatory min-
imum punishment levels) and urged Congress to take further action 
because it considered the amendment an incomplete solution to an 
“urgent and compelling” problem.229  The Supreme Court then decided 
Kimbrough v. United States,230 and courts began varying from the crack 
guidelines more often.231  On April 29, 2009, the Administration urged 
 
224 See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 126-31, 131 n.343 (explaining that, as of 
2006, below-range sentences for crack cocaine increased from 4.3% of cases in the year 
before Booker to 14.7% after Booker).   
225 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FED-
ERAL SENTENCING POLICY 115-22 (2007) (noting the circuit split, that several cases 
were pending on petition for certiorari, and that certiorari had been granted in 
Claiborne v. United States). 
226 Claiborne v. United States, 549 U.S. 1016 (2006).  
227 Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch, and Dianne 
Feinstein in Support of Affirmance, Claiborne v. United States, 551 U.S. 87 (2007) (No. 
06-5618), 2007 WL 197103.  After petitioner Mario Claiborne died, thus mooting the 
case, the Court granted review in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007), and  
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).   
228 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 225, at 115-22. 
229 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 28,572-73 (May 21, 2007).   
230 552 U.S. 85; see also supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. 
231 See Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker Restored Balance?  A Look at Data on Plea Bargaining 
and Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 326, 331 (2011) (reporting that, in fiscal year 2009, 
57.1% of crack defendants without trumping mandatory minimums were sentenced 
below the guideline range); 2008–2010 USSC Monitoring Datasets (revealing that the 
rate of below-range sentences in all crack cases increased from 43.8% in 2008, to 51% 
in 2009, to 60.4% in 2010).  For a description of the Commission’s annual Monitoring 
Datasets, see FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, app. D at 1, and U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2010/2011 GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS AND RESOURCES 26-28 (2010), available  
at http://www.ussc.gov/Publications/2010_Guide_to_Publications_and_Resources.pdf.  
Datasets for each fiscal year can be obtained from the Commission eighteen to twenty-
four months after the conclusion of the fiscal year, and can be analyzed with a special-
ized software package. 
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Congress to eliminate the crack/powder disparity, and noted that until 
a comprehensive solution was implemented in the form of legislation 
and amended guidelines, prosecutors would “inform courts that they 
should act within their discretion to fashion a sentence that is con-
sistent with the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”232  On August 3, 2010, 
Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the 
100-to-1 powder-to-crack quantity ratio to 18-to-1 and directed the 
Commission to reduce guideline penalties accordingly.233  Thus, Booker 
and what followed in the courts prompted the Commission to take 
direct action in 2007, and contributed to the confluence of events that 
led Congress to take further action in 2010—fifteen years after the 
Commission first sought to amend the crack guidelines.   
The Commission has revised other guidelines in response to sen-
tencing data and reasons in recent amendment cycles.234  The Com-
mission is planning a report to Congress regarding the guideline 
applicable to possession of child pornography, a guideline that both 
courts and prosecutors find to be highly problematic.235  And the 
Commission recently announced that it intends to address problems 
with the fraud guideline in response to high rates of below-guideline 
sentences, both non-government sponsored and government spon-
sored, in certain kinds of cases.236 
 
232 Restoring Fairness to Federal Sentencing:  Addressing the Crack-Powder Disparity:  Hear-
ing Before Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 101 
(2009) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen.).  
233 Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; id. § 8, 124 Stat. at 2374. 
234 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 742 (Nov. 1, 
2010) (eliminating “recency” points from the criminal history score, citing frequent 
below-guideline sentences in cases in which recency points were added to the criminal 
history score); id. amend. 738 (Nov. 1, 2010) (expanding slightly the availability of  
alternatives to straight imprisonment, citing judicial feedback); id. amend. 754 (Nov. 1, 
2011) (reducing large increases under the illegal reentry guideline based on stale prior 
convictions, citing appellate decisions finding unwarranted uniformity in requiring the 
same increase regardless of the age of the conviction). 
235 See 76 Fed. Reg. 58,564, 58,564 (Sept. 21, 2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 1 n.4, 8, 41-54 (2009); Letter 
from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, Dep’t of Justice, to 
Chief Judge William K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 6 ( June 28, 2010).  
236 See 77 Fed. Reg. 2778, 2780, 2783 ( Jan. 19, 2012); Public Meeting Minutes, U.S. 
SEN’T COMMISSION ( Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_ 
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120110/Meeting_Minutes.pdf. 
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Booker has also allowed the courts to share “principles of general 
applicability” with each other, and in turn, to communicate more ef-
fectively with the Commission regarding whether the guidelines fulfill 
the purposes of sentencing.237  Freed of the stunted departure standard 
and the restrictive standard of review, district courts consider well-
reasoned decisions of other district courts and courts of appeals in 
other circuits regarding the soundness of particular guidelines.238  And 
courts of appeals have held that district courts must consider nonfrivo-
lous arguments raised by a party based on relevant analysis provided by 
other courts.239  In this manner, courts are now engaged in an ongoing, 
national conversation regarding sentencing policy and practice, and 
are providing valuable feedback to the Commission in the process.240  
Sentencing in cases involving the guideline for possession of child 
pornography illustrates the enormously influential effect of reasoned 
judicial decisions across districts and circuits,241 which has produced 
aggregate data that the Commission is taking into account.242                
 
237 See Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch, and  
Dianne Feinstein, supra note 227, at 22-25. 
238 See, e.g., United States v. Shull, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2011) 
(agreeing with the analysis from the Northern District of Iowa regarding the unsound-
ness of the current crack guidelines, and adopting a one-to-one ratio in crack cases 
(citing United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 891-92 (N.D. Iowa 2011))).  
239 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 958, 963 & n.4  (9th Cir. 
2011) (reversing for failure to address a challenge to the child pornography guideline 
after setting forth an extensive analysis and agreeing with principles stated by other 
courts of appeals); United States v. Davy, 433 F. App’x 343, 349-52 (6th Cir. 2011) (re-
versing for failure to consider a challenge to the stolen-gun enhancement under 
§ 2K2.1, with reference to a decision from the Eastern District of New York (citing 
United States v. Handy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 437, 478-80 (E.D.N.Y. 2008))). 
240 As Professor Berman observed five years before Booker, the SRA’s framers ex-
pected that “judges would share—with each other and with the Sentencing Commis-
sion—case-specific insights on sentencing policy and practice and thereby contribute to 
the development of principled and purposeful sentencing law.”  Douglas A. Berman, 
Balanced and Purposeful Departures:  Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 88 (2000).  But “the ‘heartland’ and 
‘abuse of discretion’ standards,” as described in Koon, “devalued departure authority as 
a means for judicial contribution to the evolution of the sentencing law under the 
Guidelines.”  Id.  “Lost along the way was an appreciation of departures as a mechanism 
through which judges could provide meaningful feedback concerning the Guidelines 
as they related to the fundamental purposes of punishment.”  Id. at 71. 
241 See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, No. 09-0024, 2011 WL 890502, at *5, *16 (D. 
Me. Mar. 11, 2011) (citing nonbinding decisions from other circuits and districts re-
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As the Commission improves the guidelines, judges follow them 
more often,243 as the Supreme Court predicted they would.244  Moreover, 
as transparency has increased, the Justice Department’s influence on 
the Commission has lessened somewhat, and Booker has had a salutary 
influence on some of the Department’s own policies.  Attorney General 
Eric Holder has recognized that “equal justice depends on individual-
ized justice,” and accordingly has authorized prosecutors to request 
variances based on the purposes and factors set forth in § 3553(a), 
with supervisory approval.245  Further, the Department has now required 
United States Attorneys in all districts to implement an early disposi-
tion (“fast track”) program for illegal reentry cases, noting that the 
availability of such departures in some districts but not others had 
 
flecting “judicial disquiet” with the child pornography guideline, and quoting the First 
Circuit’s “cautionary coda” in United States v. Stone that the child pornography “guide-
lines . . . are in our judgment harsher than necessary” (quoting 575 F.3d 83, 97 (1st Cir. 
2009))); United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing eight 
decisions from districts in other circuits in support of its conclusion that the child por-
nography guideline produces sentences greater than necessary to achieve sentencing 
purposes); United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 892, 901 (E.D. Tenn. 
2009) (relying on the analyses of “[c]ourts across the country” and deciding to sen-
tence the defendant below the guideline range because “the child pornography Guide-
lines do not fully describe the current sentencing practices of district courts or adequately 
differentiate between the least and worst offenders”). 
242 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
243 After increasing nearly every quarter through fiscal year 2010, the overall rate of 
non-government sponsored below-guideline sentences began to drop during the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2011, concurrent with the reduction in the crack guidelines on 
November 1, 2010.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT:  1ST QUARTER RELEASE 12 tbl.4 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT] (showing a decrease from 18.7% in the fourth quarter of 2010 to 17.5% in 
the first quarter of 2012).   
244 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107 (2007) (“[A]dvisory Guidelines 
combined with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guide-
lines in response to sentencing practices will help to ‘avoid excessive sentencing dispar-
ities.’” (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005))).  Justice Scalia 
explained in Rita v. United States that as the Commission “perform[s] its function of 
revising the Guidelines to reflect the desirable sentencing practices of the district 
courts . . . district courts will have less reason to depart from the Commission’s recom-
mendations.”  551 U.S. 338, 382-83 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 218. 
245 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 
19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf. 
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generated concern about unwarranted disparity.246  That concern had 
been raised by the courts through variances made possible by Booker.247    
And what effect has loosening the hold of the guidelines had on 
sentencing outcomes?  In our judgment, no one can honestly say that 
judges have been unduly lenient.  One year after Booker, when the 
guidelines were still being widely enforced, judges sentenced below 
the guideline range in 12.5% of cases,248 an increase from 10.9% in 
2001 when the guidelines were mandatory.249  In fiscal year 2011—four 
years after the Supreme Court made clear in Gall that judges may con-
sider all relevant circumstances, including those placed off limits by 
the Commission’s policy statements, and in Rita and Kimbrough that 
judges may discount unsound guidelines250—the rate of sentences  
below the guideline range had risen to only 17.4%.251  The low rate of 
below-range sentences is even more remarkable in light of the near 
absence of mitigating factors in the guidelines and the one-way up-
ward ratchet in guideline penalties over the years, which the Commis-
sion has just begun to address.  When judges do depart or vary, the 
median decrease remains, as it was before Booker, exceedingly mod-
est—about twelve months.252  And average sentence length for all cases 
is, and has remained since Booker, about ten months below the average 
guideline range.253  Average sentence length was roughly forty-six 
 
246 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys 2 ( Jan. 
31, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf. 
247 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485 (10th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 707-10 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Camacho-
Arellano, 614 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 
142 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 228 (1st Cir. 2008). 
248 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 47.   
249 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  DOWNWARD DEPAR-
TURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 60 (2003).  
250 See supra notes 194, 197-99. 
251 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS-
TICS, tbl.N (2011) [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK].  
252 See, e.g., 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.31A; 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 190, tbl.31A; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING STATISTICS tbls.31A-31D (2006); 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING STATISTICS tbls.31A-31D (2008); 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbls.31A-31D; 
2012 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 243, tbls.10-13.  
253 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 32 fig.C 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT]; 2012 QUARTERLY DATA 
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months before Booker 254 and was forty-three months in the most recent 
fiscal year.255  This small decrease is primarily attributable to variances 
and lowered guideline ranges for crack cases and a large increase in 
the number of immigration cases prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), 
which has a statutory maximum of two years and a correspondingly low 
guideline range.256  Average sentence length has remained the same or 
slightly increased for all other important categories of offenses,257 except 
that it has slightly decreased for marijuana offenses,258 and has substan-
tially increased for fraud offenses259 and child pornography offenses.260 
It appears that prosecutors, too, generally view the guidelines as 
unduly harsh.  The government moved for sentences below the guide-
line range in 26.3% of all cases in fiscal year 2011.261  Additionally, the 
government either agreed to or did not oppose more than half of sen-
tences the Commission classifies as “non-government sponsored below 
 
REPORT, supra note 243, at 32 fig.C.  Figures C through I of the quarterly data reports 
graph average sentence length and average guideline minimum from fiscal year 2005 
through the first quarter of fiscal year 2012. 
254 The average sentence length was 46.8 months in 2001, 46.9 months in 2002, 
47.9 months in 2003, 50.1 months in 2004 (pre-Blakely), 45 months in 2004 (post-
Blakely), and 46.3 months in 2005 (pre-Booker).  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13 (2001); 2002 SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 187, tbl.13; 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.13; 2004 SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 190, tbl.13; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 SOURCEBOOK].  
255 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.13. 
256 See 2010 FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 32 fig.C, 36 fig.G, 38 
fig.I; 2012 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 32 fig.C, 36 fig.G, 38 fig.I. 
257 See 2010 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 32-38 figs.C-I; 2012 QUAR-
TERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 32-38 figs.C-I.  Average sentence length has 
increased slightly for firearms offenses, alien smuggling offenses, and powder cocaine 
offenses; has increased somewhat significantly for heroin offenses; and has remained 
the same for methamphetamine offenses. 
258 See 2010 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 38 fig.I; 2012 QUARTERLY 
DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 38 fig.I. 
259 See 2010 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 253, at 33 fig.D; 2012 QUARTERLY 
DATA REPORT, supra note 243, at 33 fig.D. 
260 Compare 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.13 (reporting a mean sentence 
of 119.1 months), with 2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 254, § 2 tbl.13 (reporting a mean 
sentence of 75 months before Booker), and id. § 3 tbl.13 (reporting a mean sentence of 
78.6 months after Booker). 
261 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.N.   
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range.”262  And, although the government’s success rate on appeal is 
roughly the same or better than before Booker, it appeals about the 
same number of below-guideline sentences as it did before Booker.263  
Further, since the Attorney General’s May 2010 announcement that 
prosecutors may request variances consistent with § 3553(a), the gov-
ernment has sought sentences below the guideline range for reasons 
other than cooperation or fast track at an increasing rate, particularly 
in cases in which the guidelines are most in need of revision.264  In-
deed, the decrease in recent years in government sponsored down-
ward departures for cooperation may well be due to the ability of 
 
262 This statistical inference is based on the following facts.  First, the government did 
not object to 44.5% of defense motions (3334 of 7488) for a below-range sentence clas-
sified as non-government sponsored in fiscal year 2011.  Id. tbl.28A.  Second, because 
the statement-of-reasons form does not provide a checkbox for the court to indicate the 
government’s position regarding reasons not addressed in a plea agreement or motion 
by a party, there is no information regarding the government’s position on another 
4664 below-range sentences, all of which are classified as non-government sponsored.  
Id.  Since defense attorneys generally raise all nonfrivolous grounds for below-range 
sentences and judges do not raise meritless grounds sua sponte, it is likely that the gov-
ernment did not object to a significant portion of these sentences.  Third, in 3030 other 
cases classified as non-government sponsored below-range, the Commission did not 
receive sufficient information to determine the government’s position or whether the 
source was a plea agreement, a motion by a party, or something else.  Id.  Since a large 
majority of cases for which information was available were sponsored or agreed to by 
the government, it is reasonable to assume that the government sponsored or acqui-
esced in a significant portion of cases where information was not available.  Together, 
these cases easily exceed 50% of sentences classified as “non-government sponsored 
below range.” 
263 In fiscal year 2011, the government raised 92 issues on appeal; the government 
prevailed in 65% of the 26 of those that involved § 3553(a) or a claim of unreasonable-
ness.  2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.58.  In 1998, the government raised 122 
issues on appeal; for the 41 of those that related to departures, it prevailed 63% of the 
time. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STA-
TISTICS, tbl.56 (1998).  In 1999, the government raised 54 issues on appeal; for the 25 
related to departures, it prevailed 28% of the time.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.58 (1999).  In 2003, under the 
strict PROTECT Act standard of review, the government raised 176 issues on appeal; 
for the 63 related to departures, it prevailed 73% of the time.  2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 190, tbl.58.  
264 The government sponsored below-guideline sentences for reasons other than 
cooperation or fast track in 2.9% of cases in 2005 and in 4.4% of cases in 2011.  Compare 
2005 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 254, § 3 tbl.26, with 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, 
tbl.N.  The rate was 14.7% in child pornography possession cases.  Id. tbl.27.  
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prosecutors to use other mechanisms to mitigate the harshness of 
guideline sentences.265   
The observation of Professor Kevin Reitz, an expert on guidelines 
systems, made soon after Booker still holds: 
  No member of Congress should work to overhaul the post-Booker 
Guidelines on the theory that they herald a return to the bad old days of 
fully discretionary judicial sentencing or on the theory that the new  
“advisory” Guidelines are extremely permissive compared with norms in 
guidelines sentencing systems nationwide. . . . [T]he Booker -ized Guide-
lines . . . remain as restrictive of judicial sentencing discretion as any sys-
tem in the United States.
266
 
Three-fourths of federal judges express agreement with the state-
ment that the post-Booker advisory guidelines system “best achieves the 
purposes of sentencing,” with only three percent preferring the pre-
Booker mandatory guidelines.267  Prosecutors also prefer advisory guide-
lines to other possible options, and the Department of Justice has thus 
far followed their lead.268  The organized public and private defense 
bars support the advisory guidelines system,269 as do organizations ded-
icated to fair and rational sentencing policy.270   
 
265 While the rate of cooperation departures has fallen from 15.5% in 2004 (before 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)) to 11.2% in 2011, the rate of government 
sponsored fast track and other departures has grown from 6.4% in 2004 (before 
Blakely) to 15.1% in 2011.  See 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, § 2 tbl.26A; 2011 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.27.  
266 Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 
171 (2005). 
267 See supra note 8.  Fourteen percent believe the purposes of sentencing would be 
best achieved by a system along the lines of Judge Sessions’s proposal, if coupled with 
fewer mandatory minimums, which we analyze in Section IV.A, infra, while eight per-
cent believe that having no guidelines at all would best achieve these purposes.  Id.  
268 Breuer, supra note 10, at 112 (noting that prosecutors “were not enthusiastic” 
about a return to a mandatory guidelines structure and that the Department of Justice 
“does not plan to seek legislative reinstatement of a mandatory Guidelines system”); cf. 
Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 793 (2008) (noting that some line prosecutors welcome Booker, 
as “a fair number of these assistants chafe at the Department’s insistence on draconian 
penalties”).   
269 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
270 Supporters include Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the ACLU, and the 
Sentencing Project.  See Uncertain Justice:  The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission Six Years After Booker:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
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In sum, Booker and its progeny have established a measure of bal-
ance for the first time since the guidelines’ inception.  Judges have 
been remarkably restrained in exercising their discretion, and the 
Commission—working with, instead of against, judges and educating 
rather than automatically bowing to the harshest voices in Congress—
is beginning to fix broken guidelines.  The Attorney General has di-
rected federal prosecutors to comply with the new law of sentencing by 
seeking sentences outside the guideline range when appropriate.271  
Thus far, Congress has enacted fewer mandatory minimums and  
issued fewer specific directives to the Commission after Booker than in 
any other seven-year period since the guidelines went into effect.272   
To state the matter succinctly, there is no need for a Booker fix.  
Booker was the fix. 
III.  THE UNCONVINCING RATIONALES FOR A BOOKER “FIX” 
Judge Sessions observes that most sentences are within the guideline 
range; that average sentence length has remained relatively constant; 
and that, when judges depart or vary, the extent of the adjustments has 
been “modest” and, indeed, slightly less than before Booker.273  Similarly, 
the Commission observes that over eighty percent of sentences are 
within the guideline range or pursuant to a government motion for a 
 
& Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mary 
Price, Vice President and General Counsel, Families Against Mandatory Minimums), 
available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FAMM%20Testimony%20Booker 
%20Hearing%2010-12-11.pdf; Uncertain Justice:  The Status of Federal Sentencing and the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years After Booker:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (state-
ment of American Civil Liberties Union), available at  http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/ 
ACLU%20Sentencing%20Hearing%20Testimony%2010-12-11final.pdf; Mary Price, Vice 
President and Gen. Counsel, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Statement Before 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_ 
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_FAMM.pdf; 
 Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., The Sentencing Project, Statement Before the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/ 
Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_Mauer.pdf.   
271 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.   
272 See Study of Mandatory Minimums and Specific Directives (2011) (on file with 
authors).  The study, completed by the authors, catalogues mandatory minimum stat-
utes and specific directives enacted from 1987 through 2011. 
273 Sessions, supra note 12, at 316, 329.  
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sentence outside the guideline range,274 and that the “clear linkage” 
between guideline ranges and sentences imposed “demonstrates that 
the guidelines . . . continue to work to guide the sentencing decisions 
of federal judges.”275  Yet, Judge Sessions and the Commission both call 
for a legislative fix.  In support of their proposals, they claim that judges 
create unwarranted disparities.  These claims, however, rest on flawed 
and incomplete data analyses.  Moreover, Judge Sessions and the 
Commission fail to acknowledge that much more troubling forms of 
unwarranted disparity have been reduced as a result of Booker and 
would be reintroduced by their proposals.    
A.  Disparities Under the Mandatory Guidelines 
The SRA was largely motivated by the perception that the “unfet-
tered discretion” the law conferred on judges in imposing sentences, 
and on parole authorities in setting release dates, had resulted in wide, 
unwarranted disparities.276  Yet reexamination of the studies that pur-
ported to show significant disparity in judicial sentencing decisions 
before the guidelines revealed both that the data and methodologies 
upon which these claims were based were flawed and that sentencing 
outcomes generally corresponded to relevant differences in offenses 
and offenders.277  The most sophisticated studies of sentencing under 
the mandatory guidelines found that interjudge disparity in average 
sentence length fell by one month or less.278  The Commission viewed 
 
274 The precise rate is 82.6%, including 54.5% within the range, 26.3% below the 
range based on a government motion, and 1.8% above the range.  2011 SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 251, tbl.N. 
275 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 22.  
276 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38-49, 74-75 (1983).   
277 See DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:  DOES RACE MATTER?  THE TRANSITION TO 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986–90, at 25-26 (1993) (“Differences clearly thought to 
be unwarranted (e.g., by the offender’s race or ethnicity) were found to be uniformly 
small or statistically insignificant.”); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 47, at 107 (“[T]he 
more sophisticated the study, the less clear the evidence of unwarranted disparities.” 
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 107-12 (discussing the flaws of the studies that most influ-
enced Congress).    
278 See James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentenc-
ing Disparity:  Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 294 
(1999) (finding that the average difference in sentence length fell from 4.9 months 
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this reduction as “significant progress,”279 but others considered it to 
be a sign of failure and not sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the 
more problematic kinds of disparity that the guidelines introduced.280  
The Commission itself recognized that interjudge disparity is only one 
form of disparity and that reducing interjudge disparity created and 
left unchecked other kinds of disparity.281   
In fact, the guidelines created—and masked—much more trou-
bling disparities.  The new, harsher rules had a disproportionate im-
pact on black offenders, and some of these rules were not necessary to 
satisfy the legitimate purposes of sentencing.282  Offenders who dif-
fered significantly in their culpability, danger to the public, risk of re-
cidivism, and rehabilitative needs were treated the same.283  Moreover, 
the guideline range—assumed by many to be identical for similar  
offenders convicted of similar offenses—can be, and is, calculated very 
differently for any number of reasons, including happenstance,284 lack of 
clarity in the guidelines,285 different interpretations of the guidelines,286 
 
before the guidelines to 3.9 months after the guidelines); Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 239, 286-89 (1999) (finding that the average difference in sentence length fell 
from 7.87 months before the guidelines to 7.61 months after the guidelines).  
279 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 99. 
280 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 191, at 89-100; see also Anderson, Kling & Stith,  
supra note 278, at 301-04.   
281 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 79-92, 131-35.   
282 See id. at 131-34 (finding that the guidelines and mandatory minimums for crack 
offenses as well as the use of prior drug trafficking convictions in the career offender 
guideline have an adverse impact on black defendants and “serve no clear sentencing 
purpose”). 
283 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process:  The Problem Is Uni-
formity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 851-70 (1992). 
284 See, e.g., United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“To a considerable extent, the amount of loss caused by this crime is a kind of accident, 
dependent as much on the diligence of the victim’s security procedures as on [the de-
fendant’s] cupidity.”); Robert L. Hinkle, Dist. Judge, Statement Before the U.S.  
Sentencing Commission (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_ 
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20090210-11/Hinkle_statement.pdf (“By hap-
penstance, one defendant provides information to the prosecutor first and benefits 
from § 1B1.8, but a codefendant comes in later and thus faces a markedly higher  
offense level.”).  
285 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 50, 87 (explaining that the relevant 
conduct rule is inconsistently applied, in part because of “ambiguity in the language of 
the rule”); Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of 
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different views of the evidence,287 and varying prosecutorial practices.288  
The Commission’s “statistics showing the number of sentences within 
the guideline range do not pick up these disparities, because they are 
disparities in the calculation of the guideline range.”289  Furthermore, 
measuring disparity solely with reference to judicial decisionmaking 
ignores disparities inevitably created by differing prosecutorial charg-
ing and plea-bargaining policies and strategies across cases and dis-
 
the Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 16, 17-20 (1997) (reporting 
that, in an empirical study of the relevant conduct rule, forty-six probation officers 
assigned the same “typical drug distribution case” widely varying base offense levels, 
and hypothesizing based on the results that officers interpreted the rule in three dif-
ferent ways).   
286 See Hinkle, supra note 284, at 2-3 (“In one district a defendant is tagged only 
with the drugs involved in a specific transaction; in another the concept of relevant 
conduct is applied more broadly, and the offense level skyrockets.”); see also Panel Dis-
cussion, Federal Sentencing Under “Advisory” Guidelines:  Observations by District 
Judges (Mar. 7, 2006) (statement of Judge Gerard E. Lynch) (remarking that, “in per-
fect good faith,” it is often possible to interpret a guideline in more than one way), in 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 16 (2006). 
287 For example, in United States v. Quinn, at the sentencing of one codefendant, the 
prosecutor and probation officer argued for a guideline range of 37-46 months based 
only on the drugs found on her person and at her and her codefendant’s residences on 
the date of arrest.  472 F. Supp. 2d 104, 105-06 (D. Mass. 2007).  At the later sentencing 
of the other codefendant, the same prosecutor and a different probation officer urged 
a guideline range of 151-188 months, based primarily on additional drugs he allegedly 
sold over the previous five years.  Id. at 106-07.  Although there was hearsay infor-
mation indicating that the first codefendant was involved in these uncharged sales as 
well, the prosecutor explained that the information was more reliable with respect to 
the second codefendant.  Id. at 109.  To avoid a very substantial disparity, the judge 
sentenced the second codefendant based on the same amount of drugs as the first 
codefendant, observing that “it is more likely in a Guidelines calculation than in a for-
mal trial that different evaluators of particular information will form different conclu-
sions about it” and that “inconsistent resolutions of essentially the same question with 
respect to two separate but similar defendants is a structural problem within the Guide-
lines’ manner of addressing ‘relevant conduct.’”  Id. at 110-11.    
288 See Hinkle, supra note 284, at 3 (“In one district the government files a notice of 
the defendant’s prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851 and the defendant thus faces a 
long minimum mandatory sentence; in another district the government chooses not to 
file the notice.”).  The severity of the career offender guideline range also depends on 
whether prosecutors file a notice under § 851.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 4B1.1(b) & cmt. 2 (2011); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 851(a) (2006).   
289 Hinkle, supra note 284, at 3. 
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tricts.290  Moreover, it is standard practice in some quarters for law en-
forcement officers to manipulate the guideline range by determining, 
for instance, the quantity or type of drugs bought, sold, or agreed upon 
before an arrest is made.291  
B.  Racial Disparity 
Perhaps the most inflammatory claim by some proponents of the 
guidelines was that judicial discretion led to racial disparity in sentenc-
ing in federal court.292  But, as noted earlier, subsequent reanalysis of 
the studies relied upon belied that claim.293  Judge Sessions and the 
 
290 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 82-85 (listing and describing prosecu-
torial “decision points” that affect the ultimate sentence).  Prosecutors, with or without 
guidelines, treat similar offenders differently for reasons of administrative efficiency.  
See id. at 86.  They also exercise their charging and plea bargaining authority and con-
trol over sentencing facts to induce guilty pleas, and to seek higher sentences for simi-
larly situated offenders after trial.  See id. at 83-84; Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 158, 
at 539-40; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 150-53 (1st Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that a sentencing disparity of more than twenty-one years between codefendants 
who went to trial and those who pled guilty was a permissible consequence of prosecu-
torial plea bargaining discretion under the guidelines). 
291 See Jon O. Newman, The New Commission’s Opportunity, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 44, 
44 (1997) (“[T]he guidelines permit undercover drug enforcement agents to deter-
mine the ultimate punishment by shaping the conversation with a suspect concerning 
the extent of future deliveries.”); Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated 
Culpability, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 49-54), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362 (describing “fictional stash house operations” in 
which informants recruit suspects to engage in fictitious robberies of quantities of 
drugs invented by the informants).  
292 See Stith & Koh, supra note 99, at 227-28 (describing “unwarranted disparity,”  
including “alleged bias against minorities,” as one of the fundamental concerns moti-
vating Congress to enact the SRA); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal 
Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1246 (2005) (recounting that some early 
reformers were “convinced that racial discrimination was a driving force behind im-
prisonment disparities and that the only way to ameliorate or eliminate it was to re-
move judges’ and parole boards’ discretion to discriminate”); Tom Wicker, Judging the 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1976, at A29 (discussing Judge Frankel’s view that the “perva-
sive racial discrimination that mars American justice” is a problem caused by judicial 
discretion); cf. Joseph C. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 
121, 121, 126 (1975) (arguing in regard to sentencing in state court that racial discrim-
ination “is widely perceived in our communities and clearly supported by statistics” and 
calling for reform to “correct the procedural and systematic defects involved in the 
sentencing process”).  
293 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.   
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Commission now claim that racial disparity has increased as a result of 
the Supreme Court’s decision to make the guidelines advisory.294  This 
claim is based on a multivariate study the Commission conducted, which 
reports a growing difference in sentence length between black and 
white males after Booker and Gall, as compared to the period following 
the PROTECT Act, when judicial discretion was most constrained.295  
Rather than implement a Booker “fix” and only then reanalyze the basis 
for this claim, we should carefully examine the basis for the claim right 
now.  We undertake a thorough examination of the Commission’s 
multivariate study in the second section below.  To set the stage for 
that examination, we first consider more generally how the presence 
or absence of judicial discretion has affected racial disparity in federal 
sentencing.   
1.  Improvements in Racial Fairness Through  
Increased Judicial Discretion 
It is now apparent that “the degree of capriciousness or prejudice 
evident in the sentencing behavior of federal judges before the estab-
lishment of the guidelines [has been] often overstated.”296  At the same 
time, the advent of mandatory guidelines and mandatory minimums 
created a new kind of racial unfairness that did not previously exist.  As 
shown in Figure 1 below, the average time served by defendants of dif-
ferent racial groups varied little before the guidelines and mandatory 
minimums went into effect in the late 1980s.  But when these laws were 
fully implemented, average time served by black offenders soared 
above the others. 
  
 
294 See Sessions, supra note 12, at 329-30 & n.127; Commission Testimony, supra note 
13, at 1, 53-55. 
295 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 53-55.  
296 David Weisburd, Sentencing Disparity and the Guidelines:  Taking a Closer Look, 5 
FED. SENT’G REP. 149, 149 (1992); see also supra note 277 and accompanying text.  
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Figure 1:  Average Time Served in Months by Black, White, and  
Hispanic Offenders from FY 1984–2010297 
 
 This racial gap was the result of new and harsher mandatory sen-
tencing rules, including statutes mandating minimum sentences for 
drug trafficking and other offenses, that applied more frequently to 
black offenders than to offenders of other races.298  To the extent that 
these rules required punishment that was greater than necessary to 
achieve the legitimate purposes of sentencing, they created unwar-
ranted racial disparity.299  Most notable in this regard were mandatory 
 
297 A version of this graph first appeared in the Commission’s 2004 assessment of 
fifteen years of guidelines sentencing.  See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 116 
fig.4.2.  It has been expanded by its designer, Paul J. Hofer, former Special Projects 
Director for the Commission, to include data through 2010.  The source of the data is 
1984–1990 USSC AO FPSSIS Datafiles and 1991–2010 USSC Monitoring Datafiles.  The 
2011 Monitoring Datafile has not yet been made available.  Time served is estimated 
from the sentence imposed.  In the Commission’s Monitoring Datafile, TIMESERV 
assumes good time credits will be applied.  Offenders receiving no term of imprison-
ment are excluded.   
298 See MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 277, at 1, 15; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra 
note 152, at 117, 135; John Scalia, Jr., The Impact of Changes in Federal Law and Policy on 
the Sentencing of, and Time Served in Prison by, Drug Defendants Convicted in U.S. District 
Courts, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 152, 155-57 (2001–2002). 
299 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 113-14, 131-35; see also Rodney 
Engen, Racial Disparity in the Wake of  Booker/ Fanfan:  Making Sense of “Messy” Results and 
Other Challenges for Sentencing Research, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1144-45 
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minimums and sentencing guidelines applicable to crack cocaine  
offenses300 and the so-called “career offender” guideline.  The Com-
mission concluded that the career offender guideline—as applied to 
those who qualify based on prior drug convictions, which most de-
fendants subject to this guideline do—vastly overstates the risk of re-
cidivism, has no general deterrent effect, and has a disproportionate 
impact on black offenders.301  Other guideline provisions and manda-
tory enhancements that result in excessively severe sentences apply 
disproportionately to black offenders as well.302   
Only after Booker have judges been able to mitigate such un-
warranted racial disparity.  By imposing below-guideline sentences that 
they could not have imposed under the mandatory guidelines, in fiscal 
year 2010 alone, judges spared more than 860 black defendants 
sentenced under the crack or career offender guidelines over 3300 years 
of unnecessary incarceration.  More than 230 defendants of other 
races were likewise spared over 900 years of unnecessary incarceration 
under these two guidelines.303  Moreover, contrary to the suggestion 
that judges exercise discretion in a biased manner, in cases in which a 
mandatory minimum did not constrain judicial discretion, black and 
white offenders received below-guideline sentences at the same rate.304 
 
(2011) (noting that “[r]acial disparity may be built into the guidelines,” and citing as 
examples the drug guidelines and the career offender guideline).   
300 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 225. 
301 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 133-34. 
302 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 352-54 (2011) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENAL-
TIES] (finding that the “cumulative impacts” of broadly defined “felony drug offense[s]” 
under 21 U.S.C. § 851, criminal history score, and ineligibility for safety valve relief “can 
result in disproportionate and excessively severe sentences,” and that these cumulative 
impacts are “particularly acute for Black drug offenders”); id. at 359-64 (finding that 
sentences for certain firearms offenses can be “unduly severe” and “these effects fall on 
Black offenders to a greater degree than on offenders of other racial groups”). 
303 These estimates were made using the Monitoring Datasets for fiscal years 2003 
and 2010.  See supra note 231.  They are based on the increase in the rate of non-
government sponsored below-guideline sentences for crack and career offenders in 
fiscal year 2010 as compared to the rate in 2003 and the average extent of these reduc-
tions.  Fiscal year 2003 was used as the comparison year because it preceded the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which affected 
how cases were handled in anticipation of Booker.     
304 According to the 2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, in cases where a mandatory 
minimum did not trump or truncate the guideline range, 24.1% of black defendants 
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Judges have also reduced unwarranted racial disparity stemming 
from the exercise of discretion by prosecutors and law enforcement 
agents.  As the Commission has found, prosecutors and agents can 
control sentencing outcomes in at least three ways:  (1) by controlling 
the quantity or type of drugs used to determine the guideline range or 
a mandatory minimum, (2) through charging and plea bargaining 
decisions, and (3) through their sole authority to move for certain 
types of departures.305  Research has revealed unexplained racial 
disparities resulting from the exercise of these forms of discretion,306 
and that much of the gap in average sentence length can be traced to 
charging decisions, particularly decisions to bring charges carrying 
mandatory minimums.307 
 
and 24% of white defendants received a below-guideline sentence. See 2010 USSC Mon-
itoring Dataset, supra note 231. 
305 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 82-87. 
306 See id. at 90-91, 131 (finding that among offenders who possessed or used a gun 
during a drug offense, black offenders are more likely to be charged with a mandatory 
minimum of five or more years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) rather than receive a two-level 
increase under the guidelines); MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 302, at 359-
60, 363-64 (finding that “stacking” § 924(c) counts results in sentences that are “exces-
sively severe and disproportionate to the offense committed,” and that black defend-
ants are charged with such stacked offenses at a greater rate than defendants of other 
races); id. at 257-58 (reporting that 29.9% of eligible black drug offenders received an 
increased mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 851, while only 25% of eligible white 
offenders, 19.9% of eligible Hispanic offenders, and 24.8% of offenders of “other” races 
received such an increase); id. at 159-60, 179, 214-15, 221, 291 (reporting that black 
offenders receive government sponsored substantial assistance departures less often 
than defendants of other races); FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 104-05 (same). 
307 See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging 
and its Sentencing Consequences (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 12-002, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377.  In a study comparing offenders 
who were similar based on arrest offense, Rehavi and Starr found that “compared to 
white men, black men face charges that are on average about seven to ten percent 
more severe . . . and are more than twice as likely to face charges carrying mandatory 
minimum sentences” and that “[t]hese disparities persist after charge bargaining and, 
ultimately, are a major contributor to the large black-white disparities in prison sen-
tence length.”  Id. at 46.  While only 12% of defendants in the sample were charged 
with mandatory minimums, “disparities in their application appear capable of explain-
ing virtually all of the aggregate racial disparity in case outcomes” in the entire sample.  
Id. at 42.  The authors cautioned that the disparities they found “could reflect unob-
served differences in case characteristics.”  Id. at 24.  The authors did not have data, for 
instance, on differences in eligibility for a charge carrying a mandatory minimum.  
Moreover, their analysis excluded drug, child pornography, and immigration offend-
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As the mandatory guidelines era came to a close, the Commission 
noted that “[d]isparate effects of charging and plea bargaining are  
a special concern in a tightly structured sentencing system like the 
federal sentencing guidelines, because the ability of judges to 
compensate for disparities in presentence decisions is reduced.”308  
After Booker, judges are better able to compensate for some of these 
disparate effects.309 
The gap in time served between black and white offenders was 
largest in 1994, at 37.7 months.310  It narrowed to 25.4 months in 2010, 
the smallest since 1992.311  This is in part due to judicial variances 
made possible by Booker, and in part due to the two-level reduction in 
 
ers, who compose more than half of the federal docket, see 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 251, fig.A, because of limitations and complications in the data.  Rehavi & Starr, 
supra, at 12-13.  Their conclusions, however, are consistent with the Commission’s 
research on mandatory minimums.  See supra note 306.  A second recent study conclud-
ed that the increased impact of the differential imposition of mandatory minimums 
accounts for racial disparity after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.  See Joshua B. Fischman & 
Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities, Judicial Discretion, and the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines 3 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series No. 2012-02, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636419. 
308 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 92. 
309 See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 397 F. App’x 329, 332-33 (9th Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that the court varied appropriately from 235-293 months to 132 months where the 
drug quantity used to calculate guideline range was based on nonexistent drugs in a 
“‘reverse sting’ operation,” thus “overstating [the] defendant’s culpability”); United 
States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A] defendant’s claim of sen-
tencing factor manipulation may also be considered as request for a variance from the 
applicable guideline range under the § 3553(a) factors [rather than under] . . . the 
stricter standard for a departure . . . .”);  United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 
1231-32, 1260 (D. Utah 2004) (imposing a sentence of one day for drug counts to par-
tially compensate for a fifty-five year mandatory sentence produced by stacked charges 
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) brought by the prosecutor after the defendant declined to 
plead guilty), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).  In addition, courts may now impose 
below-guideline sentences based on cooperation when the government fails to make 
the motion.  See United States v. Blue, 557 F.3d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Arceo, 535 F.3d 679, 688 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jackson, 296 F. App’x 
408, 409 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Doe, 218 F. App’x 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 33 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Lazenby, 
439 F.3d 928, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2006); see also 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, 
tbls.25-25B (reporting 589 downward variances or departures based on cooperation in 
absence of a § 5K1.1 motion).   
310 See supra Figure 1 and note 297.   
311 See supra Figure 1 and note 297. 
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the crack guidelines in fiscal year 2008 prompted by Booker.312  The 
precise effect of the more substantial reduction in the crack guidelines 
under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which was also prompted in 
part by Booker,313 will not be known until the fiscal year 2011 data are 
available.314  It is likely to be substantial.315 
2.  The Commission’s Study 
The Commission recently testified that a Booker fix is needed  
because, according to its most recent multivariate regression study,316 
increased judicial discretion had resulted in growing demographic 
disparities.317  Judge Sessions, referring to the same study, asserts that 
“[r]eliable evidence suggests that, as a result of the decreasing adher-
ence to the sentencing guidelines since the Supreme Court rendered 
them ‘advisory’ in 2005, . . . demographic disparities . . . have been 
increasing steadily.”318 
Multivariate regression studies like the Commission’s measure dif-
ferences among demographic groups, in average sentence lengths or 
 
312 See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text. 
313 See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.  
314 The reduction in the crack guidelines directed by the Fair Sentencing Act took 
effect on November 1, 2010, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2011.  U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, amend. 748 (Nov. 1, 2010). 
315 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 132 (“Revising the crack cocaine 
thresholds would better reduce the gap [in average prison sentences between black 
and white offenders] than any other single policy change . . . .”); cf. Memorandum 
from Office of Research & Data, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, to Chair Saris 19 & tbl.4, 28 
(May 20, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Retroactivity_Analyses/ 
Fair_Sentencing_Act/20110520_Crack_Retroactivity_Analysis.pdf (estimating that de-
fendants sentenced under the guidelines in effect before November 1, 2010 and eligi-
ble for a retroactive reduction in their sentences would receive an average reduction of 
thirty-seven months, and that eighty-five percent of these defendants would be black). 
316 Since 2004, the Commission has conducted three different multiple regression 
studies and has updated two of them.  See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 118-
27; BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 105-09; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMO-
GRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES:  AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER 
REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 14, 16, 22 (2010) [hereinafter DEMO-
GRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT].  
317 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 1; see also DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES 
REPORT, supra note 316.   
318 Sessions, supra note 12, at 329-30 (citing DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, 
supra note 316).   
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in rates of imprisonment, after adjusting for some “legally relevant” 
differences among the groups.319  Researchers conducting this type of 
study make statistical adjustment for applicable guidelines, mandatory 
minimums, and other legally relevant factors, and any differences in 
sentences remaining after these adjustments are reported as race effects 
in the decisions of judges.320  Statistical adjustment, however, is made 
only with respect to those factors (1) for which data are available and 
(2) that researchers choose to include in their statistical model.  For 
several reasons previously identified by the Commission itself and dis-
cussed below, its multivariate study does not constitute evidence that 
judges discriminate against racial minorities.   
In addition, the Commission’s study ignores racial disparities that 
are built into the rules or that result from presentencing decisions of 
investigative agents or prosecutors, because it treats the guidelines, 
statutes, and charging decisions as “legally relevant.”321  That is, includ-
ing mandatory minimums and guidelines as control variables fails to 
capture racial disparity resulting from their application.  Yet, as shown 
above, these rules and decisions “are no more or less fallible than the 
actions of the judges.”322  Indeed, viewing all of the procedures and 
considerations that affect sentencing leads us inexorably to the 
conclusion that judges are the institutional actors least likely to exercise 
racial bias.  Judges determine sentences after adversarial testing by 
opposing parties (and a probation officer), impose sentences in open 
court, explain their decisions in public, and are subject to appellate 
review.  At each of these points, judges are challenged to act only on 
the basis of relevant factors and to avoid any biases they might have.  
There are no such external checks on the decisions of prosecutors or 
law enforcement agents.  Multivariate research has focused on judges 
not because judges are a likely source of disparity, but because their 
decisions are made on the record and result in accessible data.323   
 
319 See Hofer et al., supra note 278, at 243-45.  
320 Cf. FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 118-19; Hofer et al., supra note 278, 
at 242-44.  
321 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at xiv.   
322 Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Social Science Research and the Legal 
Threat to Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 461, 463 (2007).   
323 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 135 (“[D]iscrimination by judges 
has been exaggerated by the existing research, while other stages of the criminal justice 
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The Commission reported that, according to its study, “differences 
in sentence length” between black and white male offenders “have in-
creased steadily since Booker.”324  But the same study also found that 
black females received increasingly shorter sentences than white or 
Hispanic females after Booker and Gall, and that differences associated 
with educational level decreased after Gall.325  Noncitizens reportedly 
received increasingly longer sentences than citizens after Gall, even 
though Hispanic males and females, who compose the vast majority of 
noncitizens prosecuted in federal court, reportedly received increas-
ingly shorter sentences.326  And the Commission, using a different sta-
tistical model spanning the entire ten-year period from 1999 through 
2009, previously found the greatest difference in sentence length  
between black and white offenders in 1999, when the guidelines were 
mandatory.327   
As these varying results suggest, and as the Commission previously 
warned, multivariate studies provide an unreliable basis from which to 
conclude that judges exercise discretion in a racially biased manner.  
The Commission has used three different methodologies over the 
years (the Fifteen Year model, the Booker model, and the “refined” 
model used in its most recent study).328  Its methodological choices for 
the refined model produced a greater reported race effect than previ-
ous models.329  Significantly, peer-reviewed academic research using 
 
process have been relatively neglected, in part because of the paucity of data that can 
be used to investigate them.”).  The recent research by Rehavi and Starr seeks to over-
come this problem by directly studying prosecutorial decisionmaking through available 
data from arrest through sentencing.  See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 307, at 10-12, 15.   
324 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 54. 
325 See id. app. E.  
326 Compare id., with DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 22 fig.C. 
327 Using the Booker model, the Commission reported a 14.2% difference in sen-
tence length between all black and white offenders in 1999, as compared to a 7.4% 
difference after Booker, and a 10% difference after Gall through fiscal year 2009.  
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 14 fig.13, 16 fig.B.  
328 See supra note 316.  
329 Compare DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 22 fig.C (re-
porting a difference in sentence length for black and white males of 15.2% after Booker 
and 23.3% after Gall through fiscal year 2009 under the refined model), and Commis-
sion Testimony, supra note 13, app. E (reporting a difference in sentence length for 
black and white males of 20% after Gall through fiscal year 2010 under the refined 
model), with DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 16 fig.B (report-
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different methodologies reached results that conflict with, and ex-
plain, the Commission’s results.330    
a.  Missing and Excluded Variables 
The Commission sought to identify how much racial disparity, if 
any, results from the exercise of judicial discretion, by controlling for 
all “legally relevant” factors.  A problem with this approach is that the 
Commission does not collect, and its datasets therefore do not in-
clude, many relevant factors that legitimately and legally affect judges’ 
sentencing decisions and that would change the results if they were 
included.331  The Commission has previously warned against drawing a 
conclusion of discrimination from its analyses because relevant factors 
are missing from its datasets, and because other factors may have been 
erroneously omitted.332  As the Commission explained, “judges make 
decisions when sentencing offenders based on many legal and other 
legitimate considerations that are not or cannot be measured.”333  “The 
omission of one or more important variables usually causes the value 
of the variables that are included in the model [such as race] to be 
overstated.”334  “[O]ne or more unmeasured factors . . . potentially could 
change the results of the analysis if they were included.”335  
Among the factors that are missing from the Commission’s datasets 
are criminal history not taken into account by the guidelines, includ-
ing violent criminal history events and crimes not included in the 
criminal history score; seriousness of the offense not taken into con-
sideration by the guidelines, including in some instances violence that 
was part of the present crime; employment history, current employ-
 
ing a difference for all black and white defendants of 7.4% after Booker and 10% after 
Gall through fiscal year 2009 under the Booker model), and BOOKER REPORT, supra note 
5, at 109 fig.13 (reporting a difference of 4.9% for all black and white defendants after 
Booker through January 11, 2006 under the Booker model).   
330 See infra subsection III.B.2.c. 
331 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 119, 125, 131; BOOKER REPORT,  
supra note 5, at 84, 105-06, 108; DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, 
at 4, 9-10 & nn.35-39, app. A at 3. 
332 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 4, 9-10 & nn.35-39.   
333 Id. at 4.   
334 Id. at 9.   
335 Id. at 9 n.35. 
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ment, or employment prospects; any other mitigating or aggravating 
factors not incorporated into the guideline rules; and any reason for a 
departure or variance other than substantial assistance to the govern-
ment.336  When a relevant factor is not accounted for in the Commis-
sion’s data, and that factor is correlated with race (i.e., it appears more 
frequently in some racial groups than others), the effect is erroneously 
attributed to consideration of race.  For example, the Commission has 
found that black offenders are about twice as likely as offenders of 
other races to have had violent criminal history events.337  And while 
the Commission does not collect or report data on the employment 
status of defendants, African Americans in the general population 
have a higher unemployment rate than members of other races.338  
Violent criminal history events and employment status legitimately in-
fluence sentencing decisions, but because these factors are not includ-
ed in the analysis, their effect is erroneously attributed to race.  
Another problem, particular to the Commission’s most recent study, 
is the failure to include variables that have been shown to impact sen-
tencing decisions beyond their contribution to the guideline calcula-
tion.  The Commission excluded from its refined model several such 
variables that it had included in previous models, including criminal 
history, classification as a “Career Offender” or “Armed Career Crimi-
nal,” and meeting the requirements for the “safety valve.”339  These fac-
tors have been shown to influence sentencing decisions beyond their 
 
336 DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 4, 9-10 & nn.35-39, 
app. A at 3; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 119, 125.   
337 See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 105 n.317 (reporting that in a review of a 
“25% random sample of cases” from fiscal year 2000, “24.4 percent of white offenders 
had violent criminal history events, as did 43.7 percent of black offenders, 18.9 percent 
of Hispanic offenders, and 23.7 percent of ‘other’ offenders”). 
338 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2012, at 
378 tbl.588 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition. 
html (reporting that 16% of blacks were unemployed in 2010 compared with 8.7% of 
whites). 
339 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 19-20 (enumerat-
ing factors excluded from the refined model); BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, app. B at 
23 (explaining that the model included criminal history points, Career Offender status, 
Armed Career Criminal status, and the safety valve adjustment); FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, 
supra note 152, app. D at 12 (noting that the model included criminal history category 
classified as low, medium, or high). 
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contribution to the guideline range, for example with respect to 
choosing the type of sentence, placement within the range, or the ex-
tent of a departure.340  Because these factors are correlated with race,341 
excluding them inflates the weight that the model assigns to race.342 
These missing and excluded factors are one reason the Commis-
sion’s study found an increase in sentence length differences between 
black and white males from the PROTECT Act period to the post-
Booker period to the post-Gall period.343  Sentencing decisions were 
most rigidly controlled by guidelines that excluded relevant sentenc-
ing considerations during the PROTECT Act period.  Booker made 
§ 3553(a) the sentencing law, but this holding was not fully imple-
mented until after Gall and Kimbrough were decided.  The import of 
the Commission’s study is that judges are taking greater account not of 
 
340 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, app. B at 5-6 & n.81; 
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, app. B at 23-24; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, 
at 108-09, 130. 
341 See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 302, at 354 (noting that only 
14.4% of black drug offenders received safety valve relief compared to 39.5% of white 
offenders, 46.3% of Hispanic offenders, and 48.4% of other race offenders, because 
many black offenders are disqualified by having more than one criminal history point); 
id. at 363 (explaining that black offenders constitute a large majority of offenders sub-
ject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies on the basis of criminal history); 
2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra note 231 (revealing that black defendants com-
prised 20.7% of all defendants but 32.6% of defendants in three highest criminal histo-
ry categories and 64.4% of defendants classified as career offenders).  
342 The Commission stated that it omitted these factors from the refined model be-
cause they “directly contribute to or are highly correlated with the value of another 
variable that is already included in the analysis, i.e., the presumptive sentence.”  DEMO-
GRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 19.  Other researchers disagreed 
with the Commission’s decision to omit a control variable for criminal history from its 
refined model. See Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/  
Fanfan Decision:  An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 1077, 1086 (2011).  These researchers conducted statistical tests to ensure 
that multicollinearity was within acceptable limits.  Id.  Their study and other studies 
they relied on “did not report severe multicollinearity” with criminal history and pre-
sumptive sentence, but they did find that “criminal history was notably correlated with 
race.”  Id.  They found it important to control for criminal history beyond its influence 
on the presumptive sentence because “sentencing variation explained by criminal his-
tory is not variation explained by race.” Id. at 1087; see also infra notes 376-79 and  
accompanying text. 
343 The more frequent application of mandatory minimum sentences to black  
offenders appears to be another reason.  See infra notes 383-88 and accompanying text. 
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race, but of legally relevant factors that are missing or excluded from 
its study.  
b.  Failure to Report Fluctuations That Would Undermine the Discrimination 
Hypothesis 
Under its earlier Fifteen Year and Booker models, the Commission 
found race effects for all offenses combined in some years but not in 
other years, and found race effects only for drug offenses in some 
years and only for non-drug offenses in other years.344  The Commis-
sion concluded that these fluctuations were “difficult to reconcile with 
theories of enduring stereotypes . . . or overt discrimination” on the 
part of judges.345 
Fluctuations continue in the refined model, but they are concealed 
by aggregating years and offense types.  Each iteration of the refined 
model aggregates years into periods defined by changes in the law—
post–PROTECT Act, post-Booker, and post-Gall.346  This aggregation, 
which assumes that changes in disparity are caused by changes in the 
law, masks yearly fluctuations that would undermine the discrimina-
tion hypothesis.  For example, during a twenty-one-month period after 
Gall through 2009, black males reportedly received sentences 23.3% 
longer than white males, and Hispanic males reportedly received sen-
tences 6.8% longer than white males.347  But during the longer thirty-
three-month period through 2010, these reported differences dropped 
to 20% for black males and to statistical insignificance for Hispanic 
males.348  We are left to wonder what the results were for 2010 alone.   
Similarly, in its congressional testimony, the Commission included a 
new “post-Koon” period, during which black males reportedly received 
sentences 11.2% longer than white males.349  This period, which, in the 
 
344 See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 108-09, app. B, at 31; FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, 
supra note 152, at 121-27. 
345 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 125; see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 
5, at 108 & n.320 (cautioning against inferring discrimination in light of fluctuations by 
year and offense type).  
346 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 22.  
347 Id. at 22 fig.C.  
348 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at app. E.  
349 Id. 
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Commission’s testimony, begins over three years after Koon was decid-
ed and ends with enactment of the PROTECT Act,350 aggregates three-
and-a-half individual years for which the Booker model yielded no statis-
tically significant difference or greater differences than in the post-
Booker and post-Gall periods.351  Fluctuations by offense type also un-
doubtedly continue, but the “refined model” provides no separate 
analysis by offense type.  
c.  Different Methodologies; Different Results 
Divergent findings in multivariate regression analyses are common-
place due to methodological differences among researchers, random 
fluctuations, and other sources of error.352  The Commission’s own 
studies have reached conflicting conclusions, primarily due to changes 
in methodology.353  As reviewers of research before the guidelines 
warned:  “Any findings that are sensitive to minor changes in model 
specifications such as these must be interpreted with caution.”354  The 
Commission has acknowledged this concern.355 
Peer-reviewed research authored by academic criminologists at the 
Pennsylvania State University, including a former Staff Director of the 
Commission (the “Penn State study”),356 replicated the Commission’s 
refined model, tested different models, and reached different conclu-
 
350 See id. at 53 n.164 (stating that “the Post-Koon Period” covers October 1, 1999 
through April 30, 2003). 
351 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 14 fig.13 (showing, 
under the Booker model, a black/white difference of 10.2% in fiscal year 2000 (October 
1, 1999 through September 2000), 8.2% in 2001 (October 1, 2000 through September 
2001), no statistically significant difference in 2002 (October 1, 2001 through Septem-
ber 2002) or “pre-PROTECT Act” (October 1, 2002 through April 30, 2003) and 4.9% 
post-Booker ( January 12, 2005 through November 1, 2006); id. at 16 fig.B (showing a 
7.4% difference post-Booker ( January 12, 2005 through December 10, 2007) and a 10% 
difference post-Gall (December 11, 2007 through September 30, 2009). 
352 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 118-19, 125, 127.  
353 See id. at 121-27; BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 108-09, app B, at 31; DEMO-
GRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 2, 14-16, 22-24; Commission Testimony, 
supra note 13, at 53-54, app. E.  
354 MCDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 277, at 106.   
355 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 127; BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, 
at 108. 
356 Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1133. 
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sions.357  Like the Commission, the academic researchers sought to 
identify racial disparity caused by judicial discretion.  However, their  
methodology differed from the Commission’s in several respects.  The 
authors of the Penn State study questioned several methodological 
choices made by the Commission in its refined model, and found that 
these choices had affected the Commission’s results. 358   
 First, the Commission modeled the sentencing decision as a single 
decision of how long to imprison, counting probation as zero months 
and treating months of home or community detention the same as 
months of imprisonment.359  As the Commission’s own research sug-
gests, certain factors—including criminal history, employment status, 
and citizenship—have a greater influence on the decision whether to 
imprison than on the decision how long to imprison.360  The Penn 
State study separately analyzed the decisions whether to imprison, and if 
so, how long to imprison, and concluded that the Commission’s com-
bination of these two variables into one variable largely explained its 
finding of increased sentence length disparity after Booker and again 
after Gall.361  Analyzing the sentence length decision over five periods,362 
the Penn State study found that the difference in sentence length  
between black and white males had been considerably reduced after 
Booker and Gall.363  The difference in sentence length between black 
and white males was:  (1) significantly less after Booker and Gall than 
before Koon, when judicial discretion was more constrained than at 
any time other than after the PROTECT Act;364 (2) “nearly identical” 
 
357 Id. at 1077-78.   
358 Id. at 1081-87.   
359 Id. at 1086, 1093-94.  In the Fifteen Year Review, the Commission modeled the 
decisions whether to imprison and how long to imprison both separately and as one 
decision.  FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 121-26, app. D at 12.  
360
 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 108-09,130; U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
Sentencing Options Under the Guidelines 15-17 (Staff Discussion Paper, 1996). 
361 Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1094-96, 1105. 
362 The time periods are (1) pre-Koon (October 1, 1993 through September 30, 
1995), (2) pre–PROTECT Act (October 1, 2001 through April 30, 2003), (3) post–
PROTECT Act (May 1, 2003 through June 24, 2004), (4) post-Booker ( January 2005 
through November 2007), and (5) post-Gall (December 2007 through September 
2009).  See id. at 1087-88, 1099. 
363 Id. at 1100, 1105. 
364 Id. at 1099-100.   
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in the pre–PROTECT Act, post-Booker, and post-Gall periods;365 and (3) 
significantly less post-Booker and post-Gall than pre–PROTECT Act when 
immigration cases are excluded from the analysis.366  The Penn State 
study thus examined a broader historical context than the Commission’s 
refined model, and reached results contrary to the Commission’s with 
respect to sentence length.367 
The Penn State study did find an increased difference in sentencing 
between black and white males, but only with respect to the odds of 
incarceration and only after Gall (through fiscal year 2009).368  As noted 
above, the decision whether to impose probation or a term of impris-
onment is highly sensitive to certain factors.369  Some of those factors 
are missing from the Commission’s datasets, which the Penn State 
study also used.  For example, employment status is missing from the 
datasets,370 and, at least in the general population, employment status 
correlates with race.371  Employment status strongly influences judges’ 
decisions to impose probation rather than a prison term, in order to 
permit defendants who are employed to remain employed;372 this pro-
motes the purposes of sentencing373 by reducing the risk of recidivism.374  
In other words, the Penn State study’s finding of an increased differ-
ence in the odds of incarceration between black and white males may 
well be the result of missing but relevant variables.375 
 
365 Id. at 1094-96. 
366 Id. at 1106. 
367 Id. at 1104-05. 
368 Id. at 1100, 1105. 
369 See supra note 360 and accompanying text.   
370 See DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES REPORT, supra note 316, at 4, 10. 
371 See supra note 338 and accompanying text.  
372 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 360, at 16-17 (finding that employed 
defendants were twenty-one percent more likely to receive an alternative sentence). 
373 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
374 See MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4-5, 54 (1994), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/ 
research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM:  THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FED-
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 12, 29 exhibit 10 (2004).   
375 The more frequent application of mandatory minimum sentences to black  
offenders appears to be another reason for racial disparity in the odds of incarceration.  
See infra notes 383-88 and accompanying text.  Because the Penn State study and the 
Commission’s study both controlled for mandatory minimums, neither could identify 
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The Penn State researchers also questioned the Commission’s de-
cision, unlike in both its Fifteen Year and Booker models, to exclude 
criminal history as a control variable except with respect to its influ-
ence on the presumptive sentence.376  The Penn State study found that 
criminal history has significant and substantial effects beyond the pre-
sumptive sentence,377 and that it was important to control for these 
effects because “sentencing variation explained by criminal history is 
not variation explained by race.”378  The Penn State researchers con-
cluded that “Black male disparity is more than 30% larger when a 
measure of criminal history is not included in the analysis.”379 
Finally, the Penn State study excluded immigration offenses because 
noncitizens are handled uniquely in many districts—for instance, with 
fast track dispositions—and most noncitizens are subject to deporta-
tion, making probation impossible.380  The Commission excluded non-
citizens from its Fifteen Year Review analysis for the same reasons.381  
Employing a model to evaluate the effect of immigration offenses, the 
Penn State study found that immigration offenses accounted for forty 
percent of the effect on sentence length for black males.382 
Other recent empirical studies conclude that racial disparity in 
sentencing after Booker is driven by mandatory minimums that con-
strain judicial discretion and are applied most frequently to black  
offenders.383  The most thorough of these studies, by Professors Joshua 
Fischman and Max Schanzenbach, takes an entirely different approach 
than the Commission or the authors of the Penn State study.  Specifi-
cally, it does not seek to control for all “legally relevant” factors; instead, 
 
the impact of such mandatory sentences on racial disparity.  See supra text accompany-
ing notes 321-22. 
376 Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1086. 
377 Id. at 1086, 1093. 
378 Id. at 1087. 
379 Id. at 1093. 
380 Id. at 1085-86. 
381 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, app. D at 12; see also U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, supra note 360, at 16 (“Non-citizens are less likely to receive an alternative 
[sentence] than are U.S. citizens, reflecting perhaps the impending deportation of the 
defendant and the absence of a local residence suitable for home confinement.”). 
382 Ulmer et al., supra note 342, at 1098. 
383 See Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 307, at 3, 14-19; Rehavi & Starr, supra 
note 307, at 46.  
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it includes only control variables that the authors conclude would not 
have been influenced by doctrinal changes, such as Booker, in order to 
best isolate the direct effect of these changes on racial disparities.384  
This study finds that racial disparities were reduced during periods of 
greater judicial discretion after Koon and Booker , 385 but had increased 
after the more recent decisions in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, as a con-
sequence not of judicial bias but of mandatory minimums that prevent 
judges from reducing black offenders’ sentences as often and to the 
degree that they otherwise would.386  The authors state that their find-
ings “suggest that judicial discretion does not contribute to, and may 
in fact mitigate, racial disparities in Guidelines sentencing.”387  This 
conclusion appears to be confirmed by the Commission’s own data 
showing that when judicial discretion is not hindered by a mandatory 
minimum, black offenders receive reduced sentences at least as often 
as white offenders. 388 
In sum, the Commission’s study, standing alone and in light of 
contrary findings, does not support a Booker fix.  Indeed, as the data 
show, offenders of all races are treated more fairly when judges can 
effectively take into account their individualized circumstances and 
the purposes of sentencing in ways the guidelines do not.389  Examin-
ing only judicial decisions as a source of possible racial disparity in sen-
tencing diverts attention from disparities built into the guidelines and 
 
384 Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 307, at 11-12.  
385 Id. at 3, 18.  
386 Id. at 16-18.  The authors found that “disparity in departure rates and prison 
sentences [for black offenders] relative to whites narrows in periods of deferential re-
view” because “when judges are freer to depart, they do so more proportionally more 
often for blacks than whites, resulting in lower prison sentences,” but “judges appear to 
be constrained more frequently by mandatory minimums when sentencing black de-
fendants.”  Id. at 14. 
387 Id. at 19; see also Rehavi & Starr, supra note 307, at 46.  
388 See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
389 See Raymond Moore, Fed. Pub. Defender for the Dists. of Colo. and Wyo., State-
ment Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 23-25 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2012021516/Testimony_ 
16_Moore.pdf (showing through data and case law that judges exercise their discretion 
after Booker to take into account the individual strengths and rehabilitative needs of 
black offenders); see also supra notes 303-11 and accompanying text (demonstrating that 
judges impose below-guideline sentences to compensate for unwarranted disparities built 
into the guidelines and disparities stemming from presentence decisions). 
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mandatory minimums as well as disparities arising at the charging and 
plea bargaining stages.390 
C.  Interdistrict Disparity 
The Commission also offered in its testimony before Congress a 
“troubling trend[]” of “growing disparities” in rates of judicial below-
range sentences “among circuits and districts” as grounds for con-
straining judicial discretion.391  As the only evidence of this claim, the 
Commission noted the difference between the highest and lowest rates 
of non-government sponsored below-range sentences by district for 
certain types of offenses during the “post-Gall period,”392 and provided 
a list, from highest to lowest, of rates of non-government sponsored 
below-range sentences for each district in fiscal year 2010.393  These 
data are misleading and incomplete.  They do not begin to establish 
that geographic differences are unwarranted, that they are growing in 
a meaningful way, or that they call for greater constraint on judicial 
discretion. 
Congress directed the Commission to consider local conditions in 
promulgating the guidelines394 and directed judges to consider pur-
poses and factors that necessarily take local conditions into account.395  
While the Commission did not take local conditions into account in 
the guidelines, prosecutors and judges always have, and quite appro-
priately so.  Regional differences remained under the mandatory 
guidelines and even increased in drug and immigration cases, as com-
pared to the pre-guidelines period.396  More recently, Attorney General 
Holder has adopted a policy of “district-wide consistency,” in accord-
 
390 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 135; Engen, supra note 299, at 1143-46. 
391 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 1. 
392 Id. at 26, 28, 31, 33, 36, 38, 41, 43, 46, 48, 50, 53. 
393 Id. app. D. 
394 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4)–(5), (7) (2006) (directing the Commission to consider 
“the community view of the gravity of the offense,” “the public concern generated by 
the offense,” and “the current incidence of the offense in the community”). 
395 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (requiring judges to consider the need for deterrence, 
just punishment, respect for law, and protection of the public); cf. id. § 3553(a)(3) 
(requiring judges to consider the kinds of sentences available). 
396 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 98-103, 110-12.   
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ance with “district-specific policies, priorities, and practices,” and “the 
needs of the communities we serve.”397 
As judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers well know, comparing 
rates of below-guideline sentences tells us nothing about whether 
there is unwarranted disparity.398  As the Commission has previously 
acknowledged, “The causes of variation in the rates of departure, and 
their potential effect on unwarranted sentencing disparity, is a compli-
cated issue that cannot be resolved through simple examination of the 
reported rates.”399  Indeed, it would seem more pertinent to know 
whether interdistrict variation in sentencing outcomes has increased 
since Booker.  The Commission has not addressed that question, but 
the authors of the Penn State study have.  In another article, they re-
ported that variation in sentence length among districts after Gall is 
less than it was before the PROTECT Act and only slightly greater than 
after the PROTECT Act.400 
Moreover, determining whether interdistrict variation constitutes 
unwarranted disparity is exceedingly complex because, as the Commis-
sion once put it, the “potential sources are so many, varied, and inter-
acting.”401  The most important of these interacting sources are the 
 
397 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 245, at 1, 3.   
398 See, e.g., Samuel A. Alito, Reviewing the Sentencing Commission’s 1991 Annual Report, 
5 FED. SENT’G REP. 166, 167 (1992) (arguing that “[c]omparisons of the departure rates 
of different circuits and districts seem . . . unsound,” because “no reliable inter-district 
comparisons can be made without controlling for differences in the mix of offenses 
prosecuted” and “for inter-district differences in the magnitude of cases within particular 
offense categories”); John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion:  
The Role of the Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 656 & n.66 
(2008) (demonstrating that regional variations in charging and sentencing appropri-
ately reflect different local priorities and needs); Alexander Bunin, Fed. Pub. Defender 
for the N. Dist. of N.Y., Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission 7-11 ( July 9, 
2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_ 
and_Meetings/20090709-10/Bunin_testimony.pdf (discussing how types of cases and 
government policies and practices affect rates of below-range sentences and sentence 
lengths among districts in five different circuits).   
399 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 111.       
400 See Jeffery Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in the Wake of 
the Booker/Fanfan Decision:  Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence Between Courts?, 28 
JUSTICE Q. 799, 816 (2011) (finding that interdistrict variation was 6.6% before the 
PROTECT Act, 5.8% after the PROTECT Act, 5.2% after Booker, and 6.3% after Gall). 
401 FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 152, at 93. 
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government’s practices and policies.  Government sponsored depar-
tures have always contributed more to interdistrict variation than 
judge-initiated departures.402  In 2011, for example, the difference be-
tween the highest and lowest rates of government sponsored below-
range sentences by district was 12.5 percentage points higher than the 
difference between the highest and lowest non-government sponsored 
rates.403  But the Commission has thus far failed to mention this fact to 
Congress or, indeed, to provide any information regarding rates of 
government sponsored below-range sentences by district.  This is a  
serious omission, given that government sponsored rates often have a 
direct impact on non-government sponsored rates.   
Indeed, the Commission’s presentation fails to shed meaningful 
light on the question of whether any differences among districts are 
unwarranted.  To begin to answer that question, it would be necessary 
to examine, for each district, the kinds of cases prosecuted, prosecuto-
rial practices and policies, and interactions between prosecutorial and 
judicial practices.  At the most rudimentary level, this would require a 
comparison of government sponsored below-range sentences, judicial 
below-range sentences, and sentence length.   
For example, Arizona’s low rate of non-government sponsored 
below-range sentences in immigration cases (4.2%) is explained by a 
high rate of government sponsored below-range sentences (64.7%), 
the vast majority of which are imposed under the government-
controlled fast track program.404  In contrast, the Southern District of 
New York’s high rate of non-government sponsored below-range sen-
tences in immigration cases (63.9%) is explained by the absence of a 
fast track program in the district and a resulting 2.5% rate of govern-
 
402 See id. at 102-07. 
403 Prosecutors sought downward departures and variances in 60.6% of cases in the 
Southern District of California and in 4.4% of cases in the District of South Dakota, a 
difference of 56.2 percentage points.  2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.26.  By 
comparison, judges imposed downward departures and variances in 49% of cases in the 
Southern District of New York and in 5.3% of cases in the Middle District of Georgia, a 
difference of 43.7 percentage points.  Id.   
404 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  FISCAL YEAR 
2010 ARIZONA 19 tbl.10 (2010).  Fast track departures accounted for 63.8%.  Id. 
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ment sponsored below-range sentences.405  The end result is that aver-
age sentence length for immigration cases in the Southern District of 
New York is slightly higher (23.5 months)406 than that in Arizona (20.5 
months).407  The Commission has previously found that the presence 
of fast track programs in some districts and not in others constitutes 
unwarranted geographic disparity.408  Judges appropriately correct for 
this disparity.409  The Commission’s presentation to Congress omitted 
these details and left the impression of wide and unexplained dispari-
ties among districts.410 
Similar circumstances explain low rates of judicial below-range 
sentences in the Western and Southern Districts of Texas, compared 
with a high rate—the highest in the country—in the Southern District 
of New York.411  A large majority of prosecutions in the Texas districts 
are low-level immigration and marijuana smuggling cases with guide-
line ranges so low (typically 0-6 months and 10-16 months, respectively) 
that offenders have already served the guideline sentence, or have lit-
tle left of it to serve, by the time a judge imposes sentence.412  There is 
little need for judges to vary downward in these districts.   
The Southern District of New York, by contrast, has a large num-
ber of cases with high guideline ranges.  These high ranges result from 
the operation of the guidelines in fraud cases, in which the “loss” 
amount, together with multiple enhancements, often vastly overstates 
 
405 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  FISCAL YEAR 
2010 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 19 tbl.10 (2010).   
406 Id. at 10 tbl.7.   
407 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 404, at 10 tbl. 7.    
408 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 185, at 66-67.   
409 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.  
410 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 26 (stating only that “[i]n the post-Gall 
Period,” there was a “range of 65.6 percentage points” between the lowest and highest 
rates of “non-government sponsored below range sentences” in illegal entry cases). 
411 The rates in the Western and Southern Districts of Texas are 11.1% and 14.9%, 
respectively, while the rate in the Southern District of New York is 49%.  See 2010 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.26.   
412 See Letter from Margy Meyers, Henry Bemporad & David Patton, Fed. Pub.  
Defenders, to Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Nov. 22, 
2011), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/letter-to-lanny-breuer-from-
defenders.pdf.   
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the seriousness of the offense;413 multi-defendant drug conspiracies, in 
which the least and most culpable defendants are often subject to simi-
lar guideline ranges;414 and illegal reentry cases subject to a 16-level 
enhancement,415 which overpunishes in most cases.416  Judges in the 
 
413 In the Southern District of New York, 26% of cases are fraud or other white col-
lar cases, compared to 13.3% nationwide.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 
1 fig.A (2010).  The fraud guideline recommends remarkably severe sentences in many 
cases in this district.  For example, in United States v. Adelson, the government sought a 
guideline sentence of life imprisonment in a securities fraud case.  441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  The court explained that in such cases, the guidelines place an 
“inordinate emphasis” on the “amount of actual or intended loss.”  Id. at 509.  Because 
these cases can involve “public companies [that] typically issue millions of publically 
traded shares,” “the precipitous decline in stock prices that typically accompanies a 
revelation of fraud generates a multiplier effect that may lead to guidelines offense 
levels that are, quite literally, off the chart.”  Id.  Finding that “the guidelines have so 
run amok that they are patently absurd on their face,” the court instead imposed a non-
guideline sentence of 42 months plus restitution.  Id. at 507, 515.  See also Frank O. 
Bowman, III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 167, 169 (2008) (“[S]ince Booker, virtually every judge faced with a top-level corpo-
rate fraud defendant in a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called for by 
the Guidelines were too high.”); Alan Ellis et. al, At a “Loss” for Justice:  Federal Sentencing 
for Economic Offenses, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 34, 37 (noting that the fraud guide-
line, focusing primarily on monetary loss, “fails to measure a host of other factors that 
may be important, and may be a basis for mitigating punishment, in a particular case”).   
414 Over 36% of cases in the Southern District of New York are drug cases, com-
pared to 29% nationwide.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 1 fig.A.  Sen-
tences are based on drug quantity, which is a poor measure of offense seriousness, 
particularly for low- and mid-level offenders.  See, e.g., Catharine M. Goodwin, Sentencing 
Narcotics Cases Where Drug Amount is a Poor Indicator of Relative Culpability, 4 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 226, 226-27 (1992) (explaining that because of the way in which the drug amount 
is determined under the guidelines, “minimal participants” in a conspiracy can receive 
a sentence “very close to the sentence received by the more culpable offenders”); Eric 
L. Sevigny, Excessive Uniformity in Federal Drug Sentencing, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOL-
OGY 155, 171 (2009) (finding “robust support” for the claim of unwarranted uniformity 
in drug sentencing because drug quantity “is not significantly correlated with role in 
the offense”).  The Supreme Court has made clear that it is proper to avoid unwarrant-
ed similarities in sentences among drug conspirators.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
38, 55 (2007).      
415 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2011).  
416 In the Southern District of New York, 57.8% of illegal reentry cases in 2010 were 
subject to the 16-level increase, in contrast to only 21.6% and 14.4% in the Southern 
and Western Districts of Texas respectively.  See 2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra 
note 231.  The 16-level enhancement has consistently and frequently been criticized 
since its adoption.  See, e.g., Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements 
in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV. 
719, 760-62 (2010).  
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Southern District of New York correct for these often-criticized aspects 
of the guidelines.  Further, prosecutors in this district seek below-
guideline sentences at a lower rate than the national average.417  As a 
consequence, while judges in the Southern District of New York im-
pose below-range sentences at the highest rate in the nation, the aver-
age sentence length in this district is higher than the national 
average—and nearly double the average in the Texas districts.418   
As should be clear from these few examples,419 what kinds of dif-
ferences among districts exist, what causes them, and whether they are 
unwarranted are complex questions which the Commission’s bare list-
ing of rates of below-guideline sentences does not begin to answer.  If 
interdistrict variation is to be considered seriously as a basis for greater 
constraints on judicial discretion, the issue requires meaningful analy-
sis and proof.  The Commission has not carried its burden.  
D.  Interjudge Disparity 
Judge Sessions cites increasing interjudge disparity “as a result of 
the decreasing adherence to the sentencing guidelines” as a justifica-
tion for resurrecting mandatory guidelines,420 claiming that allowing 
judges to “assess the merits of particular guidelines provisions can only 
lead to a system in disarray.”421  The Commission makes a similar  
argument in support of its request for “heightened” review of policy 
disagreements.422   
 
417 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 19 tbl.10 (reporting that gov-
ernment sponsored departures and variances were 17.8% in the Southern District of 
New York, compared to 25.3% nationwide). 
418 Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  FISCAL 
YEAR 2010 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 10 tbl.7 (2010) (reporting a mean sentence 
of 17.3 months), and U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  
FISCAL YEAR 2010 WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 10 tbl.7 (2010) (reporting a mean sen-
tence of 13 months), with U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 405, at 10 tbl.7  
(reporting a mean sentence of 36 months in the Southern District of New York and 30 
months nationwide).   
419 For other examples, see Letter from Thomas W. Hillier, II, supra note 11, at 8-
10, add. 2-7.  
420 Sessions, supra note 12, at 329-30 & n.127. 
421 Id. at 335. 
422 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56. 
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The government had advanced a related argument in Kimbrough.  
The Solicitor General’s brief noted that if judges could vary based on 
their disagreement with the crack/powder disparity, defendants in-
volved with the same quantity of drugs would receive different sentences 
depending on the particular judge.423  The Supreme Court responded 
that some variation among judges was a “necessary cost” of the remedy 
it had adopted in Booker and held that the “proper solution” was “not 
to treat the crack/powder disparity as mandatory.”424  Instead, the 
Court emphasized, district courts must consider the need to avoid un-
warranted disparities, along with other § 3553(a) factors, in individual 
cases and, in so doing, must weigh sentencing practices in other courts 
against any disparity created by the guidelines themselves.425  The 
Commission, the Court explained, would “help to ‘avoid excessive sen-
tencing disparities’” through “ongoing revision of the Guidelines in 
response to sentencing practices.”426 
The system is working as the Court expected.  After Kimbrough, 
many, but not all, judges varied from the crack guidelines to avoid the 
unjust crack/powder disparity.427  After recent amendments to the 
crack guidelines, prompted in part by judicial variances, judges follow 
the guidelines more often.428  Permitting judges to sentence the indi-
viduals before them fairly, and giving judges a voice in the evolution of 
the guidelines, leads to gradual and well-informed change and less 
disparity overall.   
Further, after Booker and its progeny, judges properly consider not 
only the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, but also the need to 
avoid unwarranted uniformity.429  There will always be individualized 
circumstances of the offense or characteristics of the offender that 
cannot be included in general rules because they cannot, as a practical 
 
423 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106-07 (2007).   
424 Id. at 107-08. 
425 Id. at 108. 
426 Id. at 107 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005)).   
427 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
428 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
429 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 55-56 (2007) (approving the district court’s 
differential treatment of coconspirators who were not similarly situated).  
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matter, be described and assigned numerical values in the abstract.430  
As the Senate Judiciary Report recognized, 
[E]ach offender stands before a court as an individual, different in some 
ways from other offenders.  The offense, too, may have been committed 
under highly individual circumstances.  Even the fullest consideration 
and the most subtle appreciation of the pertinent factors—the facts in 
the case; the mitigating or aggravating circumstances; the offender’s 
characteristics and criminal history; and the appropriate purposes of the 
sentence to be imposed in the case—cannot invariably result in a pre-
dictable sentence being imposed.  Some variation is not only inevitable 
but desirable.
431  
 Since the mandatory guidelines excessively curtailed judicial dis-
cretion, it is not surprising that the transition to advisory guidelines 
has resulted in an increase in differences among judges.  A “first look” 
at post-Booker sentencing by judges in one federal courthouse found 
such an increase.432  A study of 2262 sentences imposed by ten judges 
in the District of Massachusetts from October 1, 2001, through Sep-
tember 30, 2008,433 found that the identity of the judge accounted for 
6.1% of variation in sentence length in the nine months after Gall and 
Kimbrough, compared to 3.1% during the 33 months from October 1, 
2001 through June 23, 2004,434 and 4.7% during the 14 months from 
enactment of the PROTECT Act through June 23, 2004.435  The study 
also found that the identity of the judge accounted for 6.6% of the 
variation in distance from the guideline range in the nine months  
after Gall and Kimbrough, compared to 2.4% during the 14 months 
from enactment of the PROTECT Act through June 23, 2004.436 
 
430 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(b) (2011) (“[I]t is 
difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of  
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.”). 
431 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150 (1983).  
432 Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker:  A First Look, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (2010). 
433 Id. at 24-27. 
434 Id. at 32 tbl.1.  On June 24, 2004 the Supreme Court handed down Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). 
435 Scott, supra note 432, at 65 tbl.A9. 
436 Id. at 40 tbl.3.  
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The author of the study, Professor Ryan Scott, concluded that “the 
effect of the judge remains relatively modest.”437  He emphasized that 
“inter-judge sentencing disparity is but one consideration among many 
in evaluating the federal sentencing system” and recognized that it “is 
entirely possible to conclude that Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall have im-
proved federal sentencing, on balance, by allowing judges greater flex-
ibility to reject unjust guidelines and impose just sentences.”438  In 
seeking to explain judges’ “unexpectedly mild reaction to Booker,”439 
Professor Scott posited that the reason for the persistent high rate of 
sentences within the guideline range (and for differences among 
judges) was that some “business as usual” judges agree with the guide-
lines more than others or believe that the Commission is more compe-
tent to decide sentences than they are.440   
An increase in differences among judges after Booker, in one dis-
trict or in the nation as a whole, must also be understood in the con-
text in which it occurs.  Most importantly, in contrast to the pre-
guidelines system, judicial discretion is intricately guided by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), the statute Congress enacted to ensure reasonable con-
sistency in sentencing.441  And the Supreme Court has given the guide-
lines more primacy than does the plain language of the statute, by 
directing judges to treat the guideline range as “the starting point and 
the initial benchmark.”442  Moreover, the government agrees to or does 
not oppose more than half of non-government sponsored below-range 
sentences.443  Sentences are subject to appeal by both parties and, as we 
have noted, the government’s success rate on appeal is roughly the 
same or better than before Booker.444   
 
437 Id. at 41. 
438 Id. at 41-42. 
439 Id. at 42.  Indeed, the study found that six of the ten judges ( judges A, C, D, E, 
H, and I) imposed below-range sentences less often in the ten-month period after Gall 
and Kimbrough than in the two years immediately following Booker, two judges ( judges F 
and G) imposed below-range sentences at about the same rate, and two judges ( judges 
B and J) imposed below-range sentences at a greater rate.  Id. at 35-36 & nn.180-182. 
440 Id. at 47, 50-51. 
441 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50-52, 74-75 (1983). 
442 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
443 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.   
444 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.  
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Further, as the Supreme Court suggested in Kimbrough, the Com-
mission itself can avoid excessive disparities among judges by revising 
guidelines that most judges (and many prosecutors) find to be prob-
lematic.445  As the Commission improves the guidelines, judges who 
previously exercised their discretion to reject flawed guidelines follow 
them more often, and judges who followed the guidelines in any event 
continue to do so.  In fact, there has been a notable decrease in below-
range sentences in the District of Massachusetts, the subject of Profes-
sor Scott’s study, since the crack amendments went into effect in fiscal 
year 2011.446   
Finally, we reiterate that there will always be individual characteris-
tics of the defendant and circumstances of the offense that are not and 
cannot be included in general rules.  If some judges believe it is their 
duty to impose individualized sentences, while others assume (incor-
rectly) that the Commission has included all relevant factors in the 
guidelines and rejected all irrelevant factors, there will be an increase 
in interjudge disparity, but a decrease in unwarranted uniformity.  
In sum, the components of a system to avoid unwarranted disparity 
are in place.  While Booker may indeed lead to increased interjudge 
disparity, as some judges adjust to their greater sentencing responsibil-
ity differently or more slowly than others,447 it simultaneously decreases 
more troubling kinds of disparity, including unwarranted uniformity, 
and inspires long term improvement.  In the meantime, it is “better to 
have five good sentences and five bad ones than to have ten bad but 
consistent sentences.”448 
 
445 See supra notes 195-96, 426 and accompanying text.  
446 Compare 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 190, tbl.26 (reporting that 35.7% of sen-
tences were non-government sponsored below range in the District of Massachusetts in 
fiscal year 2010), with 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 251, tbl.26 (reporting that 30.8% 
of sentences were non-government sponsored below range in fiscal year 2011).    
447 Cf., e.g., United States v. Johnson, 635 F.3d 983, 987, 989 (7th Cir. 2011) (revers-
ing a life sentence under the crack guidelines and remanding for resentencing because 
the district court judge did not properly consider whether, per Kimbrough, the life sen-
tence was “‘greater than necessary’ to comply with § 3553(a)(2)” and instead opted to 
wait for congressional action); United States v. Montague, 438 F. App’x 478, 479-80 
(6th Cir. 2011) (reversing a guideline sentence and remanding for resentencing where 
the district court “repeatedly expressed its view that it is not the district court’s job to 
‘figure out whether the Guidelines are justified or not’”).  
448 Hinkle, supra note 284.   
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IV.  THE PROPOSED FIXES  
Accepting for the sake of argument the assertion of the Commis-
sion and Judge Sessions that a Booker “fix” is needed, the question 
would still remain whether either of their proposals would give rise to 
a fair, workable, and constitutional system of federal sentencing.  Close 
scrutiny of their proposals demonstrates that they would not. 
A.  Judge Sessions’s Proposal 
1.  The Details 
The current sentencing table consists of 258 cells at the intersec-
tion of forty-three offense levels on a vertical axis and six criminal his-
tory categories on a horizontal axis.449  Judge Sessions proposes a table 
consisting of thirty-six cells at the intersection of nine offense levels on a 
vertical axis and four criminal history categories on a horizontal axis.450  
The thirty-six “broader cells” would contain ninety-two “sub-ranges.”451  
The Sessions proposal would not “discard” the current forty-three  
offense levels; rather, they would be “associated with” and “tie[d]” in 
groups to the broader cells in the new table, to assist in determining 
severity and proportionality and to facilitate data analysis.452    
The thirty-six cells would be based on the offense of conviction and 
aggravating factors relating to offense conduct and criminal history.453  
The Commission would choose these aggravating factors from among 
those in the current Guidelines Manual and assign them new numeric 
values.454  The sentencing ranges in the broad cells would be “manda-
tory” but would not violate Booker because aggravating facts concerning 
offense conduct would be charged in an indictment and proved to  
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant.455  
 
449 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (2011).  
450 Sessions, supra note 12, at 342-45.   
451 Id. at 345.   
452 Id. at 342-43.   
453 Id. at 347-48 & nn.176 & 179, 351-52.   
454 Id. at 347-49.  
455 Id. 346, 348. 
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Criminal history would be found by the judge by a preponderance of 
the evidence or admitted by the defendant.456 
Twenty-eight of the thirty-six broader ranges would each contain 
three sub-ranges,457 with the middle sub-range for “heartland” cases.458  
Upon conviction, the defendant would be assigned to the middle sub-
range of the broader range.459  In order to impose a sentence in the 
upper or lower sub-range, the judge would be required to consider (1) 
a series of aggravating and mitigating factors identified in application 
notes (if found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence)460 
and (2) “all other relevant factors” in the Guidelines Manual.461  The 
factors in the application notes would consist of those factors in the 
current Guidelines Manual not chosen by the Commission to be 
charged in an indictment and proved to a jury or admitted by the de-
fendant, and would not be assigned numeric values.462    
The few mitigating factors used to calculate the current guideline 
range, such as the defendant’s minor or minimal role in the offense, 
could be considered only in choosing a sub-range within the mandatory 
cell (and in sentencing within that sub-range).463  Acceptance of re-
sponsibility (i.e., pleading guilty) would “ordinarily” reduce the sen-
tence by “at least one sub-range below where the judge would 
otherwise have sentenced the defendant” but “not necessarily” to the 
next lower cell.464   
There would be no variances from the broader cells based on the 
purposes and factors set forth in § 3553(a), but instead only limited 
departures from the otherwise-mandatory cells if permitted by the 
 
456 Id. at 351-52; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 
(1998) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not require the fact of a prior convic-
tion to be charged in an indictment).   
457 Sessions, supra note 12, at 345. 
458 See id. at 343 (“[M]id-range . . . would serve as an advisory range for a typical or 
‘heartland’ case.”). 
459 Id. at 347. 
460 Id. at 348-49, 350-52. 
461 Id. at 348-49, 353-54. 
462 Id. at 348-49. 
463 Id.  
464 Id. at 349.   
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Commission.465  Judicial downward departures would be “infrequent” 
and based on “truly extraordinary mitigating circumstances.”466  Depar-
tures for cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of others, 
however, would be encouraged and would require a government  
motion.467  Judge Sessions’s proposal would permit upward departures 
based on criminal history,468 but not on other grounds because upward 
departures would be “virtually unnecessary” given the breadth of the 
mandatory ranges and would pose constitutional problems.469   
Restrictions on downward departures would be enforced through 
appellate review with “teeth.”470  In Judge Sessions’s view, the “threat of 
reversal”471 would “promote the legitimacy of the new presumptive 
guidelines.”472  Downward departures challenged on appeal by the 
government would be subject to “relatively strict scrutiny,” while review 
of guideline sentences would be virtually eliminated.473  There would 
be no “‘substantive reasonableness’” review of any sentence,474 “just as 
there was no such review in the pre-Booker era.”475  Appellate courts 
would review jury fact findings used to set the mandatory cell for suffi-
ciency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia,476 reversing only if the 
court, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, [concluded that no] rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”477  A jury finding in favor of the defendant could not be  
 
465 Id. at 350-51; see also id. at 354 n.205 (“[T]he guidelines would be binding on 
district judges, who would not be free to ‘vary’ from them as judges can currently do 
from the advisory guidelines pursuant to Booker.”). 
466 Id. at 351.   
467 Id. at 352.   
468 Id. at 351-52. 
469 Id. at 350.   
470 Id. at 351.   
471 Id. at 353 (quoting Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics of Sentencing, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2009)).  
472 Id. 
473 Id. at 354. 
474 Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 
475 Id.   
476 Id. at 354 & n.204 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).  
477 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  
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appealed by the government.478  If Judge Sessions is correct that there 
would not be a significant increase in jury trials,479 most sentences 
would not be appealable at all because they would be conclusively de-
termined by plea agreements. 
Those who value judicial discretion should be satisfied with this 
scheme, Judge Sessions maintains, because judges would have “greater 
discretion” within the mandatory “broad ranges.”480  Judge Sessions 
asserts that another selling point for judges is that uncharged and  
acquitted “relevant conduct” would play a “more limited role.”481   
2.  The Flaws 
Perhaps the most serious flaw of the Sessions proposal is that judi-
cial feedback to the Commission and constructive evolution of the 
guidelines would virtually cease.  The guideline range in each case 
would be set by the prosecutor’s charges and the jury’s factfinding or 
the defendant’s negotiated admissions.  Judges would have no role in 
determining the broader cell range, quite limited authority to sen-
tence outside that range, and no opportunity to provide reasoned crit-
icism of the guidelines.  While Judge Sessions acknowledges that the 
Department of Justice and Congress undermined the Commission’s 
neutrality during the mandatory guidelines era—creating a one-way 
upward ratchet, undue severity, and lack of proportionality in the 
guidelines482—his proposal would eliminate the only known antidote, 
which is transparent feedback from Article III judges applying the sen-
tencing statute in real cases.  The Commission cannot claim to be “at 
the crossroads” of all three branches483 without hearing from, and lis-
tening to, the members of the branch in which it is “located.”484   
 
478 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1977) (hold-
ing that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeals from acquittals). 
479 Sessions, supra note 12, at 353. 
480 Id. at 351. 
481 Id. at 350. 
482 Id. at 306, 317-23, 334-36. 
483 Id. at 305; see also Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 2; Implications of the  
Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17 (2005) 
(statement of Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission).     
484 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
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Judge Sessions offers his proposal as a political “compromise” that 
would significantly constrain judicial discretion in return for the hope 
that statutory mandatory minimums might be “repealed or at least cur-
tailed.”485  But even if one were to assume that Congress would repeal 
and foreswear all mandatory minimums if it enacted the Sessions pro-
posal, the cure would be worse than the disease.  Judge Sessions ex-
plains that his proposal would “mak[e] mandatory minimum statutory 
penalties unnecessary.”486  If this is true, the reason is that the proposal 
itself would create the equivalent of mandatory minimums, or near-
mandatory minimums, across the board.487  Moreover, in reality, the 
threat of new mandatory minimums would always be present.  Manda-
tory minimums are a function of politics, not changes in the law re-
garding judicial discretion.  Congress enacted mandatory minimums 
throughout the mandatory guidelines era, as Judge Sessions acknowl-
edges.488  Since 1987, there has been only one election year—2010, 
when the guidelines were advisory—in which Congress did not enact 
or expand mandatory minimums.489  Nor does Judge Sessions explain 
why, under his system, the Commission would not feel “compelled,” as 
it has in the past, to increase guideline sentences to “ward off” manda-
tory minimum penalties.490   
Judge Sessions also asserts that if his proposal were adopted, “Con-
gress would have less of an incentive to issue directives” to the Com-
mission to add new aggravators.491  This argument posits that, in a 
system with wider mandatory ranges, Congress would be less inclined 
 
485 Sessions, supra note 12, at 340. 
486 Id. at 309-10. 
487 See Memorandum from Mary Price, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums, to Spencer Overton, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office 
of Legal Policy 7 (Aug. 14, 2009) (on file with authors) (opposing such a compromise 
as it “would abandon mandatory sentences that apply to some crimes and replace them 
with mandatory or near-mandatory guidelines across the criminal code”).   
488 See Sessions, supra note 12, at 331 (“Since 1991, the number of criminal statutes 
that have mandatory minimum sentences has increased by more than 78%.  There are 
now over 170 provisions that bear mandatory minimum sentences.” (citations omitted)). 
489 See Study of Mandatory Minimums and Specific Directives, supra note 272.   
490 Sessions, supra note 12, at 318 (quoting R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblew-
ski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 752 (2001)).   
491 Id. at 348. 
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to issue directives because it would recognize that increasing the range 
by even one or two cell levels would be “unduly harsh”; moreover, 
“should [Congress] elect to” issue directives anyway, “it would effec-
tively bar itself from inserting any further upward adjustments in the 
future” because guideline sentences would quickly reach life impris-
onment.492  The implications of this argument are alarming.  Congress 
has not hesitated in the past to direct guideline increases for offenses, 
such as drug trafficking and child pornography possession, that were 
already treated severely under the guidelines; like mandatory mini-
mums, directives are a function of politics. The fact that congressional 
directives would quickly reach the stopping point of life sentences—
and mandatory life sentences at that—hardly recommends the Sessions 
proposal.  
Judge Sessions claims that his system of wider ranges would simul-
taneously (1) reduce disparity among judges and (2) provide greater 
judicial discretion within the broad cell ranges.493  As a practical, if not 
logical, matter, it would be difficult to achieve both these ends, and 
Judge Sessions’s attempt to avoid this conundrum leads him to propose 
a system of sub-ranges that would be unconstitutional, as we explain 
below.  
Judge Sessions, like others who have discussed a jury-driven system, 
recognizes that to be workable in practice, such a system would require 
relatively few aggravating facts for the jury to find, and therefore pro-
poses fewer and consequently wider ranges than exist under the current 
sentencing table.494  But the wider ranges would invite much greater 
 
492 See Bowman, supra note 170, at 1343-44.  Judge Sessions adopts Professor Bow-
man’s argument.  See Sessions, supra note 12, at 348 & n.178.  
493 Sessions, supra note 12, at 354. 
494 Id. at 355; see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids:  A Proposal for Recon-
figuring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 199 (“As a practical 
matter, a system that gives juries a larger sentencing role requires that the number of 
facts juries are asked to decide be fairly small.”); James Felman, How Should the Congress 
Respond if the Supreme Court Strikes Down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 17 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 97, 97 (2004) (“The number of culpability factors is a trade-off related to both 
complexity and the width of the sentencing ranges which result . . . .”); cf. Felman Testi-
mony, supra note 11, at 22 (noting that “the ranges under a jury-driven system would 
almost certainly have to be significantly wider than the ranges under the present guide-
lines,” and opposing such a system in part because it “could actually increase variations 
among sentences because the ranges would be so much wider”).  
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variation in sentences than exists under the advisory guidelines system.  
The current sentencing table consists of 258 ranges that are overlapping 
and narrow; nearly half of the ranges are 12 months or less in width, 
and only 10% are more than 80 months wide.495  Under the current 
advisory guidelines system, the median decrease from these narrow 
ranges for non-government sponsored below-range sentences is about 
12 months.496  Viewed another way, 22% of these below-range sentences 
are 6 months or less below the guideline range, 48% are no more than 
one year below the range, and 72.4% are no more than two years be-
low.497  In contrast, under Judge Sessions’s proposal the mandatory cells 
would vary in width from a low of 16 months to a high of 286 months, 
with 67% of the ranges 80 months or wider.498  Even at the middle of 
the Sessions table, the four ranges would vary in width from 80 months 
to 105 months to 136 months to 226 months.499  This or any similar 
reduction in the number of ranges and corresponding expansion of 
widths would produce ranges that are wider than the vast majority of 
judicial departures and variances today.   
Thus, the proposed rejiggering of ranges would not please those 
who wish to constrain judicial discretion.  Anticipating this objection, 
Judge Sessions proposes to regulate judges’ sentencing choices 
through the introduction of three sub-ranges within each mandatory 
range, the middle of which would be an “advisory range for a typical or 
heartland” case.500  The jury’s verdict or the defendant’s guilty plea 
would, standing alone, result in a sentence in the middle sub-range.  
In order to move from that sub-range to a higher or lower sub-range, 
the judge would be required to consider a series of factors chosen by 
 
495 About 48% of the current ranges are 12 months or less in width; 15% are 12-24 
months in width; 8% are 25-35 months in width, 7% are 37-47 months in width; 4% are 
52-58 months in width, 7% are 65-81 months in width; 8% are 110 months, and 2% are 
life.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A sentencing tbl. (2011).   
496 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.  
497 2010 USSC Monitoring Dataset, supra note 231.   
498 None of the ranges would be less than 16 months wide, and twenty-four (or 
66.6%) would be 80 months wide or more.  Only eight of the ranges (or 22%) would 
be less than 36 months wide, and only ten (or 28%) would be less than 48 months wide. 
Sessions, supra note 12, at 345. 
499 Id. at 345.   
500 Id. at 343, 347.  
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the Commission from among the existing guideline factors, nearly all 
of which are aggravating.501  Critically, a judge who imposed a sentence 
in an upper or lower sub-range would be reversed unless it was clear 
from the record that he considered “all of the relevant aggravating 
and mitigating factors identified in the application notes and all other 
relevant factors in the Guidelines Manual before imposing a particular 
sentence.”502  Reversal would also be required if the judge “considered 
a prohibited factor.”503  This appears to mean that, in order to sen-
tence outside the middle range of the mandatory cell, judges would be 
required to consider aggravating facts (and a small number of mitigat-
ing facts) designated by the Commission, as well as the restrictions on 
mitigating facts set forth in policy statements and commentary—and 
only those facts and restrictions.  There is, at least, no mention in 
Judge Sessions’s proposal of sentencing factors not designated by the 
Commission, or of any sentencing principles, such as parsimony, the 
purposes of punishment, or the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.  
The proposal thus evidently contemplates that the only lawful  
bases for imposing a sentence above the middle sub-range would be 
judicial factfinding of aggravating factors specified by the Commission.  
Yet such a system would violate the fundamental commands of Booker.  
A sentencing range is advisory only if the judge is authorized to sen-
tence above or below it based on facts and principles not specified by 
the Commission.504  If we have understood Judge Sessions’s proposal 
correctly, the top of the middle sub-range would be the “maximum” 
for Sixth Amendment purposes.505  Accordingly, sentences above this 
maximum may not be authorized solely on the basis of aggravating 
 
501 Id. at 347-49.   
502 Id. at 353-54 (emphasis added). 
503 Id.  
504 What made the guidelines mandatory before Booker was that departures were 
available only under circumstances specified by the Commission.  United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234-35 (2005).   
505 The “maximum” for Sixth Amendment purposes is the “maximum authorized 
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict.”  Id. at 244;  see also Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004) (“[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the max-
imum he may impose without any additional findings.”).   
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facts found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.506  But 
this is exactly what the Sessions proposal, as we read it, contemplates.507     
The constitutional problem is best illustrated by the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation, in Cunningham v. California, of a sentencing sys-
tem strikingly similar to the one Judge Sessions proposes.508  The Cali-
fornia system provided for an upper term, a middle term, and a lower 
term.509  The judge was directed to start with the middle term and to 
move from that term only if the judge found and placed on the sen-
tencing record aggravating or mitigating facts related to the offense or 
the offender, beyond the facts of which the defendant was convicted.510  
The system made no provision for the judge to impose a sentence 
above the middle term based on anything other than facts.511  The 
Court made plain that the system would have been constitutional if it 
had authorized the judge to sentence above the middle term based 
solely on a “policy judgment” in light of the “general objectives of sen-
tencing,” or the judge’s subjective belief regarding the appropriate 
sentence.512  Because California’s sentencing rules referred only to 
“facts” in aggravation,513 the system violated the Sixth Amendment.514         
In contrast, the federal advisory guidelines system is constitutional 
because, “[a]s far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard 
the Guidelines and apply the same sentence (higher than . . . the bot-
tom of the unenhanced Guidelines range) in the absence of the spe-
cial facts . . . which, in the view of the Sentencing Commission, would 
warrant a higher sentence.”515  Moreover, “courts are entitled to vary 
 
506 See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2007) (“[T]he Federal 
Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to 
impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than prior con-
viction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.8 
(“Whether the judicially determined facts require a sentence enhancement or merely 
allow it, the verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.”).  
507 See Sessions, supra note 12, at 348-49, 350, 351-52. 
508 549 U.S. 270.  
509 Id. at 275.  
510 Id. at 279. 
511 Id. at 279-80.  
512 Id. at 279-81; see also id. at 292-93. 
513 Id. at 279. 
514 Id. at 292-93. 
515 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 353 (2007). 
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from the . . . guidelines in a mine-run case where there are no ‘partic-
ular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a variance from the 
Guidelines’ sentencing range.”516  Because “the Guidelines are now 
advisory[,] . . . courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on 
policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.”517  
Indeed, it is this ability to sentence outside the guideline range based 
on a policy judgment alone that makes the guidelines advisory and thus 
constitutional.  As stated by then–Solicitor General Kagan, “[T]he very 
essence of an advisory guideline is that a sentencing court may, subject 
to appellate review for reasonableness, disagree with the guideline in 
imposing sentencing under Section 3553(a).”518  While Judge Sessions 
states that the middle sub-range would serve as an “advisory” range,519 
this appears not to be so, because there is no provision for the judge to 
sentence above or below it based on policy considerations alone. 
Judge Sessions’s discussion of offender characteristics further re-
veals that the promise of “greater discretion” within the broad, manda-
tory ranges is illusory.520  The Judge states that under his proposed sys-
system, “the vast majority of offender characteristics,” while rarely 
permissible as grounds for departure, “would be relevant to deciding 
where a defendant falls within the broader cells.”521  It appears, however, 
that this exercise of judicial discretion within the mandatory cells 
would be subject to the Commission’s restrictions regarding offender 
characteristics.522  As assurance that the Commission would not con-
tinue to seek to constrain judges from considering offender character-
 
516 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009). 
517 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101-02 (2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (“The sentencing judge . . . may hear  
arguments . . . that the Guidelines sentence should not apply . . . because the Guidelines 
sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or perhaps because the 
case warrants a different sentence regardless . . . .”). 
518 Brief for the United States at 11, Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 
(2010) (No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 5423020. 
519 Sessions, supra note 12, at 343. 
520 Id. at 336-37, 351. 
521 Id. at 351. 
522 See id. at 353-54 (stating that the judge would be required to consider “all of the 
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors identified in the application notes and all 
other relevant factors in the Guidelines Manual before imposing a particular sentence” 
within the broad cell (emphasis added)).  
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istics, Judge Sessions points to recent amendments as “signaling at 
least some change in direction.”523  It is true that in 2010, when Judge 
Sessions was Chair, he and Vice Chair Ruben Castillo sought to revise 
the offender-characteristics policy statements to make them consistent 
with § 3553(a) and other provisions of the SRA.   But other Commis-
sioners resisted, and the changes were marginal at best.  The Commis-
sion received voluminous empirical evidence and public comment 
demonstrating that mitigating offender characteristics are highly rele-
vant to the purposes of sentencing.524  In response, the Commission 
changed a few characteristics from “not ordinarily relevant” to “may be 
relevant,” but only if they are “present to an unusual degree and dis-
tinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines”525—
essentially the same standard for characteristics deemed “not ordinarily 
relevant.”526  The Commission simultaneously amended the introduc-
tory commentary to state that the “most appropriate use” of offender 
characteristics is in choosing a sentence within the guideline range, 
 
523 Id. at 336. 
524 See, e.g., Comment of Philip Miller, Chief U.S. Probation Officer, E. Dist. of Mich. 
3-4 (2010); Letter from Probation Officers Advisory Grp. to Hon. William K. Sessions, 
III, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Feb. 3, 2010); Letter from Jon Conyers, Jr., 
Chair, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Chair, H. Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec., to Hon. William K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2-3 (Apr. 6, 2010); Margy Meyers & Marianne Mariano, Fed. Pub. 
& Cmty. Defenders, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 19, 43-80 (Mar. 17, 
2010); Letter from Practitioners Advisory Grp. to Hon. William K. Sessions, III, Chair, 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 6-10 (Mar. 22, 2010); Letter from Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Assoc. Professor, Ariz. State Univ., to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1-5 (Mar. 17, 2010).  
525 Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.11 
(2011), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.11 
(2001). See also id. app. C, amend. 739 (Nov. 1, 2010).  The Commission also changed 
drug or alcohol dependence or abuse from a prohibited ground to one that “ordinarily 
is not a reason for a downward departure.”  Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5H1.4 policy statement (2011), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5H1.4 policy statement (2001). See also id. app. C, amend. 739 (Nov. 1, 2010).  
526 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(4) policy statement (2011) 
(stating that circumstances deemed “not ordinarily relevant” may be considered “only 
if . . . present to an exceptional degree”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§5K2.0 policy statement (2001) (“[A]n offender characteristic or other circumstance 
that is, in the Commission’s view, ‘not ordinarily relevant’ . . . may be relevant . . . if 
such characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes 
the case from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the guidelines.”).   
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rather than varying from it.527  Meanwhile, the Commission continues 
to deem a large number of mitigating factors to be never or not ordi-
narily relevant.528  The Commission’s recent actions with respect to  
offender characteristics are not cause for optimism. 
Judge Sessions also asserts that under his proposed scheme, un-
charged and acquitted crimes would play a “more limited role.”529  It 
appears, however, that the use of unconvicted conduct under the pro-
posal would either violate the Sixth Amendment or have a very sub-
stantial impact on sentence length.  The proposal would require  
judges to consider uncharged and acquitted crimes established by a 
preponderance of the evidence in choosing a sub-range within the 
mandatory cell.530  As we have already noted, consideration of uncon-
victed conduct in sentencing above the maximum of the middle sub-
range would be unconstitutional because it would elevate the sentence 
above the maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict or the defend-
ant’s guilty plea.531  If our constitutional argument misunderstands the 
Sessions proposal—perhaps because he means to allow a sentence 
above the top of the mid-range solely on the basis of policy considera-
tions—then the breadth of the mandatory cells would permit uncon-
 
527 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2011); id. 
app. C, amend. 739 (Nov. 1, 2010).   
528 Factors deemed “not ordinarily relevant” include:  education and vocational 
skills; drug or alcohol dependence or abuse; employment record; family ties and re-
sponsibilities; civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; 
and prior good works.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.4, 5H1.5, 
5H1.6, 5H1.11 (2011).  Prohibited grounds for a departure include:  gambling addic-
tion; lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged 
upbringing; personal financial difficulties; economic pressures on a trade or business; 
diminished capacity if caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants or if 
the defendant was convicted of a sex offense; fulfillment of restitution obligations as 
required by law; acceptance of responsibility; role in the offense; and decision to plead 
guilty.  Id. §§ 5H1.4, 5H1.7, 5H1.12, 5K2.12, 5K2.13, 5K2.0(d).  
529 Sessions, supra note 12, at 350.     
530 See id. (“Uncharged relevant conduct could only be used to sentence within a 
larger cell on the simplified grid (and then only if found by the court by a preponder-
ance of the evidence).  Acquitted conduct . . . could not increase a defendant’s offense 
level.”); id. at 351-52 (“Uncharged prior criminal conduct, if proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, would remain a valid consideration for an increase in a defend-
ant’s sentence within the relevant sentencing cell on the grid.”). 
531 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234-35 (2005); see also supra note 506 
and accompanying text. 
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victed conduct to have an enormous impact on sentence length.  For 
example, under the broader cell ranges, a defendant convicted of a 
drug trafficking offense placing him in the fifth offense level and with 
a Criminal History Category of III could, on the basis of unconvicted 
conduct (including reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in fur-
therance of “jointly undertaken” activity532), face a sentence up to 271 
months, twice the 135-month sentence at the bottom of the range.533  
The solution to the unjustified use of unconvicted conduct to in-
crease the severity of punishment is not to create broad, mandatory 
sentencing ranges.  The solution is much closer at hand.  The Com-
mission can correct the misguided relevant conduct rule right now, as 
practitioners and judges have urged for years.534  The Commission 
could, for example, adopt the proposal of former Commissioner John 
Steer, a one-time supporter of the relevant conduct rule, to eliminate 
acquitted conduct from the guideline calculation and substantially 
limit the weight of uncharged conduct.535 
At the same time, the Sessions proposal would introduce unwar-
ranted disparities that would be hidden and impervious to correction.  
The mandatory guideline range would be determined by the prosecu-
tor’s charges and the parties’ negotiations (in cases that do not go to 
trial), and those decisions would not be explained in open court or 
subject to judicial review.  The advisory guidelines system has signifi-
cantly ameliorated hidden disparities arising from plea bargaining and 
other presentencing decisions.536  The Sessions proposal would reverse 
these gains.     
 
532 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 
533 Sessions, supra note 12, at 345.  In the eight cells in the two rows at the top of 
the grid, the impact of relevant conduct would be relatively limited, with increases 
ranging from 16 to 46 months.  Id.  But the remaining twenty-eight cells range from 33 
to 286 months in width.  Id. 
534 Nearly seventy percent of judges responding to a Commission survey believe that 
neither dismissed conduct nor uncharged conduct referenced only in a presentence 
report (and not presented at trial or admitted by the defendant) should be considered 
at sentencing, and eighty-four percent believe that acquitted conduct should not be 
considered at sentencing.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8, tbl.5. 
535 See An Interview with John Steer, CHAMPION, Sept. 2008, at 40, 42.   
536 See supra Sections III.A-B.   
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Judge Sessions’s proposal also raises separation of powers concerns 
that would appear to make the Sentencing Commission itself unconsti-
tutional.  When the Supreme Court upheld the initial guidelines sys-
tem in Mistretta, the Court found it significant that the Commission 
would be making rules to be applied exclusively by judges to facts 
found exclusively by judges, rather than defining crimes and setting 
the outer limits of punishment.537  Under a system of mandatory guide-
lines with jury factfinding, in contrast, the Commission’s primary task 
would be to determine what conduct must be charged in an indict-
ment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a 
defendant then to be sentenced within the resulting range.  The pros-
ecutor’s charges and the jury’s factfinding (or the defendant’s admis-
sions), not the judge, would determine that range.  Making rules for 
that purpose is not “the Judicial Branch’s own business—that of passing 
sentence on every criminal defendant.”538  It is the business of Congress. 
To be sure, the Court in Booker rejected the government’s argu-
ment that the power of the judiciary would be improperly expanded to 
include the legislative function of defining crimes were the Commis-
sion to make binding rules that determine sentences based on jury 
factfinding.539  But the Court has never addressed whether a delegation 
of political and substantive functions to a Commission whose members 
are subject to removal by the President for “good cause”540 and whose 
mandatory guidelines would be directly implemented by the prosecu-
tor’s charges (as opposed to judicial factfinding) would improperly 
expand the power of the executive.    
 
537 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989); see also id. at 396-97 
(finding that Congress’s decision “to locate th[e] Commission within the Judicial Branch 
does not violate the principle of separation of powers,” in part because the guidelines 
“do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public or vest in the Judicial 
Branch the legislative responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum penalties 
for every crime,” but rather pertain to “the special role of the Judicial Branch in the 
field of sentencing,” and “leave[] with the Judiciary what long has belonged to it”). 
538 Id. at 408. 
539 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 241-42 (2005) (relying on Mistretta as 
“premised on an understanding that the Commission, rather than performing adjudi-
catory functions, instead makes political and substantive decisions”); Reply Brief for  
the United States at 9-10, 17-19, Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (Nos. 04-0104, 04-0105), 2004 WL 
2190496. 
540 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). 
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The Court has recognized that even limited removal power over an 
“independent” agent may “dictate that [the officers subject to that 
power] will be subservient” to the branch holding the removal power.541  
Judge Sessions’s proposed system would therefore create an agency 
whose officers are, at least in constitutional terms, “subservient” to the 
executive.  Unlike the system considered in Mistretta, this agency would  
exercise broad policymaking discretion to create rules that give prosecu-
tors—agents and employees of the executive branch—power to set the 
sentencing range of individual defendants, effectively cutting out the 
judicial factfinding so crucial to the outcome in Mistretta.  Thus, what-
ever branch the Commission is said to be “located” in, and whether or 
not there are judges on the Commission, such a system would uncon-
stitutionally assign to the executive direct control over the traditionally 
judicial function of sentencing542 and would unconstitutionally unite 
the power to prosecute with the power to sentence.543  As the Supreme 
Court recently emphasized in the context of statutory interpretation, it 
is not “natural” to read the law as giving an executive agent “what 
amounts to sentencing authority,”544 and “our tradition of judicial sen-
tencing” is ever-accompanied by the “desideratum that sentencing [is] 
 
541 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 692-93 (1988) (recognizing that the President’s “good cause” removal power over 
an independent agency in the executive branch, though limited, nevertheless allows 
some “power to control or supervise” the agency to ensure that it does not take action 
that “interfere[s] impermissibly with [the President’s] constitutional obligation to en-
sure faithful execution of the laws,” and that, under such circumstances, the President 
“retains ample authority to assure that the [independent executive official] is compe-
tently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with 
the provisions of the Act”); PIERCE, supra note 59, § 2.5, at 84 (arguing that a “cause” 
requirement for removal “must include failure to comply with any valid policy decision 
made by the President or his agent”).   
542 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916) (“Indisputably under our constitu-
tional system the right . . . to impose the punishment provided by law, is judicial . . . .”). 
543 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17 (“[H]ad Congress decided to confer responsi-
bility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we might face 
the constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had assigned judicial 
responsibilities to the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to prose-
cute and the power to sentence within one Branch.”); see also Stith, supra note 45, at 
480-81 (concluding that uniting prosecutorial and sentencing authority would be  
unconstitutional).   
544 Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (2012). 
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not to be left to employees of the same Department of Justice that 
conducts the prosecution.”545 
Even if the President’s removal power in this context would not 
mean that the executive branch has actual control over the Commis-
sion’s policymaking and implementation of the SRA,546 the constitu-
tional difficulty would be altered but not eliminated.  If, despite the 
material transformations in its duties and despite the President’s re-
moval power, the Commission would not really be controlled by the 
executive (and thus not accountable to the people through the execu-
tive branch), the question becomes in what branch this Commission 
may constitutionally be located.  The Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Mistretta that the Commission is “not controlled by or accountable to 
members of the Judicial Branch,”547 but nonetheless found the Com-
mission to be part of the judicial branch because its primary task was 
to write sentencing rules for judges to implement.548  But under the 
Sessions proposal, as we have noted, that would no longer be the pri-
mary task of the Commission; the guidelines would be implemented 
through the prosecutor’s charges and jury factfinding or the parties’ 
negotiations.  In these circumstances, it would be mere pretense to 
assert that the Commission is a judicial branch agency either function-
ally or formally. 
If the Commission may not be located in either the executive 
branch or the judicial branch, then its political and substantive pow-
ers—as materially transformed by Judge Sessions’s proposal—would be 
subject only to Congress’s control.  Congress, however, may not cir-
cumvent the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and pre-
sentment by delegating its fundamental policymaking authority to its 
 
545 Id. at 1471-72. 
546 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (holding that 
Congress may constitutionally limit executive removal power over members of an  
“independent” agency performing quasi-legislative functions so that the agency oper-
ates “free from executive control”); cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 411 (“[W]e see no risk that 
the President's limited removal power will compromise the impartiality of Article III 
judges serving on the Commission . . . .”). 
547 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393. 
548 Id. at 392-93. 
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own agent.549  Setting mandatory punishment ranges based on factors 
charged in an indictment, and either admitted in a guilty plea or 
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, is undeniably “the making 
of laws.”550   
This leaves no constitutionally permissible location for a Commis-
sion exercising the power that Judge Sessions’s proposal would assign 
to it.551  It thus appears that only Congress itself could enact the kind of 
guidelines Judge Sessions proposes.  But Congress lacks the time, ex-
pertise, and political impartiality to do so—which is why it delegated 
this function to a commission in the first place. 
 
549 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (invalidating a one-House veto of 
executive action because it was “legislative in purpose and effect,” and thus an exercise 
of “legislative power,” but had not been passed in both Houses and presented to the 
President, as required by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution).  As Justice Stevens 
stated in Bowsher v. Synar, “Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formu-
late national policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative 
committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress.”  478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in the judgment).  Congress also may not reserve control over the 
execution of the laws, if it could be said that the Commission would assume an execu-
tive rather than legislative function.  See id. at 726 (majority opinion).   
550 See Stith, supra note 45, at 481-82 (noting that, while Congress may legislate sen-
tencing rules, it may not create and command an agency “to do its bidding,” while 
“pretending . . . that the agency . . . is part of the same ‘branch’ of government as the 
Article III judges whose sentencing authority Congress has decided to take away”); cf. 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding “no place within our constitu-
tional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power 
other than the making of laws”). 
551 We note that Judge Sessions’s proposal bears a strong structural resemblance to 
the remedy proposed by Justice Stevens in dissent in Booker.  See 543 U.S. 220, 285 
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But Justice Stevens’s remedy garnered only four votes, 
see id.; id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part), and Justice Stevens did not address the 
separation-of-powers argument that we raise here.  As noted earlier, Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion in Booker addressed the question whether the Commission’s political 
or quasi-legislative power would unconstitutionally aggrandize the judicial branch if 
guideline factors were charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt.  See supra text accompanying note 539.  It was apparently in that limited 
context that Justice Stevens stated, “We have thus always recognized the fact that the 
Commission is an independent agency that exercises policymaking authority delegated 
to it by Congress.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 243.  To the extent that the Stevens majority 
opinion in Booker might be read as approving an independent Commission outside of 
either the judicial or executive branches with the primary task of writing substantive provi-
sions of criminal law, we submit that the majority in Booker was, in this respect, in error. 
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B.  The Commission’s Proposal 
The Commission has described several proposed legislative changes, 
but as of this writing, it has proposed language for only some of them.552  
The discussion that follows is therefore to some extent provisional. 
The Commission has asked Congress to enact legislation requiring 
that sentencing courts accord the guidelines “substantial weight.”553  
The proposed legislation would also codify what the Commission has 
recently asserted in the form of a guideline:  that sentencing is a 
“three-step” process beginning with calculation of the guideline range, 
immediately followed by required consideration of the Commission’s 
policy statements and commentary, which primarily seek to restrict 
sentences outside the guideline range.554  Only after these steps would 
the judge consider the § 3553(a) factors “taken as a whole.”555  In a re-
lated vein, the Commission has asked Congress to resolve an alleged 
“tension” between the Commission’s interpretation of directives to the 
Commission at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, et seq. and Congress’s directive to 
judges in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to consider the “history and characteris-
tics of the defendant.”556  The Commission suggests, for example, that 
Congress codify the Commission’s policy statements deeming the de-
fendant’s education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties 
and responsibilities, and community ties to be “not ordinarily relevant 
to the determination of whether to impose a sentence outside the ap-
plicable guideline range.”557  The Commission has also asked Congress 
 
552 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 55-59. 
553 Id. at 58-59. 
554 Id. at 57-58; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2011); id. 
app. C, amend. 741 (Nov. 1, 2010).  
555 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2011).  
556  See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 57. 
557  The Commission posed this formulation to panelists at a recent hearing.  See 
Henry Bemporad, Fed. Pub. Defender for the W. Dist. of Tex., Statement Before the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission app. question 4 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.fd.org/ 
pdf_lib/bemporad_statement_2_16_12.pdf.  Similarly, Department of Justice officials 
have suggested that judges should be limited to considering the offense and criminal 
history in determining the length of a prison term, and that offender characteristics 
should be taken into account, if at all, through “prison credits” administered by the 
executive branch.  See Letter from Jonathan Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legis-
lation, Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 33-34 
(Mar. 12, 2012); Matthew Axelrod, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Statement Before the U.S. 
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to require the courts of appeals, in reviewing sentences, to (1) apply a 
“presumption of reasonableness” to within-guideline sentences, (2) 
demand a “greater justification” of the district court the further the 
sentence imposed is from the guideline range, and (3) apply a 
“heightened standard of review” to sentences that result from a policy 
disagreement with the Commission.558 
It is clear that these proposals are intended to undo the holdings 
of the Supreme Court in Booker and its progeny and to reestablish the 
Commission’s guidelines and policy statements as the “law” of sentenc-
ing without, however, crossing the line into unconstitutionality by 
making the guidelines too mandatory.  We have previously explained 
why we conclude that the post-Booker sentencing system is far preferable 
to any regime of mandatory guidelines.559  Here we limit ourselves to 
the constitutional question:  do the Commission’s proposals violate 
Booker ’s command, as repeated and strengthened in subsequent deci-
sions, that in order to be constitutional the guidelines must be “adviso-
ry” only?  We believe that the answer is “yes,” although we recognize 
that at least as to one proposal the question is close,560 and hence we 
invite others to consider our analysis and draw their own conclusions.  
The Commission’s rationale for giving “substantial weight” to the 
guidelines is that the Commission itself already took into account the 
§ 3553(a) factors in writing the guidelines.561  Quite apart from the 
lack of evidence that the Commission has based the guidelines on the 
§ 3553(a) factors in any systematic way—and substantial evidence that 
 
Sentencing Commission 10-13 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_ 
Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_Axelrod.pdf; 
Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., and Jonathan Wroblewski, Dir., Of-
fice of Policy & Legislation, Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentenc-
ing Comm’n 3-4 (Sept. 2, 2011). 
558 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 55-56. 
559 See supra Part II.   
560 See infra notes 583-89 and accompanying text.  
561 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 57-58.  This is the same implausible 
and legally flawed theory the Commission urged upon the courts in the immediate 
wake of Booker.  See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 (stating that “[i]mmediately 
after the Booker decision, the Commission developed a post-Booker guidelines training 
program” which “explains how the sentencing guidelines reflect Congress’ objectives in 
the SRA and that the guidelines accordingly should be given substantial weight” and 
“describes federal sentencing under Booker as a 3-step process”). 
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it has not562—this proposal would violate the holdings of Booker and 
subsequent decisions concerning the role of the guidelines in the sen-
tencing determination.  Specifically, the “Guidelines are only one of 
the factors to consider when imposing sentence,”563 there is no “legal 
presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply,”564  and “they 
are also not to be presumed reasonable.”565  Policy statements that con-
flict with § 3553(a) need not be considered and are not entitled to 
weight.566  As we have noted, only Justice Alito holds the view that the 
guidelines and policy statements can and should be given “some signif-
icant weight.”567 
The Commission’s proposal that Congress codify its new “three-
step” guideline, especially in conjunction with the “substantial weight” 
proposal and the proposals involving the standard of appellate review, 
is also constitutionally suspect.  The Commission forthrightly acknowl-
edges that the purpose of its three-step process is to “ensure[]” that 
the guideline sentence is given “proper weight.”568  The three-step 
guideline directs courts that they “shall” in each case “consider Parts H 
and K of Chapter Five, Specific Offender Characteristics and Depar-
tures, and any other policy statements or commentary in the guide-
lines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence” and that 
 
562 See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 47, at 51-74 (describing the work of the 
original Commission and presenting substantial evidence that the guidelines it pro-
duced, and as amended by subsequent Commissions, do not take the purposes of sen-
tencing into account).  
563 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007).   
564 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).  The court of appeals may, on 
the other hand, apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to a district court’s 
discretionary decision to impose a guideline sentence.  Id. at 347. 
565 Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009).   
566 See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1242-43, 1247 (2011) (holding that 
a court of appeals could not, on the basis of a policy statement, prohibit a district court 
from considering factors that were “highly relevant” under § 3553(a), especially where 
the policy statement “rest[s] on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in 
the sentencing statutes Congress enacted”); id. at 1249 (refusing to “elevate” policy 
statements above other factors); Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60 (upholding a variance from the 
guideline range based on circumstances relevant under § 3553(a) but disapproved by 
policy statements); see also supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.   
567 Gall, 552 U.S. at 68 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
568 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 57. 
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they “shall” do so before considering § 3553(a) “taken as a whole.”569  
But the referenced policy statements explicitly forbid or discourage 
judges from imposing a non-guideline sentence, as did § 3553(b), 
which Booker excised.570  Indeed, these provisions not only deem many 
factors to be never or not ordinarily relevant to sentencing,571 but also 
quote from and cite excised § 3553(b),572 state that courts are not in-
tended “to substitute their policy judgments for those of the . . . Sen-
tencing Commission,”573 and inform courts that “the most appropriate 
use” of the “history and characteristics of the defendant” under 
§ 3553(a) is “to consider them not as a reason for a sentence outside 
the applicable guideline range but . . . in determining the sentence 
within the applicable guideline range.”574   
Yet the Supreme Court excised § 3553(b) because that provision, 
including the “policy statements and official commentary” referenced 
therein, made the guidelines mandatory.575  Accordingly, after Booker, 
sentencing courts need not consider policy statements unless raised by 
a party as a basis for “departure,” as the Court has made clear in sub-
sequent decisions.576  The Court has further held that the Commis-
 
569 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(b)–(c) (2011).   
570 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  
571 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.4. 5H1.5, 5H1.6, 
5H1.7, 5H1.11, 5H1.12, 5K2.0(d), 5K2.12, 5K2.13. 
572 Id. § 5K2.0(a)–(b); id. cmt. nn.2-4.  
573 See id. § 5K2.0 cmt. background. 
574 Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.  
575 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-35, 245, 259; Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 
1245 (2011); see also supra Part I.B.2. 
576 Under the procedure set forth by the Court, after calculating the guideline 
range, the sentencing court must “giv[e] both parties an opportunity to argue for what-
ever sentence they deem appropriate.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).  
Arguments for a sentence outside the guideline range may take “either of two forms”:  
for departure “within the Guidelines framework” or for “application of the sentencing fac-
tors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV) warrant[ing] a lower [or 
higher] sentence.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (first emphasis add-
ed).  Accordingly, the courts of appeals have held that district courts need not consider 
policy statements regarding departures unless a party seeks a departure, and even then 
may instead consider a variance under § 3553(a).  See United States v. Ball, 418 F. App’x 
107, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 362-66 (4th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. McGowan, 315 F. App’x 338, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 901 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moton, 
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sion’s restrictions on consideration of particular factors may not be 
elevated above the general sentencing factors described in § 3553(a) 
or used to deny a variance based on such factors where relevant.577  
What the Supreme Court said about early efforts by some courts of 
appeals to thwart Kimbrough’s holding is also true of the Commission’s 
“three-step” process:  it is a “smuggled-in dish that is indigestible.”578   
The Commission’s related proposal that Congress resolve a pur-
ported “tension” between directives to the Commission and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) by directing the courts that certain offender characteristics 
are “not ordinarily relevant” in deciding whether to impose a non-
guideline sentence579 rests on a misinterpretation of directives to the 
Commission.580  Moreover, a statutory prohibition on judges consider-
ing virtually all personal characteristics of the offender about to be 
sentenced would raise additional constitutional concerns both by mak-
ing the guidelines functionally mandatory,581 and by offensively inter-
fering with the fundamental judicial function of sentencing.582 
The Commission also proposes that Congress require courts of 
appeals to apply a presumption of reasonableness to guideline sen-
 
226 F. App’x 936, 939-40 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713, 
723 (5th Cir. 2007).  
577 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1242-43, 1249-50; Gall, 552 U.S. at 53-60.  Accordingly, 
the courts of appeals have reversed when judges have declined to consider relevant 
circumstances in deference to policy statements.  See United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 
482, 499 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 567-70 (5th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Hamilton, 323 F. App’x 27, 31 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 830-32 (8th Cir. 2009).  Courts of appeals have also rejected chal-
lenges to variances based on policy statements that restrict departures.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2008).  But see United States v. Bistline, 665 
F.3d 758, 766-67 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring—even after Booker, Gall, Rita, and Pepper—
that the district court take into account policy statements on departures in applying 
§ 3553(a)). 
578 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009). 
579 See supra notes 556-57 and accompanying text.   
580 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.   
581 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (holding that the guide-
lines were mandatory and thus unconstitutional because “departures are not available 
in every case, and in fact are not available in most”). 
582 Cf. Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1471-72 (2012) (noting that “our  
tradition of judicial sentencing” is accompanied by the “desideratum that sentencing 
[is] not [to] be left to employees of the same Department of Justice that conducts the 
prosecution”). 
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tences, again to “assist in ensuring” that the guidelines are “given sub-
stantial weight” and also to “promote more consistent sentencing out-
comes.”583  The first purpose is contrary to the Court’s holdings as 
explained above, and the second is puzzling since guideline sentences 
are rarely reversed for substantive unreasonableness.584  A presumption 
of reasonableness might be thought constitutional standing alone, as 
the Court in Rita permitted the courts of appeals to apply a rebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness when the sentencing judge imposes a 
guideline sentence.585  For Congress to legislate such a presumption, 
however, is a very different proposition.  First, Rita permitted a pre-
sumption of substantive reasonableness only.  A presumption of proce-
dural reasonableness would clearly be unconstitutional.586  Moreover, 
as we have noted, the nonbinding presumption of substantive reason-
ableness that the Supreme Court has permitted rests on deference to 
the sentencing judge, not to the guidelines.587  The presumption is sub-
ject to limitations that make this clear but would be difficult to write 
into a statute; the “presumption is not binding,” “does not . . . insist 
that [either side] shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or 
proof,” does not reflect “deference of the kind that leads appeals 
courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert agency than to a 
district judge,”  and has no “independent legal effect.”588  Without these 
limitations, a presumption of reasonableness for guideline sentences 
 
583 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 55-56.  
584 At the time of this writing, only four guideline sentences have been reversed as 
substantively unreasonable since Gall was decided, one from a circuit that has adopted 
a presumption of reasonableness, see United States v. Wright, 426 F. App’x 412, 414-15 
(6th Cir. 2011), and the others from circuits that have not.  See United States v. Dorvee, 
616 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 
1055 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Paul, 561 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2009).     
585 Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. 
586 Review for procedural error precedes review for substantive reasonableness and 
prevents constitutional error.  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  It is “significant procedural error” 
if, in imposing a sentence within a correctly calculated guideline range, the district 
court “treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the § 3553(a) factors, . . . 
or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”  Id.  One study found that rever-
sal for procedural error results in a different sentence on remand more than half the 
time.  See Jennifer Niles Coffin, Where Procedure Meets Substance:  Making the Most of the Need 
for Adequate Explanation in Federal Sentencing, CHAMPION, Mar. 2012, at 36. 
587 See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
588 Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 350. 
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may function as an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for 
non-guideline sentences.589   
The Commission’s other proposals, which would require stricter 
review of non-guideline sentences, clearly go too far toward resurrect-
ing the previous mandatory guidelines regime.  Preliminarily, it is im-
portant to understand that the Supreme Court has recognized only 
two standards of review for discretionary decisions involving mixed 
questions of law and fact, which includes the determination of the  
appropriate sentence under § 3553(a):  de novo and abuse of discre-
tion.590  In the federal sentencing context, Booker and subsequent deci-
sions have repeatedly rejected de novo review for sentences outside the 
guideline range, including the euphemistically named “heightened” or 
“closer” review.591  The Court has emphasized that all sentences must 
be reviewed only for abuse of discretion, “whether inside, just outside, 
or significantly outside the Guidelines range,”592 and whether based on 
individualized circumstances or on a conclusion that the guideline 
itself fails to achieve § 3553(a) objectives.593    
The Commission nonetheless proposes two kinds of intensified re-
view for sentences outside the guideline range.  The first would “direct 
sentencing courts to provide greater justification for sentences im-
posed the further the sentence is from the . . . applicable advisory 
guidelines sentence,” to be enforced on appeal.594  But in Gall, the 
Court squarely held that an appellate rule, adopted in several circuits 
after Booker, “requiring ‘proportional’ justifications for departures from 
the Guidelines range is not consistent with our remedial opinion in 
United States v. Booker.”595   
 
589 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 47, 51; Rita, 551 U.S. at 354-55. 
590 HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF  
REVIEW:  APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY 
ACTIONS 4-6, 16-17 (2007).   
591 See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009); Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-11 (2007); Gall, 552 U.S. at 56, 59-60; United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005). 
592 Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; see also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110; Rita, 551 U.S. at 351; 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
593 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110; Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-53, 59-60.   
594 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56. 
595 Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. 
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The Court framed the analysis by emphasizing that “courts of ap-
peals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or signif-
icantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard”596 and that review of sentencing decisions is “lim-
ited to determining whether they are ‘reasonable.’”597  Under the rule 
at issue in Gall, courts of appeals would measure the extent of variance 
in percentages, and then would require an “extraordinary” justifica-
tion if the percentage was “extraordinary.”598  As Gall explained, this 
approach was not only logistically dubious,599 but also amounted to de 
novo review600 and came “too close to creating an impermissible pre-
sumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines 
range.”601  The Court thus concluded that the “practice—common 
among courts that have adopted ‘proportional review’—of applying a 
heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines 
range . . . is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing deci-
sions—whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.”602     
To be sure, the Court, in providing guidance to the district court, 
stated that the judge “must consider the extent of the deviation and 
ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the 
degree of the variance” and that “a major departure should be sup-
ported by a more significant justification than a minor one.”603  But the 
appellate court is in a different position.  The court of appeals “may con-
sider the extent” of a variance as part of the “totality of the circum-
stances” but “must give due deference to the district court’s decision 
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance” 
and may not substitute its judgment for that of the district judge.604  
 
596 Id. at 41. 
597 Id. at 46. 
598 Id. at 45. 
599 See id. at 47-49. 
600 Id. at 56, 59-60. 
601 Id. at 47. 
602 Id. at 49. 
603 Id. at 50. 
604 Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
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“[I]t is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de novo whether the jus-
tification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable.”605   
The Commission’s proposed rule would cross the line laid down in 
Gall by requiring appellate courts to enforce a rule “direct[ing] sen-
tencing courts to provide greater justification for sentences imposed 
the further the sentence is from the . . . applicable advisory guidelines 
sentence.”606  This proposed double directive, from Congress to the 
courts of appeal to the district courts, is different from the Supreme 
Court’s instructions to sentencing courts in Gall.  By transforming the 
latter into a standard of appellate review, the requirement would, con-
trary to Gall ’s explicit directions to the courts of appeals, have those 
courts substitute their judgments for those of sentencing judges.  
Moreover, the Commission’s proposal would make the extent of a var-
iance from the guideline range not just one consideration in the total-
ity of circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, 
as Gall directed, but the primary consideration.  The proposal is thus 
functionally equivalent to the “proportional justifications” approach 
that Gall held to be inconsistent with the abuse-of-discretion (or “un-
reasonableness”) standard that Booker required.607  
The Commission’s second proposal for stricter review of non-
guideline sentences—a “heightened standard of review for sentences 
imposed as a result of a ‘policy disagreement’ with the guidelines”608—
is also inconsistent with critical aspects of the Court’s Booker jurispru-
dence.  The Supreme Court has forbidden a de novo standard of review, 
whether explicit or de facto,609 and has specifically rejected “a height-
 
605 Id. at 59. 
606 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.  
607 Most courts of appeals have adopted the analysis we present here.  See United 
States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Townsend, 618 
F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469, 475-76 (5th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189-90, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc); 
United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Martin, 
520 F.3d 87, 91-93 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 806-07 (10th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007).     
608 Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56. 
609 Gall, 552 U.S. at 56; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005). 
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ened standard of review” for sentences outside the guideline range.610  
Moreover, to avoid a Sixth Amendment violation and to ensure that 
the guidelines are truly advisory, sentencing judges must be permitted 
to sentence outside the range based on a policy disagreement, subject 
to review for reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard.611  
The Commission claims that a “heightened” standard of review would 
nonetheless be “consistent” with certain dicta in Kimbrough.612  There, 
the Court dismissed a suggestion that “closer review” might be appro-
priate for a variance “based solely on the judge’s view” that the guide-
line itself “fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.”613  The 
Court rejected that suggestion because the justification offered for it—
that the Commission has the capacity to “base its determinations on 
empirical data and national experience”614—did not apply in that case:  
“The crack cocaine Guidelines . . . present no occasion for elaborative 
discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do not exemplify 
the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.”615  
Although the Court did not reach the question of whether “closer re-
view” would always violate the Constitution, Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion presented a powerful argument that it would.616  Moreover, in 
Spears, the Court rejected a court of appeals’ later application of 
 
610 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. 
611 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91, 101-02, 110 (2007); Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 278-
81, 286-87 & n.12 (2007). 
612 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 56.   
613 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 351). 
614 Id. (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)).  
615 Id. 
616 Justice Scalia wrote separately to say that he joined the opinion because he did 
not take the discussion of “closer review” to be “an unannounced abandonment” of the 
principle “that the district court is free to make its own reasonable application of the 
§ 3553(a) factors, and to reject (after due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines.”  
Id. at 112-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia continued:   
[I]f the Guidelines must be followed even where the district court’s application 
of the § 3553(a) factors is entirely reasonable; then the “advisory” Guidelines 
would, over a large expanse of their application, entitle the defendant to a lesser 
sentence but for the presence of certain additional facts found by judge rather 
than jury.  This, as we said in Booker, would violate the Sixth Amendment.   
Id. at 113-14.   
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heightened review to a district court’s disagreement with the crack 
guidelines,617 and in Pepper, it ignored a renewed suggestion that it 
adopt the “closer review” standard rejected in Kimbrough’s dicta.618       
Both the Commission and Judge Sessions also suggest that non-
guideline sentences based on “policy disagreements” are an affront to 
Congress’s authority to issue directives to the Commission.619  This 
complaint mischaracterizes the Court’s decisions.620  It also mistakenly 
equates directives to the Commission, which do not bind the courts, 
with statutes directed to the courts, which do unless they are unconsti-
tutional.  In Kimbrough, the Court rejected the government’s argument 
that the Commission and the courts were required to apply the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act’s 100-to-1 powder-to-crack cocaine quantity ratio to all 
sentences between the statutory minimum and maximum sentences.621  
The Court rejected this interpretation because the statute said “nothing 
about the appropriate sentences within these brackets.”622  To illustrate 
its point that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act did not direct the Commission 
to incorporate the ratio into the guidelines, the Court contrasted that 
statute with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), a directive that “specifically required the 
Sentencing Commission to set Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist 
offenders ‘at or near’ the statutory maximum.”623  When the Eleventh 
Circuit later interpreted this directive to the Commission as binding on 
the courts, the Solicitor General argued, in support of the defendant’s 
petition for certiorari, that the “premise that congressional directives 
 
617 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009). 
618 See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1254 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(indicating that, unlike the majority, he “would decide the question Kimbrough left 
open”).  The Court did not respond to this suggestion. 
619 See Commission Testimony, supra note 13, at 17; Sessions, supra note 12, at 327.   
620 The Court’s decisions permit policy-disagreement variances for guidelines that 
fail to properly reflect § 3553(a) considerations; these decisions do not discuss, and are 
not limited to, guidelines stemming from congressional directives.  See Kimbrough, 552 
U.S. at 101-02; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).  While some of the 
guidelines with which courts have disagreed were largely driven by congressional direc-
tives (e.g., the child pornography guideline), others were not (e.g., the crack and illegal 
reentry guidelines).  Still others exceeded a congressional directive (e.g., the career 
offender guideline). 
621 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 102-03. 
622 Id. at 103. 
623 Id. (emphasis added). 
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to the Sentencing Commission are equally binding on the sentencing 
courts . . . is incorrect.”624  If it were otherwise, a great many guidelines 
would be mandatory and thus unconstitutional.625  The Court granted 
the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consid-
eration in light of the Solicitor General’s position.626  The lesson is 
clear:  the Supreme Court has recognized the authority of sentencing 
judges to vary from guideline ranges based on a “policy disagreement” 
not as a challenge to Congress but as a legal principle necessary to 
avoid a Sixth Amendment violation.627  
CONCLUSION 
The history of federal sentencing since the SRA has proved that a 
neutral and rational sentencing system is not possible without the bal-
ancing influence of the judiciary.  The SRA included several proce-
dural mechanisms intended to achieve both reduced sentencing 
disparity and increased sentencing fairness in individual cases.  Momen-
tously, however, Congress exempted the Commission from judicial 
review.  The honor system did not work.  The Commission, with the 
misguided assistance of the Supreme Court, nullified the departure 
mechanism intended to allow individualized sentences and constructive 
evolution of the guidelines.       
As a result, the judicial feedback mechanism for which the SRA 
provided did not function until the post-Booker era.  As Judge Sessions 
put it, “In an advisory guidelines system, the Commission’s acceptance 
by the criminal justice community depends upon respect for the exer-
cise of its expertise in sentencing policy.”628  Indeed, for the first time, 
the frontline actors in sentencing—most importantly, the Article III 
judges called upon to begin their sentencing deliberations by calculat-
ing the guideline range—are informing the Commission of the nature 
 
624 Brief for the United States, supra note 518, at 9. 
625 See id. at 10-11 & n.1; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19 n.5, Vazquez v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010) (No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 543301 (identifying at 
least seventy-five “distinct guidelines and policy statements [that] have been promul-
gated or amended . . . in response to congressional directives”). 
626 Vazquez, 130 S. Ct. at 1135. 
627 See supra notes 199-204, 508-14 and accompanying text. 
628 Sessions, supra note 12, at 335. 
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and extent of problems with the guidelines.  The political branches 
remain an influence on the Commission’s work, but they are no longer 
the only significant influence.  The relatively mild countervailing force 
of judges themselves has encouraged the Commission to perform as 
the expert body Congress intended. 
The sentencing process has also changed for the better, as judges 
are permitted to consider all relevant facts about the offense and the 
offender.  Allowing judges to consider factors and purposes of sen-
tencing that are not adequately taken into account in the guidelines 
has avoided thousands of years of unnecessary incarceration under 
guidelines that the Commission itself had found to be unjustified by 
any legitimate purpose and to have an adverse racial impact.  At the 
same time, judges have not been unduly lenient.  Indeed, they have 
responded to the increase in their discretionary authority with re-
straint and moderation.  It is hardly surprising, then, that other front-
line actors—including federal prosecutors—also support the advisory 
guidelines system.  The Commission has made incremental changes to 
the guidelines in consideration of the sentencing data and reasons it 
receives.  We expect that the current system will be stable and enduring 
as the Commission further revises broken or ill-conceived guidelines.629 
Proposals advanced by Judge Sessions and the Sentencing Com-
mission are not only unnecessary, but would substantially undo the 
balance that Booker has achieved.  Judge Sessions and the Commission 
acknowledge that judges have not been unduly lenient and that the 
guidelines continue to exert a strong gravitational pull on sentences, as 
they have since Booker.  Their claim of increased racial disparity stems 
from an unreliable study, which has been contradicted and explained 
by different studies, and the claim of a troubling increase in regional 
disparity is simply unsupported.  At the same time, Judge Sessions and 
the Commission fail to acknowledge that Booker has alleviated proven 
 
629 If, however, the Commission at some point comes under so much political  
pressure that it abandons its efforts to fix broken guidelines or even returns to the one-
way upward ratchet, the frequency of non-guideline sentencing can be expected to 
increase, for the fundamental rule of Booker and its progeny is that judges are not  
required to impose guideline sentences that fail to account for relevant sentencing 
purposes and factors. 
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forms of unwarranted disparity and that their proposals would revive 
these problems.      
Judge Sessions’s proposal to establish a system of mandatory guide-
lines would abruptly halt judicial feedback and constructive evolution 
of the guidelines, transfer sentencing power from the judge to the par-
ties, and virtually eliminate appellate review.  At the same time, there is 
no reason to think that his proposal could achieve the legislative com-
promises he predicts.  It would also invite greater variation in sentenc-
ing than exists today (under one reading) or require judicial factfinding 
in a manner that would violate the Sixth Amendment (under another 
reading).  Finally, the Sessions proposal raises serious constitutional 
issues relating to separation of powers—issues that the pre-Booker 
guidelines did not raise and that neither Mistretta nor Booker addressed.   
The Commission’s proposals to establish a highly constraining 
guidelines regime would similarly interfere with individualized sen-
tencing and constructive evolution of the guidelines.  They would also 
appear to violate the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as laid 
down in Booker and its progeny because, especially taken together, they 
would give significant weight to the guidelines and in practical effect 
would entail a presumption of unreasonableness for sentences not in 
accord with the Commission’s policies.  In the meantime, the pro-
posals would spawn years of disruptive litigation. 
We repeat:  Booker was the fix. 
